# The PCSO Review- An Evaluation of the Role, Value and Establishment of Police Community Support Officers within Cambridgeshire Constabulary



Inspector James Sutherland February 2014

## Acknowledgements:

This report was written with the assistance and contribution of the following persons:

Detective Inspector Martin Brunning (PCSOs and Investigation)

Toni Close (Public and Staff Consultation)

Sergeant Ian Wood (Partner Agency Consultation)

Sergeant Jenny Herd (Staff Consultation)

Steph Wise (Communications)

Detective Inspector Dan Middleton (PCSOs and Intelligence)

Sergeant Nick Lidstone (PCSO History)

Sergeant Nick Lidstone (PCSO History)

Dr Barack Arial- Hotspots Policing

The views and recommendations contained in this report are not directly attributable to the above persons unless otherwise indicated.

#### **Contents**

#### Part I - Overview of the PCSO Review

- 1. Introduction
- 2. Methodology
- 3. Guiding Principles

#### Part II- The Role and Value of PCSOs

- 4. Background- A brief history of PCSOs
- 5. Literature review: academic research, official reviews and media coverage of PCSOs
- 6. The practitioner's perspective
- 7. The public perspective
- 8. The partner's perspective
- 9. The managerial perspective

## Part III- Operational Issues

- 10. PCSOs and crime investigation
- 11. PCSOs and intelligence
- 12. PCSOs and incident response
- 13. PCSOs and ASB
- 14. PCSO shift pattern
- 15. PCSO specialisms
- 16. PCSO supervision
- 17. PCSO powers
- 18. PCSO training
- 19. PCSO shift pattern
- 20. PCSO deployment guidelines

## Part IV- Future options

- 21. Refined traditional model
- 22. Radical hotspot model

Conclusion

## Summary of Recommendations

## Annexes

Annex A: Telephone survey methodology

Annex B: PCSOs in the media

Annex C: Force intelligence review

Annex D: Partner agency interviews

Annex E: Home Office consultation on PCSO powers

Annex F: PCSO Deployment Guidelines (2013 revision)

February 2014 Addendum

#### 1. Introduction

The PCSO Review of which this report is the end product was initiated at the request of Chief Superintendent Hebb in February 2013 in response to a number of issues facing the Constabulary. Cambridgeshire Constabulary, along with the majority of the public sector, is facing an unprecedented requirement to make savings whilst maintaining its responsibility to keep the public safe and fight crime. Considerable effort has been made to achieve these savings through organisational restructuring (Op ReDesign), collaboration with Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire and reducing layers of management, duplication and unnecessary processes; an endeavour which is ongoing (Op Metis). Savings have been made while maintaining the front line, the establishment of constables and service delivery.

However despite these efforts further savings must be identified and it is therefore necessary to examine all areas of the constabulary to ensure that value for money is being delivered. Against this backdrop a substantial change to PCSO funding being implemented: from 2014 PCSO funding from central Government will no longer be ring-fenced. This means that for the first time since their inception, PCSOs have a financial opportunity cost for the Constabulary- their funding could conceivably be used to increase the establishment of constables or reduced in order to contribute to the required savings.

These changes to funding combined with the requirement to make savings make it a logical juncture to step back and ask fundamental questions regarding the role of PCSOs: What are they for? Are they value for money? Where should they go, what should they do and when should they do it? Finally: how many PCSOs does Cambridgeshire need?

In line with the principles of both Op ReDesign and Op Metis, the PCSO review is not a simple cost cutting exercise but an evidence based, comprehensive and objective examination of these fundamental questions with the final goal of ensuring value for money and quality of service for the people of Cambridgeshire. For this reason the review has sought to achieve a public centric approach: putting the public at the heart of the review and ensuring that their views were both understood and reflected in the final recommendations of the report. At the same time, considerable time and effort has been given to seeking the views and experiences of PCSOs themselves in order to gain a full understanding of a role which has, in some quarters at least, been misunderstood and openly denigrated.

It should be noted from the outset that Cambridgeshire Constabulary's PCSOs have engaged with this review in an open and highly professional manner, demonstrating extraordinary enthusiasm and dedication to their work. Despite the obvious anxiety that such a review would cause, both individually and collectively, PCSOs and their staff association representatives have assisted the review where ever possible and in a manner which is a credit to themselves and the Constabulary.

PCSOs have been the visible face of the Constabulary for more than a decade. They have become interwoven in the social fabric of communities, built lasting relationships with partners, elected representatives and individual members of public. It is unsurprising then that a review of this type will be of considerable interest both internally and externally. Given the possible impact of its findings for individual members of staff and the wider public it is anticipated that its findings and the evidence that supports them will be closely scrutinised. For this reason a more considerable explanation of methodology and terms of reference has been included here than would normally be the case with an internal review. Given a possible non-police professional audience and in line with the objective evidence based

nature of the review a considerable amount of supporting documentation and information has also been included (in annexes or reference form where appropriate) to allow for the findings and recommendations made here to be understood and verified.

## 2. Methodology

The methodology employed by this review is a blended approach of qualitative and quantitative techniques that can be divided into two broad sections- internal and external research.

The first phase of the external research consisted of a literature review of academic research, governmental reports and media sources concerning PCSOs.

The second phase of the external research consisted of engagement with partner-agencies. A list of partner agencies maintained by the Corporate Communications Department was used to inform partners in writing of the PCSO review and invited expressions of interest in being formally involved. All partners who responded were interviewed in person by a member of the review team with a standardised list of questions. Some partner agencies choose to submit written responses and general views on the work of PCSOs either as a result of the approach of the project or of their own volition having become aware of the existence of the review through direct contact with PCSOs. This phase of the external research created over twenty hours of documented interviews.

The third phase of the external research consisted of a public consultation on the value of PCSOs. This was, as directed by the goal of taking a public-centric approach, a massive exercise which itself consisted of two parts. Part one involved telephone survey research as part of the on-going satisfaction survey. Two questions were included as part of the survey to gauge the level of contact with PCSOs and the satisfaction with that level of contact. The first question gauges the reach of PCSOs, the second the efficacy and hence value of that reach. The survey was conducted on a statistically valid demographic sample of the population of Cambridgeshire and adhered to a rigorous methodology to ensure the credibility of the data produced. A total of 641 people were contacted as part of the telephone survey. A detailed description of the phone survey methodology comprises Annex A.

Part two consisted of a survey open to all residents of Cambridgeshire. Respondents to this survey were entirely self-selecting (save for a minority who may have been actively encouraged to participate through direct marketing of the survey by individual PCSOs.) The survey was publicised through the constabulary's website, social media outlets (Facebook, Twitter) and via e-cops to all subscribers. This approach, combined with the promotion of the survey by UNISON lead to further publicity from traditional local media- TV, radio and newspapers. Further promotion of the survey came from elected representatives who included links to the survey on local websites and email circulars. The net effect was to generate a considerable response to the survey. In total 1568 persons responded to the survey. By comparison a similar exercise concerning various aspects of the Op ReDesign project yielded approximately 80-100 responses depending on the area of the project that was highlighted. This in itself is indicative of the level of public interest in the role of the PCSO and is a likely indicator of the value to which some communities place on individual PCSOs. The open survey was based on a semi-structured free text format response to a small number of open questions. The rationale for this was to allow the public to express their views and relay their experiences of PCSOs in as open way as possible without presupposing what those views were or assuming a certain level of knowledge of PCSOs. In

short, the intent was to understand the depth of views of the people of Cambridgeshire rather than to marshal those views into a structured question format that would yield easy analysis but artificially simplistic answers. The responses to the survey were subjected to a grounded theory based 'coding' analysis to draw out recurrent 'themes' and the nature of any relationship between these themes. The combination of these two approaches resulted in a deep level of understanding of how the public view and value PCSOs and has informed the recommendations and key findings contained within this review. Further details on the public surveys are contained within the relevant chapter.

The final phase of the external research consisted of collaboration with Cambridge University to expand the pilot project- Operation Style: an examination of the hotspots metho of policing utilising PCSOs rather than constables. This phase entailed extensive data analysis and is discussed further in part IV.

The internal research consisted of the following phases. Phase one consisted of a series of workshops held with PCSOs. These workshops were themselves run in two phases. Stage one consisted of seven workshops held at locations around the force (Cambridge, Ely, Huntingdon, March, Peterborough, St Neots and Cambourne). The focus of these workshops was predominately to explain the scope of the project to staff, to answer questions and to highlight areas of concern to be considered during the course of the review. These workshops were attended by approximately 100 PCSOs. The second stage of the workshops included longer (typically two hour) sessions held with small groups (typically 6-12 although occasionally larger) to discuss various aspects of the PCSO role including core activities, supervision, deployment and various cultural issues. These workshops were again held around the force to allow for as representative selection of PCSOs as possible. Attendance at a workshop was not mandatory but they were widely supported. Workshops were held in Peterborough, Wisbech, March, Huntingdon, Cambridge, Sawston, Histon and St Neots. Given the sensitivities of the discussion and the reasonable anxieties of individual officers in expressing frank opinions in a time of financial uncertainty, these workshops were held under Chatham House Rules- opinions expressed within the workshops were noted, and have on occasion been quoted directly but without attribution to the person giving the

Phase two of the internal research consisted of one-one interviews and a small number of workshops with staff at senior management, second line manager (LPA Inspector) and first line manager (LPA Sergeant level). Again these were carried out under CHR.

Phase three of the internal research consisted of an online staff survey open to all PCSOs. This survey asked questions based on issues identified during the staff workshops and allowed for all PCSOs to go on-the-record (albeit anonymously) about these issues irrespective of whether they had attended a workshop.

The final phase of the internal research consisted of a detailed examination of certain operational areas drawing upon the professional knowledge of key subject experts to assess PCSO performance and value those operational areas under examination.

#### **Report Structure**

Having completed both the internal and external areas of research the review process examined the evidence in order to be able to answer the questions and make suitable recommendations on the key questions captured within the review's remit. The result of this process is this final report which consists of four parts.

Part one outlines the project methodology and report structure

Part two presents the evidence gathered through the internal and external phases of the review and includes recommendations for reform as well as as exploring the background to the creation and initial deployment of PCSOs including a literature review.

Part three consists of a review of specific operational issues including reviews by subject experts. Further recommendations for reform are made.

Part four draws together the evidence of the first three parts to answer the key questions of what adds value and what is the optimum number of PCSOs. Part four consists of two chapters which draw upon all of the above to present two models for the future role of PCSOs. Model one is the 'refined traditional model' which examines scenarios based on possible constabulary budgetary constraints and presents an algorithmic-formula approach based on the guiding principles (see below) and the conclusions drawn as to what adds value. This is in order to mitigate against the worst effects of any budgetary cuts and achieve in each case, the optimum distribution of PCSOs. This algorithm also allows for a consideration of the risks of each budgetary scenario. As implied by it's title, the refined traditional model seeks to maintain the current model under various budgetary scenarios through improvements in current practice and considered deployment of scare resources. The necessary recommendations for reform are made throughout the report so that they can be considered in context (the reforms are summarised however at the end of the report).

Model two is the radical hotspots model. Drawing upon the collaborated research with Cambridge University, this model seeks to expand the Op Style project across the force with considerable implications for establishment, shift patterns and the extent to which some communities experience PCSO lead local policing.

## 3. Guiding Principles

The design, research and preparation of this report has been guided by three fundamental principles. It is hoped that all the findings and recommendations contained within the report can be related back to these principles. Whilst they are not immune from contention or debate, they appear to the author to be as close to being self-evidently fair and sensible as is possible. The principles are:

- 1. Some communities need more support than others.
- 2. Scarce resources should be directed at the areas of greatest need.
- 3. All communities have a right to a certain level of PCSO involvement in local policing.

Principle (1) and (2) recognise that Cambridgeshire is a diverse county and the needs of communities are not homogenous. This means that issues will sometimes arise that require a greater level of Constabulary focus and resources in order to mitigate threat, risk and harm. These issues may be entrenched and require a long term commitment of resources.

Principle (3) recognises that all areas of the constabulary contain communities that value local policing and it's ability to tackle local issues of concern irrespective of how those issues

compare to the issues affecting other communities. No part of Cambridgeshire forgoes its right to receive a local-policing service.

It is recognised that there is the potential for tension between principles (1-2) and (3). Finding a fair accommodation for these principles is a principle aim of this report.

#### Part II

## 4. PCSOs- A Brief History

PCSOs were created by the Labour Government as part of the 2002 Police Reform Act. The creation of PCSOs (referred to in contemporary debates as CSOs) was one of two highly controversial aspects of the act, the other being 'clause five' which empowered the Home Secretary to direct Chief Constables under certain circumstances. Considerable debate took place within parliament on how these two areas of controversy may interact with concerns being raised that Chief Constables may be forced to adopt CSOs through either clause five or through pressure from the Treasury through ring-fenced funding or both. Further controversy and debate regarding CSOs (the concept itself had cross-bench support) centred on which powers they would receive, principally around powers of arrest and powers of detention, a debate that has continued to this day. The Minister for Policing, Crime Reduction and Community Safety, Mr. John Denham stated during the second reading of the bill:

"People will need to understand the powers that CSOs are exercising, and chief constables in particular will need to take account of that in deciding to employ and deploy CSOs. It is worth remembering that many of the objections to CSOs are almost identical to those made against the introduction of traffic wardens in the early 1960s. It was argued that traffic wardens would be confused with police officers and would divert attention from proper policing. No one would seriously argue that today. In the 1960s, it was radical to have people working for the police service as traffic wardens. In many parts of the country, traffic warden responsibilities are now carried out by people working for the local authority. While I would not suggest for one moment that it is the most popular service in the world, everybody recognises it as necessary for the proper implementation of the law.

It is a good thing that we are not using the time of professional police officers for duties that demonstrably can be carried out, properly according to the powers laid down by Parliament, by people who are not police officers. Those who oppose this change, and therefore oppose the leadership of the largest single police force in this country who want to use these powers, should think a little more carefully about the matter because, in a few years, people will look back on this debate and wonder what the argument was about." (Hansard 02/05/2002 column 60)

The circumstances in which Cambridgeshire Constabulary adopted PCSOs is detailed by Sgt Nick Lidstone, who has been central to the PCSO project with the force since the outset:

"The 195 PCSOs we have is entirely based on the funding we got. Successive applications resulted in money arriving in the Constabulary from central government, the Police Authority and to a lesser extent local authorities, all of which was converted into PCSOs. There was no science to the numbers just a conversion of cash to people

Similar to the above, within Cambs there was limited planning into distribution of PCSOs as they became available. Bearing in mind all 195 arrived during the 3 x BCU model – their deployment was based to some extent on where (as support staff) applicants wanted to serve, then a general decision to distribute numbers equally between the three BCUs. The only di-

rected deployment (and recruitment) was in an effort to attract applications from minority groups or those who had language skills which probably accounts for about 10% of the PCSO strength."

## 5. Literature Review- Academic research, official reviews and media coverage of PCSOs

Given the level of national funding for PCSOs, the innovative nature of their role and the level of debate within both parliament and the media regarding their value, the level of academic research into their effectiveness is surprisingly limited. A review of scholarly articles reveals that PCSOs have been almost ignored by criminologists.

A 2006 Home Office sponsored study of the impact of PCSOs reported:

"Data were collected on incidents of ASB and on low-level crimes – criminal damage, vehicle crime, violence against the person, burglary, theft and robbery; crimes that are most likely to be impacted on by visible patrol. The figures were from the control and experimental areas from 2002/03 to February/March 2005, so that trends in the levels of crime and ASB before and after the introduction of CSOs for areas where CSOs were introduced and ones where they were not could be compared. From the analysis of the recorded crime data in the case study areas it was not possible to discern any sustained differences in trends in the number of crimes between the areas with and without CSOs following their introduction." (Home Office Research Studies Paper 297, emphasis added)

A 2008 Home Office report on Activity Based Costing found that PCSOs in the majority of forces were spending the majority of their time on high visibility patrolling and acting in accordance with H.O deployment guidelines. However no consideration was given to the impact of those activities.

A 2010 academic paper summarised the state of research reporting that:

"Very little if any independent fieldwork is being done with UK "quasi-police", the most recent major studies having taken place soon after their inception in 2002" Jonathan Merritt, (2010)

The absence of academic discussion has not been mirrored within the mainstream media. PCSOs have been the subject to sustained debate over their efficacy and value for money. The conclusions of the media have been overwhelmingly negative. Editorials have consistently used the phrase "plastic police" whilst tabloid news coverage has focused on indiscretion, failings and criminality of a very small minority of officers whilst examples of good practice have been largely ignored. (Annex B contains examples of media reporting of PCSOs). Negative reporting of PCSOs reached such an extent that the often used derogatory term; 'plastic police' entered the English Dictionary where it was defined:

#### noun

1. (*informal*, *pejorative*) a collective term for several classes of public officer (including community support officers) authorized to perform certain tasks and duties in support of the police force, but having lesser powers than the police

http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/plastic-police

In 2007 an attempt by the then Labour Government to reverse this trend through promoting an ITV documentary "On the Beat" which focused on the work of PCSOs was itself highly criticised when it was revealed that the Home Office had paid the broadcaster a considerable sum of money in an alleged breach of OFCOM rules.

In summary, despite ten years having elapsed and considerable media debate there is no substantive evidence that PCSOs have a positive impact on reducing crime and ASB.

## 6. The Role and Value of PCSOs- The Practitioner's Perspective

A core objective of the PCSO workshops were to understand the role of the PCSO from the perspective of PCSOs themselves, to ensure a thorough understanding of the range of activities undertaken as well as their perspective on the activities that added the most (and least value).

The workshops were supported by an online survey of PCSOs focused on similar questions as those explored in the workshops ensuring that all members of staff were allowed an opportunity to state their views, as well as allowing for a degree of quantification and analysis not possible through workshops alone.

#### Value adding activities

PCSOs identified the following activities as adding the most value for the organisation and the public (sample comments from PCSOs are included under each activity type). Present in a majority of responses was an emphasis on achieving outcomes through partnership work.

## 1. High-visibility patrol

Being out there, being visible, by being a PCSO for a long time in the same place ,knowing your area, knowing the people. Having local knowledge gained by years of patrolling in all weathers and caring as you feel part of that community. – PCSO Huntingdonshire

I am known in the area I police by both the public and offenders. I am the contact point for the community and 50 percent of my work is created while out on patrol. This is difficult to measure. PCSO's are a visible and known policing resource. When we talk about keeping people safe in their homes it is the fact the public can see us and also speak with us that provides that reassurance – PCSO Peterborough

I have built up a rapport with my local colleges, universities, schools and nurseries and they value me going in and helping with the buddy scheme and giving safety advice. In some cases it is the first time a child of 4 or younger get to have ever spoken or had any contact with someone in a uniform apart from books. PCSO's are valuable resources as they are highly visible friendly and approachable out in their communities – PCSO Cambridge

Patrolling the beat visiting shops etc, people get to know you and are more likely to step forward and ask for advice help etc. – PCSO Fenland

#### 2. Supporting Police Officers

The most valuable tasks I do are ones such as crime enquiries, taking statements, house to house, CCTV as I see these as core business for the Force and it's what the public expect from us. Why have a PC do these tasks when I can do it cheaper! – PCSO East Cambs

Investigating crime, gathering intel, identifying suspects and assisting police constables, engaging with multi agencies, referring vulnerable individuals to the appropriate services,

high vis patrols, reassurance visits, crime prevention...taking statements, gathering evidence, managing neighbourhood disputes. – PCSO South Cambs

Being able to deal with issues that the public may have that doesn't require a police response but that a PCSO can deal with in a cost effective way. – PCSO Cambridge

## 3. Intelligence Gathering

We bridge the gap with the community and the Police. We are a crucial part in intelligence gathering and dealing with issues in the long term and liaising with partner agencies to help achieve this.- PCSO Cambridge

Provide intelligence- being the first point of contact for members of the public who see us every day walking the streets, working closely with offenders and building trust within the community. Working closely with schools and colleges- PCSO Peterborough

## 4. Engagement

PCSO's are for many people the ONLY regular contact they have with Cambridge Constabulary, whether it be contact with local Schools, SCDC, Councillors, or the Public. We provide reassurance, by high visibility patrols. I make a point of visiting victims of burglary, particularly if they are old or vulnerable, and involving the Bobby Scheme where appropriate. I visit schools and speak to youngsters from an early age (primary, pre-school) up until they are at college. Gives me an opportunity to educate them on rights/wrongs, personal safety, age of responsibility etc. Also enables me to spot potential ASB from an early age. This has a long term benefit, so that by the time the youngsters are 16+ we hopefully will not be getting the same problems we have had in the past with this age group. I personally find the Police Surgery that i do, once a month is very beneficial. Often receive Intel items, and i give security advice, have literature on the Bobby Scheme, immobilise, e-cops etc.- PCSO South Cambs

The PCSO's most valuable asset for the public AND the force is, essentially, as a Public relations person. We are the officers in the police that most people identify with. We are known by name by key persons in the community such as parish councillors, school heads, small business owners etc. Many of these people have our personal mobile numbers so they can contact us directly. This means that many issues can be sorted between us without the need for it to go through the dispatch process, thus freeing up the system for "bigger" jobs. To be perfectly honest many police officers would probably not want to be bothered with the sort of work we do. Personally, I am fully aware of my role and that I am not a police officer but believe that what I do is very valuable to the public and the force. — PCSO South Cambs


#### 5. Dealing with ASB

We provide reassurance to the community, implement crime prevention by education. School talks to education children on safety issues and educate them on what ASB is and what it can lead to if you get caught up in it. Neighbour disputes freeing up time for police officers to attend emergency calls.- PCSO South Cambs


Communicating with the public, spending time with victims of crime and ASB. Working with teenagers and schools so that children don't end up with criminal records at such an early age also keeping them out of trouble. Making teenagers aware of the affects that criminal


records have on their future also educating them on drugs malicious communication etc all common day incidents that are regularly reported by members of the public. As Pcso we have such a lot of dealing with other agencies so we are able to spend time with victims also perpetrators so that we can draw on help and support from other agencies – PCSO Huntingdonshire


As part of the staff survey PCSOs were asked to quantify the amount of time (expressed as an approximate percentage of their total work time) that they spend engaged in those activities that were identified as fundamental during the workshops: High visibility patrol, crime enquiries, responding to incidents (including ASB), formal engagement work and working with partner agencies.





The ranges of estimates of time spent in each activity are detailed in the charts below. In each chart the data point represents the mean with the verticle black line representing the range of estimates:











## Summary

Although the PCSO estimates of time spent on each activity (with the exception of incident response and formal engagement) have a considerable range within LPAs (reflecting the PCSO typology outlined below) the six LPAs are themselves remarkable consistent in the amount of time estimated to be spent on each activity. This suggests that there is considerably more uniformity of practice across the divergent areas than previously thought. The sole exception to this is East Cambs, where PCSOs spend relatively more time conducting crime enquiries than the other areas. This was explained during interviews with Fenland senior managers who have developed a model of crime investigation that relies heavily on PCSOs at an early stage.

However, it is reassuring to see that PCSOs report spending the majority of time on the area that they see as adding the most value- high visibility patrol.

## Examples of good working and best practice

Throughout the workshops PCSOs raised countless examples of individual projects that they had undertaken or incidents that they had dealt with that added value. Examples of exemplary work included setting up after-school activities for teenagers thereby reducing ASB, learning foreign languages to better engage with migrant communities, working within women's refuges with vulnerable victims thereby reducing instances of statements being withdrawn.

While these examples are anecdotal, they represent real world cases value for the public and a counterpoint to the frequently negative coverage that PCSOs receive in the media (see Annex B). As part of the staff survey PCSOs were asked to provide further examples of good work and achievements of which they are most proud. What follows below is a short series of examples:

I was asked, along with my beat partner who is also a PCSO to attend an arrest attempt in relation to the Chittering Murder. We were asked to be there to provide reassurance in the aftermath of the arrest and show a presence in the travelling community while the officers conducted their investigation. We were there from 6am through to lunchtime speaking with the community and showing a presence in the area. I was proud of this because we were recognised as having local knowledge and an existing link to the travelling community and a resource that could be utilised. Throughout our time on the site that day we spent a lot of time with the kids who were loitering around that had a lot of questions they wanted answering, and we were the people to do that. Instead of seeing tonnes of plain clothed officers and search teams, the community were able to see our faces who they knew and were familiar with. I believe that without our link on that day, the community would have been a lot more agitated than they turned out to be. – PCSO Cambridge

I was asked by a foreign force to check cctv in connection with the use of a stolen credit card. I remembered that Barclays bank was the only bank in the town to have its own cctv on its external ATM, I also checked town cctv and found the suspect and whilst checking HDC cctv, talking to the cctv operator, the operator remembered that the description of our suspect fitted a male who had been reported as using a dodgy card in Sainsburys. So from one chance of identifying the offender I managed to get some really good images of the male who it turned out had burgled a pub and stolen a handbag. — PCSO Huntingdonshire

I Completed a Police Community Support Officer Scheme at one of the local schools I cover. I worked with a group of 12 children under the age of 10. I created five individual sessions which explained to the children what a PCSO does and how we fit within the community.

This included what is the difference between a Police Officer and PCSO, what agencies we work with (fire department, local council and youth worker attended), statement taking (created a crime scene and children completed a statement each), different departments that work within the force (children had a visit from a dog handler) and the last session I completed a knowledge check with the children and the top scorer won a prize. We also had a ceremony giving each child a certificate advising that they had completed the course. This gave them an insight to our jobs, aspirations for joining the police force and helped build relations with the children. – PCSO South Cambs

## Activities adding minimal value

Unsurprisingly given the circumstances of the review, PCSOs were more reticent both in the workshops and in the survey to identify activities that added minimal or little value. A frequent response was to identify all activities as value adding. In certain workshops issues specific to an area where sometimes raised. Often however these were either short term local issues or personality related and not of general relevance.

Vehicle tasking was frequently identified as adding little value but generally accepted as necessary. NCALT learning packages were cited as being either irrelevant or repetitive. Enquiry office cover was a common source of complaint from PCSOs around the force. However this is an area which is currently under review by the Contact Management projectin light of this no recommendation regarding the short term provision of E.O cover is made and this requirement is left un-amended in the Deployment Guidelines (see below).

Some general concern was raised about 'management' issues; activities that were often unspecified but consisted of 'box ticking' exercises or meetings that frequently proved pointless.

PCSOs in Peterborough raised numerous concerns regarding the value of Op Style. In part this may be a communication issue (one that this report understands has already been addressed by local management). In any case it is the position of this review that, for reasons set out in the literature review (above) that Op Style is a highly valuable exercise in determining the value of certain (significant) areas of PCSO activity.

Examples of comments from PCSOs covering these issues are as follows:

Everything that I do as PCSO is equally important. From identifying offenders involved in robberies by looking at CCTV to providing reassurance to victims of crime or paroling local schools at drop off time, it is all equally important. – PCSO Peterborough

Parking tickets for double yellow lines and timed bays, I believe we should have the power to deal with obstruction and inconsiderate parking but the others simply alienate the community we are trying to build bridges with. Enquiry office cover. It adds no value to my community and is time I could spend elsewhere. – PCSO East Cambs

Being constrained to the station unnecessarily, by this I mean completing ASB call backs that have no impact on satisfaction and providing a weekly update which again is time better spent out in the public. Also covering the enquiry office where by suitably trained staff are not on should be a temporary solution, not a permanent which is what seems to have happened at this station.- PCSO Huntingdonshire

A further repeated complaint was being dispatched to incidents by the Incident Review Team that had been reported several hours earlier and for which there was no meaningful activity to conduct. This is explored further in the section 'PCSOs and Incident Response, below.

Recommendation: The Learning and Development Department audit the learning requirements of PCSOs in relation to NCALT packages.

Recommendation: The Contact Management Collaboration Project considers the long-term involvement and value of deploying PCSOs in E.O cover.

## Evolution of the Role of PCSOs

The PCSO workshops, supported by the staff survey and interviews with Local Policing Inspectors and Sergeants revealed how the role of PCSO has developed far beyond its original intention. In 2002 one LP Inspector who was then responsible for Neighbourhood Policing reported that

"We were given these staff and had literally no idea what we were supposed to do with them"

This view was supported by PCSOs during the workshops: officers of ten years service reported numerous instances of total confusion and ignorance on the part of constables, sergeants and the public as to what they were supposed to be doing and what legal powers they had. "So what can you actually do?" was a question frequently asked of the original intake of PCSOs. PCSO deployment was limited primarily to high visibility patrolling in an approach that would be best described as cautious.

In the decade since their introduction the role of PCSO has evolved considerably with officers taking on far greater responsibility and undertaking a range of policing activities. These activities vary from area to area- some are bespoke to individuals, others the result of local initiatives.

Underpinning this evolution of the role is the fact that the organisation has learned how to manage and deploy PCSOs in order to meet organisational goals and pressures. The exact nature of work undertaken varies dependent upon the individual officer, the priorities of the area and the approach taken by first and second line supervisors. However five broad PCSO 'types' have been identified through the workshops and interviews with supervisors. The types are:

## 1. The Traditionalist

The traditionalist focuses as closely as possible on the PCSO role as originally intended by parliament. High visibility patrol on foot and cycle is emphasised. The traditionalist attempts to minimise deployments that take them away from being visible on their beat. Traditionalists are motivated by consistent contact with individual community members and groups and are likely to be well known and recognised by the community as a whole. They tend to be longer in service.

## 2. The Auxiliary Police Officer

The Auxiliary focuses on those areas of work that most closely resemble the work undertaken by constables. They are most keen to respond to incidents even where these are not within their geographic area or within the deployment guidelines. The auxiliary investigates crime and is confident in crime recording and statement taking. The auxiliary tends to be younger in service with an intention of applying to be a constable. The auxiliary may be particularly valued by some sergeants due to their contribution to measurable targets.

## 3. The Specialist

The specialist takes two broad types- the first type is in a specific role designed by the constabulary to take on certain responsibilities or thematic areas. An example of this is the Safer Schools initiative or Rural Crime. The second type is a PCSO who formally is in the same role as their colleague but due to developed expertise, skills or experience works in a specific area or carries out thematic responsibilities as well as having a geographic responsibility. An example of the second type would be a PCSO who speaks multiple languages carrying out engagement work with certain communities.

## 4. The Community Organiser

The community organiser excels at partnership working and is comfortable arranging and co-ordinating working groups, liaising with stakeholders and producing action plans. They are keen to take a leading role in setting up and running community events and are highly innovative and capable of considerable independent working. The organiser is comfortable with using social media to communicate to their community.

## 5. The Empty Suit

The empty suit is an officer who is performing none of the above roles. Through exploiting a lack of easily quantifiable outputs and difficulties in supervision the empty suit fails to engage with the public, spends excessive amounts of time in the station and rarely takes a pro-active approach. Identified primarily by first line supervisors but whose existence was supported by PCSO workshops where officers frequently agreed that they knew of colleagues who fell into this category (unsurprisingly nobody self-identified in this category).

In practice all PCSOs combine elements of the first four types with only a small minority falling into the fifth type. The extent to which of the types adds the most value will be addressed throughout the review.


## 7. The Role and Value of the PCSO- The Public Perspective: Stage 1

It was recognised at the outset of the review that the public were likely to have strong views on PCSO deployment based on first-hand experience and that given this a public centred approach to assessing the value of PCSOs was critical. As detailed in the methodology section of this report, the public were consulted in two stages. In the first stage 626 residents of Cambridgeshire were contacted by telephone during May and June, to gather data for the local engagement/confidence survey (PiC). These people were also asked questions about their experiences with PCSOs in their area. Tables showing the sample by age and gender are below, as well as figures by SNT and a map of respondents by postcode.

Age		
16 to 24	16	3%
25 to 34	42	7%
35 to 44	129	21%
45 to 54	144	23%
55 to 64	90	14%
65 to 74	86	14%
75 or above	72	12%
not known	47	8%
Total	626	100%

Gender		
Female	341	54%
Male	285	46%
Total	626	100%

## Map detailing post-code locations of PIC survey respondents.



District	SNT	Total	
<b>Cambridge City</b>	City Centre		8
	East City		28
	North City		28
	South City		20
	West City		21
Cambridge City To	otal		105
<b>East Cambs</b>	Ely City		24
	Littleport and West		32
	Soham and South		44
<b>East Cambs Total</b>			100
	March and		
Fenland	Chatteris		45
	Whittlesey		18
	Wisbech		41
Fenland Total			104
	Huntingdon and		
Huntingdonshire	Yaxley St Ives and		42
	Ramsey		36
	St Neots		30
Huntingdonshire			108
Peterborough	Eastern		28
reterborough	Northern		47
	Southern		31
	Wisbech		1
Peterborough Tot			107
South Cambs	Cambourne		52
Journ Callins	Histon		20
	Sawston		30
Courth Combo Total			
South Cambs Total			102
Grand Total			626

Respondents were broadly split as to whether they had had contact with their local PCSO. Across the entire force, marginally more said that they had not had any contact with their local PCSO over the last 12 months. This is particularly pronounced in South Cambs where 73% of the respondents from that area said that they had not seen or spoken to a PCSO in the last 12 months. See below.

Have you seen or spoken to a local PCSO in the last 12 months? \*

	С	В	Е	С	F	N	Н	N	Р	B	S	C	Tot	als
Yes	49	47 %	45	45 %	46	44 %	54	50 %	49	46%	23	23 %	266	<b>42</b> %
No	43	41 %	52	52 %	57	55 %	53	49 %	56	52%	74	73 %	335	54 %
Don't know	13	12 %	3	3%	1	1%	1	1%	2	2%	5	5%	25	4%
Totals	105	100 %	100	100 %	104	100 %	108	100 %	107	100 %	10 2	100 %	626	100 %

<sup>\*(</sup>includes email and phone calls)

Respondents indicated that you were most likely to see a PCSO walking around your area if you lived in Peterborough district or Cambridge City. You would be most likely to have a social conversation with a PCSO if you lived in East Cambs; and were most likely to have had contact with a PCSO regarding a problem or issue if you lived in Huntingdonshire. See below.

Please note that numbers for each district will not add up to the number of respondents for that district because it was possible to choose more than one option if respondents had experienced more than one type of contact.

Seen a PCSO walking around in your area?

South		Huntingdon		East	Cambridge	
Cambs	P'boro	shire	Fenland	Cambs	City	Totals
			17	16		22 100
18 8%	49 22%	37 17%	37 %	36 %	44 20%	1 %

Chatted to a local PCSO socially? (includes saying hello, 'small talk', making conversation)

Sout	h			Huntir	ngdon			Eas	st	Camb	ridge		
Camb	os	P'boro		shi	re	Fenla	ind	Cam	bs	Ci	ty	Tot	als
	10						12		28				100
5	%	7	14%	12	24%	6	%	14	%	6	12%	50	%

Spoken regarding any issues? (includes reporting, seeking their advice, visits, investigations, etc)

Sout Caml		P'b	oro	Huntir sh		Fenla	and	Ea: Carr			oridge ity	Tot	tals
4	11 %	4	11%	13	35%	4	11 %	7	19 %	5	14%	37	100 %

Seen your local PCSO because of the job you do? (eg teachers, council workers etc)

South		Huntingdon		East	Cambridge	
Cambs	P'boro	shire	Fenland	Cambs	City	Totals
18			27	27		100
2 %	0 0%	2 18%	3 %	3 %	1 9%	11 %

Had some other contact with them

South Cambs	P'boro	Huntingdon shire	Fenland	East Cambs	Cambridge City	Totals
21			29			100
3 %	0 0%	4 29%	4 %	1 7%	2 14%	14 %

Across the entire force area, 64% of the respondents said they were happy with whatever level of contact they had experienced. At district level, Peterborough and East Cambs showed a particularly high percentage of respondents feeling happy with their contact, while distinctly fewer felt that way in South Cambs. See below.

		Are	you happ	y with t	his level	of cont	act?	
					D	on't		
	Ye	S	No	)	kno	W	Totals	
Peterborough	80	76%	24	23%	1	1%	105	100%
East Cambs	70	72%	19	20%	8	8%	97	100%
Cambridge City	65	71%	23	25%	4	4%	92	100%
Huntingdonshire	63	59%	35	33%	9	8%	107	100%
Fenland	60	58%	41	40%	2	2%	103	100%
South Cambs	48	49%	37	38%	12	12%	97	100%
Totals	386	64%	179	30%	36	6%	601	100%

<sup>\*</sup>those who said that they did not know if they had had contact with their local PCSO were not asked this question


Across the entire force area, the large majority of those who had said that they had had contact with a PCSO said that they were happy with the level of contact they had experienced.

335 people said that they had NOT seen a PCSO in the last 12 months. Around half of these (168) said that they were nevertheless happy with this lack of contact. This group of 168 represents around 28% of the total (601).

In general, the experience of a service increased feelings of satisfaction, while the lack of an experience did not always decrease feelings of satisfaction. See below.

Are you happy	Have you	seen or spe	Have you seen or spoken to a local PCSO in the last 12 months?										
with this level of contact?	Ye	es	N	0	Totals								
Yes	218	82%	168	50%	386	64%							
No	42	16%	137	41%	179	30%							
Don't know	6	2%	30	9%	36	6%							
Totals	266	100%	335	100%	601	100%							

In addition, the graph below shows that unhappiness (with or without contact) increases slightly with age of respondent.



Around 5% of the total sample (29 of 601) appear to be making a connection between whether Cambridgeshire Constabulary are dealing with the things that matter AND the experience of satisfactory contact.

Cambridgeshire Police are		Are	you hap	py with t	his level	of conta	ct?		
dealing with the things that matter to people in my community	Yes		N	0	Don't	know	Totals		
Agree	296	77%	100	56%	23	64%	419	70%	
Neither	40	10%	34	19%	4	11%	78	13%	
Disagree	7	2%	29	16%	2	6%	38	6%	
Don't know	43	11%	16	9%	7	19%	66	11%	
Totals	386	100%	179	100%	36	100%	601	100%	

17% of the total sample (100 of 601) believes that Cambridgeshire Constabulary are dealing with the issues that matter BUT they are still unhappy with the extent of the contact they have experienced with their local PCSO. A brief review of the verbatim comments from this particular group reveals a repeating theme: that it "would be nice" to have more contact.

Breaking down the group by District (see below) reveals that over a third of the respondents in South Cambs fall into this category.

	No. unhappy with contact AND agree that Cambs are dealing	No. who agree that Cambs are dealing (and provided an answer to contact question)	% of those in that district who agree that Cambs are dealing, but who are still unhappy with level of contact
SC	24	69	35%
HN	26	94	28%
FN	15	63	24%
PB	15	70	21%
СВ	12	62	19%
EC	8	61	13%
Totals	100	419	24%

Finally, a chi-square analysis of the data suggests that there is a *relationship* (but not necessarily a causal one) between satisfaction with how the Cambridgeshire Constabulary is dealing with local issues and satisfaction with the level of contact that the individual has had with their local PCSO (irrespective of what level of contact that was):

"Cambridgeshire Police are dealing with the things that matter to people in my community"

	Dealing	Not dealing
Observed	with	with
Happy with contact	296	7
Not happy with con-		
tact	100	29

Expected	Dealing with	Not dealing with
Happy with contact	277.8	25.3
Not happy with con-	4400	40.0
tact	118.3	10.8

x squared =	48.189	p= 0.000
-------------	--------	----------

The effect size was found to be 0.3 (on a range of possible scores of 0-1 where zero indicates no effect). 0.3 is assessed to indicate a medium association.

## Summary of findings

It should firstly be noted that the reach of PCSOs (evidenced by the number of people to have contact with a PCSO over the last twelve months) is impressive and arguably surprising given the geographic size of the county and the number of PCSOs relative to the population. This suggests that any sizeable fall in PCSO numbers will be noticed by the public in terms of visibility. This also validates PCSOs assessment that they spend the majority of their time on high visibility patrol or otherwise engaging directly with the public.

Secondly it should be noted that relatively high or low levels of recorded crime do not appear to influence the satisfaction that the public has with the level of contact with PCSOs. For example, South Cambs which has a historically low level of recorded crime and ASB still has a low level of satisfaction with the level of contact with PCSOs. This supports the third fundamental principle outlined at the beginning of this report- that some level of PCSOs provision is required in all areas of the county irrespective of the actual levels of crime.


Thirdly that there appears to be a relationship between actual contact with PCSOs and satisfaction with the level of contact- in other words satisfaction rises with greater levels of contact. If satisfaction with PCSO contact is also linked to satisfaction with the force as a whole (this is not yet established with certainty) then any sizeable reduction in PCSO numbers could have a considerable negative impact on overall public satisfaction with the constabulary.

## 7. The Role and Value of the PCSO- The Public Perspective: Stage 2

In the second stage of the public consultation an online survey was launched that allowed any interested person to relay their experiences or views on PCSOs by answering three free-text questions:

- 1. Tell us about any benefits that you believe result from using PCSOs in local policing work
- 2. Do you have a specific positive experience you would like to share about the work of a PCSO in your area?
- 3. Tell us about any concerns you have regarding PCSOs in local policing work.

The survey generated considerable interest and resulted in 1568 responses from across the county, as evidenced by the map below which shows the location of respondents based on the post-code they provided whilst taking the survey:



The intention of the survey was to allow the public to express their views on PCSOs in as un-restrictive manner as possible. The responses that were given to the questions were then examined for recurrent 'themes' (see methodology, above).


Considerable caution must be given towards generalising or placing undue weight to certain answers for the following reasons. Firstly, the public of Cambridgeshire do not think any single way about PCSOs (or policing as a whole). Secondly, this survey allowed respondents to self-select and so would inevitably involve a higher proportion of persons 'engaged' with the constabulary then would be representative of the public as a whole. The survey was also only available online and only written in English due to both time and budgetary constraints and so would be unavailable to some individuals or communities. However, despite these limitations the sheer volume of responses to the survey allowed for some consistent themes to be identified that along with the first stage of the public

consultation allows for a reasonable picture of public opinion to be generated. These recurrent themes, illustrated by actual quotes from the survey, are discussed below.

## 1. Broad support for the concept of PCSOs

Each response was assessed to see if the respondent was, on balance, broadly in favour or not in favour of the concept of PCSOs. Where no discernable views either for or against or where the views of the respondent appeared balanced they were assessed as being neutral.

## Support for PCSOs



Comments from respondents broadly supportive included:

They are the vital link between our community and the Police service and should provide the face of Policing when Officers are elsewhere. I realise that the old Beat Officer or Village Bobby has long gone but our PSCO is a vital resource and should be kept and rewarded

PCSOs provide a link between the public and the police station, giving people the chance to ask questions about local issues informally. The evening meetings are accessible to everyone.

They are vital cover for the more local issues that other branches of the police have no time for. The PCSO'S are also a great source of local info for both ourselves and the other parts of the force.

Comments from respondents broadly opposed included:

They are really no more than villagers in uniform who report back after "sniffing" out local information --- Cheap???? Labour.

I feel that PCSO's are a complete waste of time and resource. Even when they do manage to detain a criminal they have to call a "proper" PC to make an arrest. ecops it seems is a list of lunch breaks and days off linked with occasional crime.

They are obviously the 'cheaper' alternatives who have absolutely no power at all!! Doesn't give me much confidence.

Despite the large majority of respondents who were supportive of PCSOs their views were not uniform: while some explicitly expressed support for the idea of PCSOs, the support of others appeared to be based on support for highly visible policing- which could be delivered by a constable, rather than for the PCSOs themselves.

Encouragingly even those who were vehemently against the idea of PCSOs rarely used the derogatory term 'plastic police' suggesting a limit on the influence of some portions of the media who have promoted this phrase for a number of years.

The survey also allowed for the public to express satisfaction or dissatisfaction on actual PCSO performance irrespective of their views on the concept of PCSOs.

Approximately 30% of responders gave answers that indicated they were satisfied with the actual performance of PCSOs. 12% indicated dissatisfaction. Satisfaction could be found amongst those who both supported and opposed the actual concept of PCSOs. The key issue for those who were satisfied and unsatisfied was visibility- dissatisfied respondents frequently cited a lack of visibility while satisfied respondents highlighted the reverse. Other key factors influencing satisfaction was the approachability/friendliness of PCSOs, engagement by PCSOs with community groups and personal contact (overwhelmingly interactions with PCSOs were viewed favourably although a very small number of respondents relayed often highly critical accounts of individual PCSOs.)

#### 2. Saving Money

There was a wide-spread view that PCSOs were valuable in saving the constabulary money by allowing PCSOs to take on tasks that freed warranted officers to carry out other functions. A more sceptical view recognised that PCSOs saved money but interpreted this as an entirely negative development- 'policing on the cheap' was a much repeated term.

Are good at building up relationships within the community that PCs used to do but due to cuts are not seen in the community any more!

Probably a cheaper way of providing security and helping solving crime. Sooner have proper policing methods and less cutting of police numbers.

Extra support for police officers, able to deal with smaller issues.

Frees police to do other tasks for which only they have been trained

#### 3. PCSO Powers

A view that was frequently shared by respondents irrespective of their levels of support or satisfaction was that PCSOs lacked the range of powers necessary to make them effective. From a positive perspective some respondents saw the work of PCSOs and believed that even more could be gained from them. From a negative perspective some respondents be-

lieved that PCSOs were so restricted by their powers that they would be operationally ineffective. Respondents who held the negative view also frequently raised concerns regarding the training or professional competence of PCSOs. Some respondents who were satisfied and supportive worried that an absence of powers or training would place PCSOs in jeopardy or ridicule by youths. Exactly what powers PCSOs were felt to be lacking in or concrete examples of where these would be required were not detailed. This brings into question the extent to which the public have bought into the concept of the PCSO as defined by a limitation of powers envisioned by parliament as evidenced during debates in the readings of the Police Reform Act.

## 4. Local Knowledge

Those supporting and satisfied with PCSOs often highlighted the local knowledge of issues and concerns that PCSOs demonstrated. Respondents in this group appeared to be relaying first hand experiences of speaking to PCSOs, providing further evidence of the 'reach' of PCSOs into communities and the satisfaction that generates. Continuity was clearly a concern for this group and many respondents mentioned PCSOs by name.

## 5. Deters Crime/Highly Visible.

Visibility appeared to be a key factor for most respondents irrespective of whether they supported or opposed the concept of PCSOs. This was by far the most repeated positive comment. Irrespective of the current lack of evidence for the impact of PCSOs in crime reduction, a large number of respondents cited this as a reason for supporting the concept of PCSOs. Two of the most frequently cited words in the survey where 'presence' and 'reassurance'. (The word 'presence' occurred 401 times in the survey. 'Reassurance' occurred 51 times).

## 6. Friendly and Approachable/Works with Youth

A frequent positive comment regarding PCSOs was how friendly they were, often in contrast to police officers. Several respondents suggested that they were more likely to talk to PCSOs because of this and that they were more empathetic than their police officer colleagues. A large number of respondents relayed examples of PCSOs working effectively with youth through schools and community events.

#### 7. Engages with Groups.

It was apparent from the survey that large numbers of respondents came into contact with PCSOs through Neighbourhood Watch, Parish Council meetings or other formal events. Comments regarding this area of work were almost universally positive. The only negative element was the desire expressed by some respondents for *more* work of this type

#### Summary of findings

The limitations of this survey notwithstanding, it is possible to make some general conclusions on the public views of PCSOs. Firstly, there is broad support and satisfaction with the concept and performance of PCSOs. The public value the approachability and friendliness of PCSOs and are ready to accept the notion that PCSOs may be deployed to save money. Continuity of service is important but overwhelmingly the public place value in the activity that is most valued by the PCSOs themselves; high visibility patrol.

## 8. The Role and Value of the PCSO- The Partners Perspective

Given the extent of PCSO partnership working with other agencies, community groups and elected representatives it was determined at an early stage of the review to formally invite representatives of these groups to go on-the-record with their views and experiences of working with PCSOs. A large number of these groups were contacted by letter. A further number of individuals from such groups who heard about the review via their PCSO connections got in contact with the review team. All respondents to the letter and all parties who pro-actively contacted the review team (during the period of the project where partner's perspectives were being considered) were invited to be interviewed in person by a member of the review team. Some partners responded during the public consultation phase and were not able to be formally interviewed due to the time-scales of the review

Between Monday 15<sup>th</sup> July and Wednesday 24<sup>th</sup> July 2013, Sgt Ian Wood approached nine such external partner agencies across Cambridgeshire. The individuals who then agreed to be interviewed follows;

- Kevin James Community Fire Safety Arson Reduction Officer (Huntingdonshire & Fenland District Council)
- Gemma Wood ASB Manager (Cross Key Homes, Peterborough)
- Graham Mountford City Centre Coordinator: Commercial Operations (Peterborough City Council)
- Ruth Mann Neighbourhood Manager (Wherry Housing Association)
- Sarah Steggles, Danae Evans, Louise Walbank & Tulat Raja Safer Communities Section (Cambridge City Council)
- Polly Wilderspin Neighbourhood Watch Co-ordinator for Cambridgeshire
- Adele Dant Housing Officer (CHS group)
- Councillors Michael & Virginia Buckner UKIP Town Councillors (Fenland District & Wisbech - Waterlees Ward)
- Allison Sunley Targetted & Preventative Services Manager (Peterborough)

A bespoke question-set was devised to capture the Partner Agents current views on the PCSO role – including attitudes towards their general feedback and experiences of the PCSO role, PCSO deployment, range of lawful powers, modes of transport and uniform. The question-set was also devised to identify opportunities to stream-line PCSO deployment and overall business function.

## The question set was:

- 1. What has your experience been of Police Community Support Officers (PCSO)? Have you noticed any difference from County to County?
- 2. How frequently do you interact with PCSO's in your current role?
- 3. How frequently have you interacted with PCSO's whilst away from your current role (e.g. whilst at home in a social setting)?
- 4. Has the frequency of your contact with PCSO's increased, decreased or remained the same since the role was introduced? Are there any reasons for this?
- 5. Do you think PCSO's add value to Policing? Please explain.
- 6. Do you think there should be more or less PCSO's in Cambridgeshire? Please explain.
- 7. Do you prefer to see PCSO's patrolling on foot, on bike or in marked Police vehicles? Please explain your answer.
- 8. Are you able to differentiate between a PCSO and a Police Officer from a distance?
- 9. Prior to this meeting, were you aware of the range of powers that a PCSO has at their disposal?

- 10. Do you feel that your local PCSO's confidently make best use of their powers? Please explain your answer.
- 11. Do you find PCSO's more approachable than Police Officers?
- 12. Do you think PCSO's provide Reassurance to the Community when out on patrol?
- 13. What is the sole most useful function of a PCSO? Why?
- 14. What is the sole least-useful function of a PCSO? Why?
- 15. What could Cambridgeshire Constabulary do to make best use of PCSO deployments?
- 16. In your opinion, what could Cambridgeshire Constabulary as a whole do to stream-line its business functions?

With the exception of Gemma Wood (who elected to provide emailed feedback instead), Partner Agents were interviewed in person by Sgt Wood<sup>1</sup>. Interviews lasted on average between an hour and two hours each – with Meeting Notes recorded and typed-up afterwards. Although the Review Meetings could easily have been conducted by telephone or email, the general feedback from the Partner Agents was that having a physical Representative of the Organisation present was extremely beneficial. The full record of these interviews is contained in Annex D. A summary of key findings is a follows:

- Of the Partner Agents surveyed, most of them have had little or no dealings whatsoever with PCSO's outside of Cambridgeshire – it is therefore difficult to draw any meaningful comparisons to our Peers.
- Previous experiences of PCSO Staff in Cambridgeshire has been extremely good; they
  are clearly held in high regard across the County and are recognised as being integral to
  supporting frontline policing.
- Most Partner Agents interviewed agreed that PCSO's core role and function is to be the approachable, public face of the Police. They are often tasked to conduct longterm/complex local issues and are heavily involved in inter-Agency signposting work.
- Since the introduction of the PCSO role, most Partner Agents commented that they had seen an increase in their interaction with their local PCSO's. However, it was clear that where PCSO numbers had perhaps reduced in some geographical areas – some Partner Agents commented that their contact had also reduced.
- All Partner Agents agreed that PCSO's added value to Policing and were keen to see more PCSO's deployed. However, a lot of our Partner Agents had realistic expectations behind this – and concurred that future deployments should be problem-focussed and targeted.
- There was an overwhelming response that PCSO's should not patrol in marked Police vehicles – unless they covered a large geographical area. All Partner Agents commented that they would prefer to see PCSO's on foot or cycle patrol, as they are largely more accessible.
- The majority of Partner Agents interviewed stated that they would be able to differentiate between a PCSO and a Police Officer (and furthermore a Special Constable) predomi-

nantly on account of the blue detail to their uniform. A couple of Partner Agents stated that they would not be able to differentiate and nor would members of the public.

- Most Partner Agents were not aware of the full range of Cambridgeshire PCSO powers.
  They have all been emailed the list of statutory powers. Partner Agents interviewed
  stated that they welcomed the Chief Constables decision to grant them Traffic Warden
  status and full statutory powers but questioned whether the PCSO's themselves were
  confident in their abilities sometimes.
- Most Partner Agents acknowledged that there was probably very little difference in the 'approachability' of a Police Officer and a PCSO. A common theme was that Police Officers in the main did not provide a very visible presence and that PCSO's were employed well to address this. Most Partner Agents interviewed stated that they could differentiate when they should request the assistance of a Police Officer or a PCSO. Comments made also reflected the fact that PCSO's were very helpful and proactive in taking ownership of local issues and knew when to sign-post to other Agencies or Officers when appropriate.
- Partner Agents interviewed all confirmed that PCSO's continue to provide a reassuring
  presence for the Community. Their evident local knowledge and intrinsic motivation for
  their role was repeatedly quoted. PCSO's were identified as being useful for community
  intelligence gathering purposes, and for building rapport with local residents.
- In terms of the current functions of Cambridgeshire PCSO's, all Partner Agents interviewed acknowledged that any significant change in their role or remit would require a change in statute. Most Partner Agents were against PCSO's carrying handcuffs (as is being currently trialled in some of the larger Forces at present), as it would provide a visible deterrent to approach them. However, PCSO's were identified as being the consistent 'visible presence' which our Partner Agents strived for so much so, there was a lot of questions about whether PCSO shift-patterns could be aligned to regular office-hours, and whether contact management could be improved so they knew who was available to deal with immediate but non-urgent issues.
- Partner Agents interviewed all concurred that Cambridgeshire Constabulary were seemingly making the best use of the current PCSO powers. Most Agents were very complimentary about the work done by our PCSO's and there were some excellent case examples quoted, where relevant praise has been forwarded onto the local District Management Teams.
- When asked about how Cambridgeshire PCSO deployments could be maximised, most Partner Agents interviewed concurred that intelligence-led, ASB-focussed deployments should be adopted. Sgt Wood explained the support provided by the Force Intelligence Bureau, the Crime Analysts and Daily Management Meeting Structure to emphasise that this was already in place. Further explanation about how Anti Social Behaviour was managed within the Organisation was also explained which seemed to elicit a positive response too. To help cement this understanding, Sgt Wood circulated several 'Operation Insight' application forms to Partner Agents as the theme of '...misunderstanding each other's respective roles' was often repeated. Partner Agents were extremely receptive to this idea, and local District management have been consulted about how to facilitate this.

- All Partner Agents interviewed recognised that in the austere climate the level of service delivery had remained fairly constant. Some of the more Rural Areas (Wisbech and Swavesey) expressed concern about the lack of visible presence – which was addressed by Sgt Wood to the respective District Management.
- In terms of how Cambridgeshire Constabulary could stream-line its operations, the themes of 'improving contact management' and improving the mutual understanding of each other's roles was frequently alluded to. There was a suggestion that Joint-training with Partner Agents could be considered, and an improvement to technology was equally a strong theme. Sgt Wood briefly explained how Programme Metis was being rolled out, and most Partner Agents were impressed by the fact that all facets of the Organisation were being reviewed on an ongoing basis.
- All Partner Agents had a keen invested interest into the PCSO Review project and requested to be kept updated as to our progress. Comments received stated that the external consultation period was highly beneficial to ensure that an informed County-wide perspective was taken into consideration. There were repeated suggestions that this approach should continue to be adopted for future reviews of the Organisations core business functions.
- Cambridgeshire PCSO's are professional, helpful, proactive and approachable. They
  are well-trained and aware of their role and remit. They are often the visible presence of
  Cambridgeshire Constabulary, and are both consistent and detailed in their ownership of
  local issues.
- Cambridgeshire PCSO's work well with our external Partner Agencies and have clearly built up strong links in the Community. They are vital assets for intelligence gathering, and managing local issues that do not necessitate the involvement of a Police Officer.
- Involving external Partner Agents in the consultation process has helped to promote
  working relations even further. There have been some core themes and observations
  made which evidences the fact that we are consistent in our Service delivery across the
  County.
- PCSO's and the Line Managers are targeting the right people and the right places at the
  right times. Once the back-office functions of Crime Analysts and the Force Intelligence
  Bureau had been explained, Partner Agents felt more empowered in the knowledge that
  we took an intelligence-led approach to Policing.
- To some Partner Agents, the distinction between a Police Officer and a PCSO cannot be made at a distance. However, they were all confident in their ability to differentiate when a PCSO would be more suitable than a Police Officer to help them.
- All Partner Agents acknowledged that Cambridgeshire Constabulary have done well to manage the imposed financial constraints and yet deliver the same level of service.
- In the more rural areas of the County, Partner Agents were concerned about the lack of visible Police presence. Some had noticed a significant reduction in the number of PCSO's in the preceding twelve months, and were concerned about how this would impact on their local communities. Comments were made that a further strategic review of Officer deployments county-wide would probably address this.

- All Partner Agents commented that PCSO's should not patrol in a marked Police vehicle, unless they had to cover a large geographical area – as it made them less approachable and accessible to the public.
- Most Partner Agents were in agreement that the Police Service should reflect the demographic population that they serve. Agents from the Wisbech, Cambridge and Peterborough areas all stated that recruitment of Officers from a variety of ethnic and cultural backgrounds would help facilitate communication.
- Ensure that ongoing training and support is provided to all PCSO's force-wide, to ensure that they are confidently making best use of their statutory powers – and can ask for prompt assistance whenever required.
- Most Partner Agents were against PCSO's being used for Control and Restraint situations, as it would be detrimental to the public perception of their role. Most Agents concluded that there was a clear distinction between a Police Officer and a PCSO – and that the boundaries should not be blurred.

## 9. The Role and Value of the PCSO- The Managerial Perspective

During the internal phase of the review the opinions of a number of local policing Inspectors and area commanders were sought on a wide range of issues. Local Policing Inspectors were selected as they had direct experience of managing operational issues relating to PCSOs. Area commanders were consulted given their strategic perspective of the same issues.

Much like the public and partner agencies there is no total uniformity of opinion on any given subject; however a broad consensus was reached in the following areas.

### 1. Emphasis on the core PCSO role

Most Inspectors and Commanders put a high value on the traditional aspects of the PCSO role particularly 'community engagement' which was seen as having a strong bearing on public satisfaction. There was a concern raised in some quarters of 'mission-creep' and the move towards PCSOs as auxiliary police officers. The value of PCSOs in promoting community cohesion through their work was also highlighted.

## 2. Support for the concept of PCSOs

The concept of PCSOs enjoyed unanimous (if not always unqualified) support from all parties interviewed. The notion that PCSOs could be 'gotten rid of' was not seriously entertained by any interviewee. In a hypothetical scenario some managers stated that they would take an increase in the PCSO establishment over a similarly budgeted increase in PC establishment due to the tendency of PCSOs to remain in an area for a long period of time with minimal abstractions. A general view was that PCSOs could be used more effectively although this was always a view that was based on the perceived operation of PCSOs in other policing commands rather than the LPC of the interviewee.

### 3. Mitigation of current falls in numbers

Due to the recruitment freeze all interviewees were dealing with a fall in staff numbers and were working on solutions to mitigate the impact of this reduction in their areas of business. This included re-structuring teams to include joint responsibility of large areas that were formally sub-divided amongst individual PCSOs. None of the interviewees expressed a view

that their current level of staff had were clearly being experienced.	d fallen to a dangerous	s or critical level,	however difficulties

#### 4. Evolution of the role

There was broad support for the evolution of the role of PCSOs, their involvement in crime investigation and above all for the movement of PCSOs into specialist positions. The value of the safer schools initiative was frequently highlighted.

#### 5. PCSO Powers

Whilst some anomalies in PCSOs powers were raised, there was no great feeling that PCSOs were unduly constrained or operationally ineffective due to their limited powers.

#### 6. Concerns

Considerable concerns were raised regarding possible future numbers of PCSOs and the negative impact on visibility and public confidence if number fell too far. A frequently expressed view was that any considerable reduction to PCSO establishment would have to be accompanied by a considerable re-drawing of their role. Crucially it was felt that this would have to be communicated directly to the public from the senior leaders of the organisation, providing 'top cover' for front line middle managers who would be likely to face a significant backlash from the public.

## 7. Sergeant's Perspective

Sergeants involved directly in the supervision and of PCSOs were from the outset of the review the most vocal party in advocating for the value that PCSOs generate. Both at the request of the review and of their own volition, a number of sergeants sought to stress how intrinsic PCSOs are to the delivery of local policing. Sergeants did confirm difficulties with supervision (see 'PCSO supervision', below) and all had specific performance issues with *individual* PCSOs. However, the review was left in no doubt whatsoever of the value which sergeants place in PCSOs ability to deliver front line policing objectives. It is notable that no sergeant wished to express any notable cynicism or lack of support for the concept of the PCSO either on or off the record.

## Part III - PCSOs and Operational Issues

### 10. PCSOs and Crime Investigation- D.I Martin Brunning

### **CONTEXT**

This report summarises workshop research conducted with the PCSO community of Cambridgeshire Constabulary, coupled with data mined from individual CrimeFile investigations where crime has been allocated to, or updated by, a PCSO with a collar number commencing with 7.

The objectives of this report are to:

- 1. Identify the extent of tasking and activity of PCSO's in recorded crime investigations;
- 2. Comment on the value of PCSO activity within recorded crime investigations;
- Consider alternative methodologies to the delivery of core crime management elements currently conducted by PCSO's;
- 4. Evaluate the operational effectiveness of PCSO's in crime investigations;

#### **METHODOLOGY**

Representatives of the PCSO community have attended a number of workshops across the force. The purpose of these workshops, held by the Review Team, was to understand the demands upon them and to invite them to contribute to thinking that might enhance visibility, deliver more for less and overall, provide greater visibility and operational effectiveness to the public of Cambridgeshire and Peterborough. To that end, officers were invited to comment on areas of tasking, or work streams that in their perception were impeding their operational delivery capability.

Officers were candid with the Review Team and this has enabled corroborative analysis of comments and observations to take place, specifically within this report, the sphere of crime investigation.

The Crime Management element of the review has been greatly assisted by the Corporate Performance Team who provided the author with tabular CrimeFile data to assist in delivering conclusions (against Objectives 1-4).

The range and scope of the data is as follows.

All CrimeFile reports created between 1<sup>st</sup> March 2013 – 30<sup>th</sup> June 2013 allocated to or including 'notes' updated by a PCSO using collar number commencing 7XXX.

The data collection exercise resulted in 3497 individual crime reports fitting the range criteria.

This data has been refined to 10% of the original sum to make it manageable and provide the basis for detailed reviews of crime notes on a dip sampled basis. 33% of a cross section of those crime reports have been reviewed. The dip sampling reviews were structured to the point that a cross-section of investigations were the subject of scrutiny to ensure that wide ranging crime types and tactical investigation variances could be included within the commentary.

### **COMMENTARY**

The methodology of dip-sampling a representative number of CrimeFile reports across the force area has unsurprisingly revealed a number of recurring themes that account for ineffective PCSO operational activity. These are commented on more detail below, however, it is noteworthy that this can be seen happening in all sectors.

In summary, PCSO staff across the force are being utilised consistently within embedded processes that do not exploit the true value of the officers. There are numerous examples of time spent in follow up crime enquiries that simply add no value whatsoever, and on many occasions, repeat visits are made to locations of crime, or crime victims, with no tangible investigative outcome. Alternative solutions should be sought (IT based) that would not only add efficient value to operational activity, but could add significant value to the type of enquiry with a well thought out, low cost IT fix.

The critical areas of commentary are:

- Crime Allocation;
- House to House enquiries;
- Calling Cards;
- CCTV;
- Self-Tasking Reassurance/ High Visibility.

### **Crime Allocation**

- In general there is evidence of logical and visible crime allocation to PCSO's. Clear and concise allocation of crime exists from supervisors and largely with sensible investigation action plans (IAP) set. This, in the main, accounts for most of the minor crime types and are suitable for the PCSO role to investigate. This enables supervisors to have a clear idea of the workloads of their officers and given that investigations sit on individual crime queues it is easy to see where an officer is making progress or otherwise.
- There are a number of examples of 'tasking' within the data set that tend to show that PC's are tasking PCSO's with lines of inquiry that do not always arise from the tasking facility with CF. It is clear that without any historic request on CF itself, updates are being made by PCSO's which clearly come from personal tasking by other officers. Whilst the note updates are in context with the crime investigation, within a number of CF's, no contextual tasks exist that seek the assistance of a PCSO therefore the only logical conclusion to be drawn is that this tasking is taking place outside of CF. It might be inferred that this is being done with the knowledge of the relevant supervisor(s) for good reason, or likewise without to enable other staff to direct work at PCSO's without a visible audit trail. This should be explored further prior to the final report being submitted.
- PCSO's carry crime queues of lower level criminality successfully as a core function of their role.

I have looked in detail at a number of crimes to track the timeline of expediency from allocation to closure. There are two distinguishable outcomes:

- a) Where a crime investigation does not rely on H2H and CCTV enquiries being completed, investigative progress is in keeping with what I'd expect as a crime manager;
- b) Where a crime investigation does rely on H2H and CCTV enquiries, there is excessive evidence of inefficiencies and activity that could account for significant operation hours savings.

The reasons are explained below as these two key strands of investigative management are the predominant inefficiencies found.

### **House to House Enquiries & Calling Cards**

- The review has identified overwhelmingly that the operational time spent by PCSO's conducting H2H enquiries brings NO RETURN to crime investigation detection.
- Of the crime reports sampled, in every case where H2H was conducted, no additional line of inquiry or value was added to enhance the prospect of detecting the crime. In fact there was a landslide of evidence that shows this to be an area of significant wasted time. In general, tasking takes place within the CF facility, but it has to said, that this is largely a matter of process rather than being properly considered.
- The review is aware that a refined process has commenced in the IMU where a
  much more considered approach to H2H is now being trialled and the progress of
  this should be closely monitored in order that efficiencies, of some scale, could be
  capitalised upon in operational hours.
- The process of H2H generally results in Calling Cards being dropped through doors where occupants are not at home at the time of H2H calling. The review has identi-

fied that NO responses were noted on ANY crime report as a result of a Calling Card being left. This in entirely indicative of the reasonable hypothesis, that in most cases people contact the police immediately when witnessing a crime. There is a strong case to be made that for low level, simple crime investigations, H2H could be largely discounted as a viable line of enquiry.

- To compound the inefficiency, there are a number of sampled crime reports that reveal repeat visits to H2H in the same location. However, there was no evidence to show that this was any more fruitful than the first visit<sup>2</sup>. The purist approach to H2H would dictate that to fully exploit this tactic, the process must be complete to ensure that all occupants of premises who can be determined to have been at home or at a relevant premises at the time of the offence should be spoken to. There is no such evidence that this is the extent to which H2H is completed and therefore its' use in lower level crime should be confined to be called 'local enquiries'.
- It was observed that the calling cards are not bespoke to a crime/ incident type nor the requirement upon the recipient to report on a specified event, and therefore it is questionable whether this is in fact is a worthwhile tactic in entirety.
- It is considered to be low risk to remove H2H from the lower level crime types completely. It is unlikely that this would undermine the public perception of policing in Cambridgeshire, based on the evidence reviewed.

### **CCTV**

- CCTV enquires are routinely allocated to PCSO's. In many cases there is a tangible benefit in doing so and CCTV is clearly a very important facet of crime investigations.
- It is evident that this is a task seen as core to a PCSO role and manifests in tasking
  to go to a locus and scope for potential, or to be the conduit between a local authority
  and the police in obtaining CCTV footage.
- The extent of tasking to city council CCTV offices is such that the review has identified as many as 12 requests for CCTV footage within as many crime investigations in a single day. The net effect is that 12 different staff made the same request for footage. This could have been done at source in the IMU and not deferred to the PCSO role<sup>3</sup>.
- A number of crime reports also identify that the mind-set of 'process' often overlooks
  the likely outcome of tasking a PCSO to attend a locus and secure CCTV potential.
  In one crime reviewed, the notes explicitly described the crime scene as not being
  overlooked by any property. However, a PCSO was tasked to go, regardless<sup>4</sup>.

## Self-Tasking - Reassurance/ High Visibility

Some crime reports show evidence that PCSO staff are self-tasking to offer 'reassurance' in the area of a reported crime. This is of concern as it appears that the Tasking and Co-ordination process is not coherently embedded in day to day activity within the PCSO community. Whilst the author is not critical of the rationale of staff wanting to deliver high quality visible policing, it does identify opportunities to ensure that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> CF0078970313

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> CF0080450313

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> CF0080620313

- there is closer scrutiny of the operational deployments of PCSO's being in line with force priorities rather than a scattered approach of self-tasking at local level.
- A number of crime report identify a propensity in some PCSO's to provide face to face updates over IT based update functions. Such interactions clearly have value in terms of victim management; however, there are operational efficiencies to be gained by desisting from this practice.

### Summary

Police Community Support Officers play a valid and effective role in crime management across the force. There is ample evidence to show that allocating crime to them is appropriate to skill levels and capability. However, within the myriad of functions undertaken, there is clear scope to realign processes and in some cases, scope to remove elements that account for significant inefficiency around Operation Hours usage.

The review has looked in both broad and detailed terms at the quality and content of crime reports and this has enabled the author to take a very objective look at the contribution and value brought to crime investigation. The report fully endorses the continued use of PCSO's within low level crime investigation. The report makes recommendations that should be considered with a view to removing unwieldy and low return activities that if removed, would significantly reconcile any future reduction in raw operational capability. The recommendations focus on force processes that whilst perhaps controversial, would enable much better use of operational time, whilst still delivering against core roles and responsibilities and offer little risk to core performance deterioration.

Recommendation: Adopt a research based policy that acknowledges the low level of return from extensive and ineffective activity of H2H in low level crime investigations;

Recommendation: Identify a process that seeks to remove the burden from PCSO's of ineffective admin of tasking CCTV material that could be effectively managed within the IMU:

Recommendation: Ensure a robust Tasking/ Coordinating process of activity that aligns demand to need appropriately within the PCSO deployments;

Recommendation: Maximise IT solutions within the IMU to add efficiency to the management of victims and witnesses.

## 11. PCSOs and Intelligence - D.I Dan Middleton

This section of the review seeks to contribute to an overall review of the PCSO role by providing professional comment on the contribution of the PCSO role to the intelligence picture held by the force.

The report is based on basic analysis of intelligence submissions during a six-month period from March to August 2013 taken from the Intelligence Submissions Database (ISD) on Lotus Notes.

The tables below provide comparative information for illustrative purpose and relate as follows:

**Con** = Constables and probationary constables

PCSO = All PCSOs

**Det** = Detectives of all ranks

**Sc** = All members of the Special Constabulary

Other = Police Staff, Sgts and Insp ranks

**Table A** illustrates 5x5x5 submissions that, after evaluation and assessment by intelligence staff, have been deemed suitable for transfer to the force intelligence system: INTREPID.

**Table B** illustrates 5x5x5 submissions that have been rejected and not accepted for INTREPID. The analysis does not consider the reasons for rejection and does not, therefore, identify any trends or issues relating to the rank or role affected.

A final point to note is that limitations of our systems and processes make it impossible to automatically establish the outcome of each intelligence report. It is not, therefore possible to give an accurate, evidence based assessment of the value of the intelligence contributed. Annex E provides a brief analytical review of intelligence submissions conducted in June this year and gives a snapshot of the overall quality of intelligence submissions <u>N.B.</u> This report does not focus on PCSO intelligence.

Any further comment is based on my experience, observation and professional judgement.

## A) Transferred to INTREPID

5x5x5	March	April	May	June	July	August	Totals	% (*)
by rank	2399	2539	2740	2435	2463	1803	14,379	100
Con	1295	1285	1353	1401	1472	1059	7865	54
PCSO	586	700	733	619	572	440	3650	25.4
Det.	96	109	170	135	137	121	768	5.3
SC	188	215	262	192	168	69	1094	7.6
Other	234	230	222	88	114	114	1002	7

As can be seen in table A above, during the past 6 months, PCSOs have been responsible for 25% (\*) of the total number of 5x5x5 reports accepted to INTREPID. This is significant when considered in context of the overall percentage of the Constabulary's workforce (figures not included).

Broadly speaking the most common areas included in PCSO intelligence reports are, local offenders, IOM nominals, ASB issues, vehicle sightings and other general community intelligence. Further detailed analysis would be required to accurately categorise the nature and content of intelligence submissions, but based on the findings of the review detailed in Annex E, it is fair to say that very few of the reports submitted would be suitable for action without further development. There is, however, no distinction between the quality of intelligence submitted by PCSOs and all other submissions.

Anecdotally, there are various examples of where PCSOs can, and do, add value to the intelligence picture and I include examples to illustrate this point:

- In Cambridge, the PREVENT agenda and Rich Picture (SB led) intelligence requirement has been positively supported by a local PCSO who has been frequently tasked to gather intelligence on a variety of persons and places of interest.
- In Peterborough the PREVENT agenda and Rich Picture intelligence requirements have been similarly supported by PCSOs from Eastern sector.
- A PCSO from Peterborough recently received intelligence from a member of public
  within the community concerning a local burglary. The officer carried out local enquiries and local research to develop the intelligence before submitting a detailed report.
  Based on the report, 2 warrants were executed and stolen property from two commercial burglaries was recovered.
- PCSOs across the force are relied upon to provide intelligence to support tension monitoring and community impact assessments
- A PCSO from Peterborough recently provided intelligence which led to the arrest and subsequent conviction of the principal subject of an OCG suspected of large-scale theft of catalytic converters
- A PCSO from Peterborough recently produced a profile of a local drugs OCG based on intelligence the officer had gathered from community sources, self-generated research on Global and personal knowledge of the community. The profile is now being developed within the CIB

Without wishing to labour the point, it is my considered opinion that PCSOs provide a *significant* amount of useful intelligence and generally have the best access to community contacts and community intelligence.

# B) Rejected

5x5x5 by rank	March - August 2013	% (*)
Total	1825	
Con	924	50.1
PCSO	548	30
Det.	68	3.7
SC	174	9.5
Other	111	6.1

## (\*) Percentages rounded up

Table B above, illustrates the rate of rejection of 5x5x5 submissions during the same time period. The figures generally follow the same trend as for submissions accepted and do not, therefore, suggest a particular issue unique to the PCSO role. Reasons for rejection include duplicated reporting, insufficient detail, wording that may compromise the safety and security of a source and general lack of a policing purpose to justify retention. In many cases, because PCSO intelligence often relates to local community issues, rejection often occurs on the basis of Policing Purpose.

#### **Overall comment**

To conclude my report I will provide a basic SWOT analysis with comment on some broader issues included to provide context.

## **Strengths**

PCSOs provide a good link between intelligence officers and the local community. PCSOs often have access to and relationships with key community contacts that can be exploited to facilitate focused intelligence gathering, intelligence development and deployment of covert tactical options.

With focused tasking, PCSOs can contribute valuable intelligence to support Strategic and Tactical Intelligence requirements.

#### Weaknesses

The PCSO contribution to the overall intelligence picture is currently inconsistent and unreliable. The absence of an effective intelligence tasking process and focused Strategic and Tactical intelligence requirements leads to overall contribution of submissions that lack immediate value in terms of supporting enforcement action. A lack of training and awareness affects the quality of submissions and does little to encourage focus on intelligence collection and development.

## **Opportunities**

There is evidence to suggest that better tasking processes and clearer intelligence requirements would improve the quality and value of intelligence across the board but this is particularly important for PCSOs who represent a consistent, long-term link with specific communities. (Note- during workshops there was a total consensus that gathering intelligence was a key aspect of the PCSO role. However no PCSO could recall receiving a direct request or task from the CIB for the specific intelligence gathering. All PCSOs questioned felt that they could contribute more focused intelligence if they were briefed on the requirements by the CIB. JS1666)

The ability to build relationships with key community contacts and local offenders presents a real opportunity to greatly improve our intelligence coverage but this needs much greater direction and supervision.

#### **Threats**

The continued submission of poor quality, low value intelligence places pressure on the intelligence staff having to manage a high volume of incoming 5x5x5 reports. This creates a risk of valuable intelligence being missed or delayed in the assessment and evaluation process.

The lack of training and awareness on intelligence matters may lead to PCSOs wasting valuable patrol time creating reports that will add little value or result in rejection. There is a secondary risk that PCSOs may inadvertently develop relationships with community contacts that result in unauthorised CHIS activity.

Recommendation: PCSOs receive training from the C.I.B on pro-active intelligence gathering and the NIM

Recommendation: The CIB is tasked with developing a procedure, in consultation with LPAs, for the direct tasking of PCSOs with focused intelligence gathering.

### 12. PCSOs and Incident Response

During workshops and in the staff survey, PCSOs frequently identified incident response as being a core function of their role and a daily activity with estimates of the time devoted to it ranging from between 15-20% depending on the LPA. During the workshops all PCSOs rated responding to incidents as a valuable part of their role, subject to some caveats (see below). Given that all reported incidents are managed through the CC3 system, a degree of quantification of this activity is possible:

During the year 2012-2013 PCSOs responded to over 13,000 incidents (this is a conservative figure and an underestimation due to some PCSO collar numbers not being recorded against incidents that they have responded to alongside police officers). The average number of incidents responded to by PCSOs over this time was 86 with a range of between 0 (for a PCSO in a specialist role) to 197. This equates to PCSOs dealing with approximately 6% of all recorded incidents.

The number of incidents attended by PCSOs in the six LPAs was remarkably consistent and validates their own (consistent) estimates of the amount of time spent responding to incidents across all six LPAs:

Local Policing Area	Average Number of Incidents Attended by PCSOs 2012-2013
Peterborough	85
Cambridge	86
Huntingdonshire	96
Fenland	86
South Cambs	71
East Cambs	83

During the workshops PCSOs reported that it is common place to be dispatched by the FCR to an incident that they know they have a very small chance of being able to make a meaningful impact. These are incidents where there has been a considerable time lapse between the time of call and the time of dispatch. Typically these incidents are of a low priority and concern rowdy behaviour or suspicious circumstances. The reasons for delay are numerous but often are the result of resources not being available at the time of call due to higher priority incidents.

PCSOs state that they are often dispatched via telephone by the Incident Review Team to incidents that they believe they will be able to add minimal, if any value. There is a widely held belief by PCSOs that they are dispatched over the telephone to avoid the details of the incident being broadcast over airwaves which would attract supervisory attention. PCSOs also feel that there is an attitude within the FCR and the IRT of "send a PCSO" with the connotation of "because their time is expendable". PCSOs also reported that they only rarely, if ever rejected a request from the FCR to attend an incident and did so only if it was clearly outside (due to severity) of the deployment guidelines. Many PCSOs had individual experiences of the FCR attempting to dispatch them to an incident for which they were not trained, such as domestics or incidents of serious violence where they were asked to 'watch and report back.

Whilst the perceptions of the PCSOs in respect to FCR attitudes towards PCSOs are not verifiable, dip sampling of incidents confirms that there is some evidence to support the view that PCSOs are being sent to incidents a considerable time after the incident was initially

recorded with a minimal chance of a successful outcome. The incidents themselves are, in general, correctly graded and suitable for a PCSO (anti-social behaviour, suspicious circumstances with no objective risk of violence or) however the delay in dispatch makes the PCSO attendance wasteful, especially in rural LPAs where travelling times can be considerable.

In summary, PCSOs attend a significant amount of incidents that fit in with their core role and deployment guidelines.

Recommendation: The IRT and FCR are tasked with reviewing procedures around dispatch to low level ASB and suspicious circumstances incidents where there is no identifiable victim, standard ASB risk and a considerable (greater than one hour) amount of time has elapsed since the incident was recorded.

#### 13. PCSOs and ASB

Dealing with anti-social behaviour is a core function of PCSOs. During the PCSO workshops ASB was seen as one of the highest-value activities that PCSOs undertake. Dealing with ASB is the main way in which PCSOs can contribute to the constabulary's control strategy and it was widely viewed (both internally by managers and practitioners as well as externally by partners and the public) as essential that PCSOs continue to function in this role.

PCSOs expressed a view during the workshops (and this report believes them to be correct) that their consistent presence in a particular area allows them to build up a familiarity with victims of ASB and therefore makes them better able to assess vulnerability and risk over a police officer who may only have met the victim once and does not obtain a full understanding of the antecedents or background to the incident. This potentially leads to an under-reporting of risk.

PCSOs across the force manage ASB through incident files. It is a more complex task to assess the success of these investigations than crime investigations as ASB often concerns sub-criminal behaviour and does not lead to an easily measurable sanctioned detection.

While the workshops revealed that the management of ASB is not uniform across (or even within LPCs) it was clear that there were numerous examples of good practice with, for example PCSOs attending multi-agency tasking/focus groups helping to co-ordinate responses to ASB. Culturally, PCSOs felt that they 'owned' ASB and it's long term management. This was due to the more frequent 'churn' of police colleagues compared to PCSOs who would often deal with problem families or individuals for many years.

However, a review of PCSOs comments regarding their dealings with ASB, as well as comments from partner agencies, supervisors and the public all suggest that the work that PCSOs do in this regard is highly valued and that PCSOs are building up considerable professional expertise in long term ASB problem solving- often greater than their colleagues in Safer Neighbourhood Teams.

In summary, PCSOs have assumed a great deal of responsibility for providing the force's response to ASB- presenting a considerable risk if any reduction in establishment or change in remit did not consider how to provide this facility in the absence of PCSOs.

#### 14. PCSOs and Fitness

Following the introduction of mandatory fitness tests for police officers, some debate has taken place regarding a mandatory fitness test for PCSOs of a similar nature. Comments from Cambridgeshire police officers on this topic include:

"I find it incredulous to believe that it is mandatory for Special Constables to take a fitness test, when, it is not the case for PCSOs. Surely it should be mandatory for them as this is their full time role...PCSOs are frontline officers who do undergo personal safety training and to this end should show a level of fitness via the fitness test"

"Consider non-confrontational circumstances, such as general foot patrol, the ability to climb multiple stairs of a car park to assist with a vulnerable person, the circumstances are varied. You are part of a uniformed service in a role which requires you deal with members of the public; a level of fitness should be expected.

Comments from the (very small minority) of respondents in the public consultation exercise who addressed the issue of PCSO fitness include the following:

"Many do not have the manner, physical presence, bearing or appearance of authority characteristic of a police officer. They do not inspire confidence."

"Far too many PCSO's look overweight, unfit and scruffy, giving a negative image of the police."

"Is it wrong also, to notice that many of them look pretty unfit?"

During the PCSO survey a PCSO made the following comment:

"I think fitness testing is also required to a high standard. There are a lot of lazy officers who just sit in the office or drive a car constantly, even when told they are not allowed to do so."

As part of the review, discussion over these issues has taken place with Roland Ward, Manager of Rehabilitation services. These discussions, combined with views expressed by the public, police officers and PCSOs and research conducted for other aspects of this review lead to the following conclusions:

- 1. The role of the PCSO should be fundamentally non-confrontational as set out by the deployment guidelines. As detailed in the section of this report on PCSO deployment, the levels of risk that are encountered by police officers and PCSOs are considerably different. This manifests itself in different levels of training, equipment and it is therefore not unreasonable to suggest that police officers require a different and possibly higher standard of fitness than PCSOs.
- 2. The points set out in (1) notwithstanding, the role of the PCSO has a considerable physical dimension. PCSOs are expected to carry out more regular physical activity than their police officer colleagues through routinely carrying out foot and cycle patrol. This requires fitness to be maintained.
- 3. PCSOs are expected to withdraw from risky confrontational situations. Given that PCSOs cannot always predict and avoid these confrontational situations (as detailed in the PCSO risk assessment and referenced numerous times during the PCSO workshops) the ability to withdraw quickly should not be underestimated in importance. Fitness is important for this reason.
- 4. PCSO fitness is a complicated issue and requires maintaining good levels of fitness for a long period of time- often many years. PCSOs of considerable service are likely to be daily

carrying out physical activity for work that exceeds that of police officers of a similar length of service who have since moved into more sedentary roles. However maintaining life-long fitness involves education, a healthy lifestyle, being supplied with proper equipment and clothing while at work and cannot be reduced to a simple pass/fail bleep test.

5. It is clear that promoting PCSO fitness is a worthwhile endeavour: it raises the standards of professional appearance, reduces operational risk, increases operational effectiveness, is likely to reduce sickness related absence and is in the long term interests of the individual officer. Whilst the 'bleep-test' is a blunt instrument for achieving these ends, an annual bleep test is likely to act as a source of motivation for some, will end a divisive workplace issue and is likely to reveal underlying fitness/lifestyle issues for a small minority who can then be helped and supported to a higher level of fitness by the constabulary.

Recommendation: After further consultation with staff associations, PCSOs are required to attend an annual fitness test designed and administered by Health Safety and Wellbeing Services. Those failing the fitness test should be supported with action plans generated by HSWS in consultation with the individual officer.

### 15. PCSO Specialisms

The first CSOs employed by the Metropolitan Police were expected to deploy around areas potentially vulnerable to terrorist attack to provide for a high visibility presence. These deployments (which were relayed first hand during the PCSO workshops by a CSO transferee who was one of the first CSOs in the country) required the CSO to be able to wear a uniform and very little else.

As has been evidenced throughout this review, the role of the PCSO has evolved considerably since this point and this is best seen in the creation of PCSO specialist posts. During the PCSO workshops the report author has been particularly impressed by the professional knowledge, expertise and passion which specialist PCSOs have for their roles. Specialisms identified throughout the course of the review include:

- Safer Schools officers
- Licensing
- Street Life officers
- Crime Reduction/Business liaison officers
- Community Cohesion officers
- Rural Crime
- PCSOs with enhanced DV training

The development of specialist PCSOs and the work they do has been highly praised by senior managers and LPA Inspectors during one-one interviews. Whilst the workshops and some comments received during the review process suggests that the selection of individuals for specialist posts has sometimes proven divisive and may not have been as transparent a process as would be hoped for, no negative comments regarding the posts themselves have been received.

It is the position of this report that the development of PCSO specialist posts, far from removing PCSOs from their core roles, enhances the relationship between certain communities and the police- especially when those communities are not bound or limited to specific geographical areas traditionally covered by a single PCSO. It is also noted that specialist posts allow for lateral career progression in the absence of promotional possibilities and encourage the individual in continuing professional development.

Recommendation: LPA Commanders are empowered to maintain specialist posts for PCSOs from their allocated PCSO establishment.

Recommendation: The sole PCSO post that currently sits outside of Local Policing (The rural crime officer PCSO- Investigations directorate) is ring-fenced.

## 16. PCSO Supervision

In the early stages of the PCSO review a concept of a 'Senior-PCSO'; a supervisory position with enhanced responsibilities and salary was proposed and discussed. This was quickly discounted as it was felt that such a move would degrade the authority of LPA sergeants, be divisive amongst PCSOs and antithetical to the current move towards flatter levels of management and money saving endeavours.

However the issue of PCSO supervision remains a contentious one. Sergeants and Inspectors face a number of issues in supervising (and leading) PCSOs. Firstly, in many areas PCSOs and Sergeants are not aligned in shifts or location. This leads to a situation where a PCSO may not physically see their sergeant for a protracted period of time. During workshops some PCSOs relayed that they could go for weeks without physically seeing a supervisor. The PCSO survey reveals that there is a great deal of variation in supervisory contact however for many it remained an issue.

(There are of course some examples of excellent individual supervision, as evidenced by this comment from a PCSO in Huntingdonshire: "I see my supervisor most days, even if he is on rest days he makes himself available to us especially if he is aware that we are on our own. He will make himself available whenever we need help: that could be by phone if he is on rest days or by joining us on the beat.")

Secondly, the nature of PCSO work is hard to quantify and therefore hard to measure. Whilst key performance indicators are relatively easy to establish for police officers (even if their value is questionable and often leads to perverse outcomes) this is not the case with PCSOs. Measuring the quality of highly visible patrol in the absence of arrest statistics or tickets issued is difficult and time consuming. Poor performance is often having to be addressed based on anecdote and opinion rather than hard evidence and this creates situations where even gross underperformance is allowed to continue for unacceptable periods of time.

Thirdly, there is ignorance on the part of sergeants on the different terms of contract and employment laws that govern PCSOs. This is particularly significant when the ignorance concerns managing unsatisfactory performance and may lead to needless grievances and poor performance going unaddressed.

Fourthly, there is no consistent, trackable and auditable method of tasking PCSOs. PCSOs report receiving tasking from supervisors via email, telephone, airwaves and in person: PCSOs reported accomplished work in similar means all of which makes tracking PCSOs

tasks in the event of long term poor performance difficult. Use of the PDR is inconsistent for PCSOs around the force. During the PCSO survey the following question was asked:

## People Board Jan 2012-Dec 2012

"How do you (and your supervisor) use your PDR?"

A number on typical responses included:

"We don't"

"I don't"

"It's not used currently"

"Not often"

and the slightly more considered, if still negative:

"PDR is a pointless exercise which is portrayed negatively by both line mangers and all officers... What is again evident is that the right people are not recognised whereas the same people who don't stop talking about the one thing they do is duly noted. It is clear to me that if you want recognition then you have to shout about it. Quite frankly I have been too busy with my workload to do so."

Fortunately there were also numerous examples of good practice with PCSOs relating how they used them regularly in 1-1s, updated them regularly on achieved goals and of supervisory commitment and interest towards tracking professional achievement. The average response lay somewhere in the middle; clearly more can be achieved in this area.

Somewhat reassuringly these problems have been recognised nationally. A Home Office report in 2007 recognised this as an issue and cited an example of best practice with a constabulary developing a performance management framework. That constabulary was Cambridgeshire and the review process has not been able to ascertain what that framework was, or if it ever actually came to fruition. All the evidence suggests that it did not

As such it should be apparent that there is no easy answer to these problems. KPIs are likely to lead to perverse outcomes and become demotivating in all but limited circumstances and for specific purposes. The issue of supervisory contact will remain difficult to resolve given the geographic spread of PCSOs in some LPAs. It is likely that that one of the keys to this is in goal-based performance measurement that is tracked and managed via the PDR system. Discussions with the Op Metis team suggest that a development of a specific tasking system is likely. Greater use of mobile data including web-conferencing will allow for greater contact between PCSOs and supervisors. Training for sergeants on both workplace law and police staff performance management via sergeants' tool box talks will address some of the knowledge gap Greater use of geo-tracking systems currently available will allow for verification of targeted high-vis patrol plans. Qualitative and comparative evaluations of intelligence submissions will allow for under performers to be identified over time. Shared knowledge of best practice use of PDRS will help raise standards across the force. Ultimately however none of these will be a panacea and the onus is likely to remain on engaged and dedicated supervisors who lead their teams and are prepared to spend the time and energy in recognising both good and poor performance and managing it accordingly.

Recommendation: the L&D department be tasked with developing training for sergeants on managing poor performance in police staff and of employment law regarding police staff.

## **PCSO Powers**

Since their inception, the powers conferred to PCSOs have been a source of debate. The public consultation carried out by this review suggests that this debate continues with both those who support PCSOs and those who do not agreeing that they should be given more powers.

During the PCSO workshops powers were a repeated source of concern. A large number of officers from around the force expressed a wish for more powers. Normally the requested powers were of a relatively minor nature and dealt with some of the anomalies of PCSO authority- for example the ability to ticket a cyclist for riding on a pavement but not being able to ticket a cyclist for having no lights. A wish to have full powers of stop, search and arrest was very much a minority opinion.

Lacking from the public debate on this issue is any consideration of how powers will fundamentally alter the nature of the role of PCSO itself. However at a certain point, most likely at powers of arrest, a PCSO had become a defacto police officer but without the training or equipment that accompanies this.

Presently, Cambridgeshire Constabulary has deferred every available power to its PCSOs. In discussions in workshops, while PCSOs sometimes expressed frustration with the amount of time it took for a police officer to respond to a request for assistance in cases where a person had been detained (without force) for the purpose of a search, on further questioning it appears that occasions where the statutory thirty minute time lapse has expired prior to police arrival were extremely limited.

Whilst PCSO powers are outside the scope of this review in respect to making recommendations for greater powers the review, working with Sgt Nick Lidstone, did respond to a Home Office consultation regarding PCSO powers. The response to this consultation exercise has been included in Annex E

## 18. PCSOs and Training

PCSOs receive a three week basic training period on appointment to Cambridgeshire constabulary. Workshops and the PCSO survey revealed that for many this was the last extended and intensive piece of training received. Training received after this point has been sporadic and of questionable value (see earlier comments regarding NCALT training).

This is not universally the case. A number of PCSOs praised the proactive approach of supervisors in organising local training initiatives and team briefings. Some PCSOs have received enhanced training in specialist areas. However taken as a whole there appears to be scope for a greater focus on continuing professional development- sometimes through centrally organised training. Clearly PCSOs themselves should retain much of the responsibility for ensuring that their professional knowledge remains up-to-date.

It is a recommendation of this review that the L&D department carry out a full Training Needs Analysis for PCSOs. Information gathered during the course of this review will be able to assist in the preparation of this TNA, however in the interim the following suggestions are offered.

- During workshops PCSOs revealed that they had never received formal training on crime prevention despite receiving frequent requests for such advice from victims of crime and vulnerable persons and businesses. This should be redressed as a priority, increasing the professional service offered by PCSOs, enhancing their role and credibility with the public.
- The growth of migrant communities has been a major feature of socio-demographic change within Cambridgeshire over the last ten years and is set to continue. The Constabulary's reach into some of these new communities has been limited and this restricts it's ability to tackle serious and organised crime as well as tackling crime aimed at migrants; especially vulnerable migrants. PCSOs are uniquely positioned to rectify this shortcoming and would be greatly aided by a workplace based language course. Encouraging and supporting PCSOs in learning new languages would generate trust in new communities and result in greater community intelligence.
- Statement taking and Legal Issues: Many PCSOs expressed the view that statement taking was either an area where they felt they could benefit from extra training or that they were already confident statement taking and greater legal training would allow them to use this skill to assist investigators in the investigation of more serious crime types (where appropriate and without abstracting them from their core duties).
- Dealing with vulnerable persons: this was the category of training most frequently raised in the PCSO survey- officers stated that they were frequently required to deal with persons with serious mental health issues but had received very little training in either law or best practice. Some PCSOs asked for specific training in safeguarding children as they are often asked for professional advice. Some PCSOs stated that they regularly received information regarding domestic violence and would speak directly with victims due to the relationships that they built up with victims over time but had not received recent or relevant training in this area.
- Managing social media. Presently there is a very inconsistent approach to PCSOs and social media usage. Some historical errors in use/messaging have lead some sergeants to take a hyper-cautious approach which is not fully justified. Making all PCSOs familiar with social media (a phenomena which did not exist when their role was conceived) and training these staff would mitigate the risk of incorrect or poor messaging to the public and allow sergeants to take a less cautious approach.

Throughout the review process it has been observed that PCSOs often feel undervalued and misunderstood by the organisation at large. PCSOs rarely have direct contact with PCSOs from other areas and the opportunities to share best practice and to discuss shared problems are limited. In light of the comments made about training above, the following recommendations are made:

Recommendation: a twice yearly force-wide PCSO half day training day is organised on a similar model to junior manager's development days. Such an event could be used to provide a briefing from a senior officer on the constabularies direction and priorities, to run tool-box style training inputs, to allow for Q+A sessions and issues to be aired, for best practice to be shared and as an opportunity for PCSOs to make connections and professional networks with colleagues from around the force.

Recommendation: the L&D department is tasked with carrying out a full PCSO TNA.

Recommendation: the L&D department, in consultation with HR, develop a formal process for career progression from PCSO to police constable, allowing for the proper accreditation of prior learning and allowing PCSOs to develop and evidence professional knowledge that places them in a preferred position in any future recruitment processes for police constables.

#### 19. PCSO Shift Pattern

The majority of PCSOs within Cambridgeshire Constabulary work a shift pattern. This is financially significant as it incurs both weekend working allowance and a shift working allowance as set out by the terms of the staff handbook which states:

Weekend Working: Where the normal working week includes a Saturday and/or Sunday, a permanent weekend working allowance will be calculated on the basis of time and a half for all hours worked on a Saturday and/or a Sunday.

Where an alternating shift pattern involves:11 hours or more between the starting time of the earliest and end of the latest shifts and there are at least 4 hours between the starting time of the earliest and latest shifts and at least half of the shifts in the shift cycle include some unsocial hours then the following allowances will be paid where two shifts on a rota basis not including a night shift are worked over 4, 5, 6 or 7 days a week: Period covered by two shifts Proportion of basic pay 11- 14 hours 12.5% More than 14 hours 14%

Presently the vast majority of PCSOs attract both weekend working and alternating shift pattern allowance. Much debate has taken place as to whether these working arrangements provide value for money for the constabulary and the public at large. A considerable amount of money could be saved if shifts were amended so as not to incur these allowances (very rough estimates suggest in the region of 0.5 million depending on the establishment of PCSOs).

Given the significance of the potential savings extended discussions have taken place with HR and with local policing Inspectors and Sergeants to examine the operational impact of such a move. Research has also been carried out on force systems to assess the impact on service to the public.

Having examined possible shift patterns and how they impact upon allowances, the following options have emerged:

- 1. Major change: the shift pattern is amended so as PCSOs do not attract shift working allowance, unsocial allowance or weekend working allowance.
- 2. Considerable change: the shift pattern is amended so as to still provide weekend working cover but the total number of un-social shifts is reduced below 50% by stopping all shift working no later than 20:00hrs so as to not incur the 14% shift allowance.
- 3. Minor change: the shift pattern is amended so that weekend working allowance and shift allowance are still incurred but the rate of shift allowance is reduced from 14% to 12.5% by stopping all shifts no later than 22:00hrs (reduced from 00:00)

4. No change- the shift pattern remains unaltered and PCSOs continue to work weekends and un-social hours (un-social defined within the handbook as any hours worked after 20:00) up to 00:00.

It is the position of this report that option (1) be immediately discounted: the role of PCSOs manifestly extends into weekends and to make this change would cause a considerable loss of value to the public for a comparatively small saving.

Options (2) was examined through seeking the views of LPA Inspectors and Sergeants While accepting that there was not a total consensus of opinion, their views can be summarised as follows.

Firstly, anti-social behaviour does not stop at 20:00hrs and is not restricted to certain predictable days of the week, particularly in summer time and in school holidays. A shift pattern that includes a considerable number of un-social shifts is required to be able to respond in a flexible manner to ongoing and emerging ASB issues.

Secondly, the majority of formalised community engagement events takes place in the evening (Parish Council meetings, panel meetings e.c.t) as well as organised community events that PCSOs contribute to and engage with (such as youth clubs). Option (2) would limit PCSOs ability to continue this level of engagement.

Thirdly, fear of crime and ASB increases after dark and withdrawing PCSOs after 20:00hrs would send a message to the public that is likely to raise anxieties, particularly in the vulnerable. There would be a knock on effect on police officers as the burden of responding to low level ASB incidents after 20:00hrs would fall to them at the expense of pro-active police work.

Finally, the impact on individual PCSOs should not be dismissed- allowances account for a significant portion of PCSO take-home pay and have done for many years: long enough for them to be considered as salary by the majority of staff. As such changing shift patters in this way would have the same impact on PCSOs as a pay cut and this would have a considerable impact on staff morale, translating in difficulties in retention and possibly in attracting well qualified candidates to future positions. Continuity of staff and local knowledge are held to be some of the key strengths of PCSOs and this could be lost.

Local Supervisors were also asked to consider option (3). The consensus opinion was that this was a more workable shift pattern than option (2) and views regarding it were less strongly voiced. Some Inspectors suggested that there is a drop-off in the value of PCSOs after 22:00hrs as the types of incidents that can be safely attended by the decrease as the proportion of alcohol related disorders and violent incidents increases. These incident types fall outside of PCSO deployment guidelines.

An examination of CC3 reveals that in 2012-2013 the constabulary recorded over 28'000 ASB incidents. 17'000 of these took place between 08:00-20:00hrs, and 11'000 took place between 20:00-08:00. Of these night time ASB incidents, 3500 took place between 20:00-22:00, or 12.5% of the total.

Given that ASB is a core function of PCSOs and given the views of local supervisors and managers on the operational impact of the options for changing the shift patterns, combined with validation from CC3, option 2 is not recommended.

Recommendation: Option 3 is taken forward for further examination and consultation with staff and staff associations with an objective of amending the shift pattern to restrict PCSO working after 22:00hrs and achieve a 1.5% saving in shift working allowance.

(Further consideration is given to shift patterns in part four in relation to the requirements of the radical hotspots model)

### 20. PCSO Deployment Guidelines

As part of this review the entire PCSO deployment guidelines have been reviewed and revised. The PCSO deployment guidelines have been subject to regular revision and amendment over the last ten years, with the most recent version (v4.0) being formalised on April 2010. A review of v4.0 finds that it remains largely fit for purpose subject to *areas* of change (resulting in a larger number of actual changes of varying extent)

The first change is a basic update to reflect the post Op ReDesign model of local policing and changes to accepted terminology since the previous revision.

The second change is a subtle but definite move to emphasise the considerable autonomy and professional judgement that PCSOs are expected to exercise on a daily basis- some language changes have been made to reflect this. The PCSO workshops revealed the extent to which PCSOs have to be self-managing and responsible for pro-actively responding to local needs especially in more rural areas in the absence of the more regular supervisor contact that is present in the more urban LPAs. Self-motivation and good autonomous decision making has been a positive evolution in the PCSO role and the new deployment guidelines are designed to encourage this whilst recognising the continuing need for supervisory oversight.

The third change is to recognise the legitimate growth in PCSO specialisation (see section 'PCSO Specialisation, below)

The fourth change is a substantive amendment to PCSO crewing policy. At present PCSOs adhere to the Force crewing policy- i.e while there is a presumption of single-crewing during day shifts, after 20:00hrs PCSOs are expected to be double crewed subject to risk assessment and supervisory discretion.

It should be noted that the PCSO role is one that carries inherent risks to staff. It was certainly the case that particular incidents where PCSOs encountered extreme hostility, aggression and violence where highlighted by staff during the workshops. In the PCSO survey one officer commented:

"I feel that I would benefit from having a wider range of equipment to protect myself. The role is supposed to be non-confrontational however on several occasions I have found myself in situations that I have been sent to whereby I have had to deal with people who were extremely aggressive, including being attacked with an axe. Luckily no one has yet been hurt and I accept that given the varied and unpredictable nature of Police work even PCSO's may come up against conflict however I think it is unfair that we are still branded as a non-confrontational role when we are clearly not."

The PCSO risk assessment (Annex B) details fifteen risks related to general patrol. However it should also be noted that double crewing does not exist in the risk assessment as a control measure. It is therefore necessary to ask if double-crewing of PCSOs after 20:00hrs is a necessary response to risk or an out-of-date legacy.

The practice of double-crewing stems from the traditional (although sometimes disputed) practice of double crewing police officers after 20:00hrs. This however draws a parallel between the two roles which is incorrect- as (re)emphasised in the deployment guidelines:

"PCSOs are not police officers and do not have a positive duty to intervene. They also have the fundamental option to withdraw from an incident based on their own assessment of risks"

It should also be noted that the double-crewing of PCSOs carries certain dis-advantages and costs as revealed in interviews with local policing Inspectors:

"you have some individuals refusing to go out after 20.00 because they don't have anyone to crew with."


This experience was repeated in interviews with Local Policing Sergeants. There was also negative comment from the public during the consultation phase making reference to double-crewed PCSOs 'chatting' to each other and being (seemingly) uninterested in talking to the public as a result. Finally, double-crewing severely limits the amount of coverage that PCSOs can provide by effectively halving available units and increasing the cost of providing PCSOs after 20:00hrs (exacerbated by the anti-social working allowance that is attracted by working after 20:00hrs).

Whilst both the risk assessment and deployment guidelines recognise that PCSOs may spontaneously encounter incidents that create an officer safety risk or attend seemingly innocuous incidents that develop into violent encounters, the deployment guidelines clearly re-enforce the principle that the PCSO role is essentially intended to be non-confrontational and should not routinely require PCSOs to deal with violent individuals or to use force to defend themselves or others. There is an inherent assumption in the current post 20:00hr double crewing policy that this is not the case after 20:00hrs due to an increase in risk. Is this supported by evidence?


In answering this question this review examined two data sources- state zero incidents (any incident where an officer has activated their emergency airwave button automatically generating a CC3 incident record) and recorded use of force by PCSOs, both for the financial year 2012-2013.

Force-wide recorded state-zero incidents in this period numbered 152 (accepting that there may be further incidents where the operator manually changed the incident type to reflect the nature of the ongoing incident). Of these 152 incidents only 11, or just over 7% of the total, were from PCSOs. Of those 11 incidents, 5 were false activations (user error) leaving six occasions over the course of the year where emergency assistance was required. Of these six incidents 4 occurred in between 14:00-16:00, one occurred in the morning and only a single incident occurred after 20:00hrs.

Over the same period there were 2559 recorded incidents of use of force by all officers (including PCSOs, police officers and detention officers). Of these 78 were by PCSOs (3%). There were considerable differences between the LPAs on the use of force over this period:



The breakdown of use of force by time period is as follows:



The following conclusions can be reached from this data. Firstly, the use of force by PCSOs is non-uniform around the county and is clearly far more prevalent in urban areas. Whilst a recorded figure of zero for East Cambs and Huntingdonshire is likely to be the result of non-reporting, it is clear that PCSOs in Cambridge and Peterborough are more likely to use force. This may be because these officers are more likely to encounter aggressive subjects or it may be (based on anecdotal evidence) that PCSOs in rural areas are more likely to withdraw from situations that may escalate to the point of using force due to the greater distances that any supporting officers would have to travel if emergency assistance was required. It is likely to be a combination of both of these factors.

Secondly, it should also be noted that the use of force within LPAs is not uniform: two PCSOs (unrelated: one in Peterborough, one in Cambridge) were jointly responsible for 28% of all instances of use of force by PCSOs. Excluding these two outliers (with a suggestion that there may be a need to assess their deployment as they appear to be routinely at greater risk than their colleagues) use of force by PCSOs reduces to the relatively low figure of 56 instances, or 2% of the force total.

Thirdly, force is mostly likely to be used before 20:00hrs: 82% of instances of use of force by PCSOs took place *before* 20:00hrs. This statistic combined with the very low level of emergency assistance incidents recorded by PCSOs after 20:00 suggests the following key finding:

Double-crewing of PCSOs after 20:00 is based on a faulty perception of risk that is not supported by evidence. Whilst the risks faced by PCSOs are very real and should not be underestimated they are more likely to occur during daylight hours and provide evidence for the continued importance of PCSO training in conflict management, proper and sufficient PPE and arguably standards of fitness (see below).

Recommendation: Double-crewing of PCSOs after 20:00hrs ceases. All PCSOs should be single crewed at all times unless there is a specific operational requirement to do otherwise. Instances of double-crewing by PCSOs should be authorised by a supervisor.

Recommendation: The force reviews and approves the re-drafted PCSO deployment guidelines contained in Annex C.

### **Part IV- Future Options**

#### 21. Refined Traditional Model

Parts II and III of this review have established the following basis for arguing in favour of a refined traditional model of PCSO deployment. Firstly that PCSOs have the overwhelming support of the public for the work they do. The public place a premium on the high visibility and reassuring presence that PCSOs provide. The strength of feeling of some communities regarding the value that their local PCSO provides cannot be overstated.

Secondly, that partner agencies place a high value in the work carried out by PCSOsespecially in terms of their formal engagement activities, problem solving and local knowledge.

Thirdly, supervisors and managers believe PCSOs to be integral to the model of local policing and vital in maintaining organisational performance. This view is supported by examinations of PCSOs work by subject experts. PCSOs contribute a considerable amount of hours to crime investigation, incident response and are responsible for a sizeable 25% of the force's intelligence submissions. PCSOs take a leading role in tackling ASB and have

Fourthly, despite high visibility patrol being their number one activity, PCSOs are either seen or come into direct contact with under half of the population of Cambridgeshire. Visibility is linked to satisfaction and lack of visibility is a frequent complaint of those who support the concept of PCSOs but are unsatisfied with the current level of service. This leads to the following conclusions.

- 1. The public, partner agencies, and police managers all agree that PCSOs add considerable value to the constabulary. These consensus opinions are supported by considerable anecdotal evidence from PCSOs and quantifiable data from constabulary systems. That PCSOs are an intrinsic and valuable part of the constabulary should be beyond dispute.
- 2. The chief way in which PCSOs add value from the public perspective is by operating as they were originally intended to do- patrolling on foot in a highly visible manner. The public's desire for this type of activity appears to be almost unlimited. Given the proportion of the public who did not come into contact with a PCSO last year or who did and want more contact, it is highly unlikely that the constabulary would ever be able to employ PCSOs to the point where they reached diminishing returns- the staffing numbers involved would become economically unviable before this point of diminishing returns was reached. Greater supervisory tasking and accountability leading to more focused high-visibility patrolling would likely lead to even greater value being achieved.

The question then is not: do PCSOs add value, as they certainly do. The question is not: what is the optimum number of PCSOs; as given the public's desire for high visibility policing this optimum number is probably economically unattainable. The questions to be answered

under this model there are: how many PCSOs can the constabulary afford, and how should those PCSOs be distributed?

This review was carried out against a backdrop of diminishing budgets and a requirement to make further financial savings. The review team were not however given a target and how much the constabulary can afford to spend on PCSOs is dictated by a number of factors that are out of scope of this report. In light of these financial uncertainties it is not viable for this report to make single recommendation on the PCSO establishment- that number may be unaffordable and in any case, all other factors being equal, it is the position of this report that every extra PCSO will add value: there is no clear upper limit.

Therefore this review process has created a PCSO establishment formula- an algorithmic approach where the budget- x- is entered into system and the formula calculates the establishment and the 'optimal' distribution for that establishment for the six LPAs.

The formula is based upon the three guiding principles of this review: that all areas require a level of PCSO coverage, that some communities require more support than others and that scarce resources should be targeted at the areas of the greatest need.

It should be noted that this formula and the distributions that result from it are illustrative and represent an approach that can be followed, not necessarily to the exclusion of all other approaches and considerations. This is because, as will be seen from the details of the formula below, certain assumptions are based on (the authors) professional judgement (for example there is no scientific method of deciding what proportion of the available budget should be set towards 'need' and what proportion should be set on population)

## \*\*\*Note Adendum- Feb-2014: pg

In balancing the demands of these principles the formula takes the following steps.

- 1. 50% of the available budget is dedicated to providing PCSOs to all six LPAs, irrespective of the 'need' of those LPAs. The distribution of PCSOs to the LPAs is based on the proportion of the population of constabulary within the LPA.
- 2. The second 50% of the available budget is allocated to the six LPAs based on need. 'Need' here is defined in three ways. The first is in recorded demand for policing. Recorded incidents are taken as a proxy for total demand. The second is in recorded ASB- a key component of PCSOs work. The third recognises that some communities may need more support than others and that these communities may be less likely to ask for police support-giving a false impression of the level of need. Therefore the third measurement of need is the Office of National Statistics calculations of the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD). The IMD measures seven indications of the deprivation of an area including recorded crime but also including a range of socio-demographic factors such as employment and education. These IMD measures were converted from ONS lower super output areas to wards to allow for comparisons with incident and ASB recording.
- 3. Each ward in the county is ranked in these three areas compared to all other wards- so that the ward with the most recorded ASB receives a ranking of (1). This is assessed for all wards in all three categories of need, resulting in each ward having three ranking numbers. The average of these three ranks is then taken to produce the average rank score (for example an ASB rank of two, an IMD rank of ten and a recorded incident rank of three gives a total score of fifteen which produces an average rank score of five. This allows all wards in the county to be ranked according to the greatest need.

- 4. All wards are then assessed for their population size (this is important as there is a considerable range in ward populations). This allows for a weighting factor to be introduced. The formula dictates that the remaining 50% of the budget is divided by 32'000 (the total cost of an average PCSO for the constabulary) producing the available number of PCSOs available to distribute based on demand. The first ranking ward earns a PCSO for its LPA. The second and the third ranking wards do likewise until there are no more available PCSOs. However, if the first ward allocated a PCSO is in the 4<sup>th</sup> quartile for ward population (i.e in top 25% of most populous wards) then that ward earns 1.5 PCSOs for it's LPA. This is the case for all following wards until the number of available PCSOs is zero. However if a ranking ward is in the first quartile (the 25% least populous wards) they are only awarded 0.5 PCSOs for their LPA. All ranking wards within the second and third quartiles earn 1 PCSO. For example: if a total of ten PCSOs is available for distribution based on demand and the first three wards are all in the fourth quartile then: 4x 1.5= 6, meaning that there are four PCSOs remaining after these first four wards are allocated their PCSO. Assuming that the next four wards are in the second or third quartiles then the number of available PCSOs stops at the eight ward.
- 5. The total number of PCSOs allocated by total population share and by 'need' are then added together and this is the final number of PCSOs available to each LPA. It is critical to note that the ward based ranking system is a method of allocating PCSOs to LPAs recognising the highly local nature of PCSO work, but it does not dictate that a high ranking ward receives its own dedicated PCSO: distribution of PCSOs within LPAs is a decision for the area commander although the ward ranking system may be informative in this decision making process.

The PCSO distribution formula is contained within a separate excel spreadsheet, however some worked examples based on hypothetical budgetary scenarios are presented below. Brief comments on the viability and impact of the models based on the research and analysis set out in Part II and III of this review are included below the tables.

(Note- all figures are approximate and include some rounding and an assumption of an average staff cost of 32k. No account has been made of the recommended ring-fenced post or the part funded post within Peterborough)

## **PCSO Budget: £6 Million**

LPA	Current Establishment 2013-2014	New Establishment	Change +/-
Peterborough	63	51	-12
Cambridge	29	31	+2
Huntingdonshire	33	37	+4
South Cambs	20	25	+5
East Cambs	12	17	+5
Fenland	22	26	+4
Total	179	187	+8

Notes: An increase on the current establishment although a redistribution of officers away from Peterborough based on the demand analysis and the principles of the model. The public sees an increase in visibility and possible expansion of specialists posts.

## PCSO Budget: £5.5 Million

LPA	Current Establishment 2013-2014	New Establishment	Change +/-
Peterborough	63	51	-12
Cambridge	29	29	0
Huntingdonshire	33	35	+2
South Cambs	20	21	-1
East Cambs	12	14	+2
Fenland	22	24	-2
Total	179	174	-5

Notes: An approximation of the current position (2013-14 establishment) No significant impact for the public. Some internal redistribution away from Peterborough based on the more rigorous assessment of need.

# **PCSO Budget: £5 Million**

LPA	Current Establishment 2013-2014	New Establishment	Change +/-
Peterborough	63	47	-16
Cambridge	29	28	-1
Huntingdonshire	33	32	-1
South Cambs	20	17	-3
East Cambs	12	10	-2
Fenland	22	22	0
Total	179	156	-23

Notes: A reduction broadly in line with the current (10/13) actual numbers of PCSOs. Some re-organisation within LPAs is required; some areas see shared PCSO ownership. Specialist posts are maintained. Some loss of visibility unless recommended mitigating actions are taken to reduce other aspects of workload.

## PCSO Budget: £4.5 Million

LPA	Current Establishment 2013-2014	New Establishment	Change +/-
Peterborough	63	44	-19
Cambridge	29	26	-3
Huntingdonshire	33	29	-4
-South Cambs	20	14	-6
East Cambs	12	8	-4
Fenland	22	19	-3
Total	179	140	-39

Notes: A sizeable reduction affecting all areas to a great extent with the exception of Fenland which benefits from the consideration of deprivation in distribution. Re-organisation of teams now essential. Considerable work required to mitigate against full impact including all recommendations regarding investigation of crime, reduced incident workload through better management of incidents and further use of social media to mitigate against loss of visibility. Patrol work must be more intensively managed and supervised to achieve comparable results.

# **PCSO Budget: £4 Million**

LPA	Current Establishment 2013-2014	New Establishment	Change +/-
Peterborough	63	41	-22
Cambridge	29	24	-5
Huntingdonshire	33	25	-8
-South Cambs	20	11	-9
East Cambs	12	7	-5
Fenland	22	17	-5
Total	179	125	-54

Notes: A considerable drop in resources affecting all areas. Mitigating factors not able to sustain business as usual. Prioritising of PCSO workloads required. Decrease in services for public. Near certainty in a considerable drop in high visibility patrol unless radical steps taken to reduce PCSO workload in other areas (near total removal in crime investigation and serious reduction in incident response). ASB work and specialist posts maintainable.

## **PCSO Budget: £3.5 Million**

LPA	Current Establishment 2013-2014	New Establishment	Change +/-
Peterborough	63	37	-26
Cambridge	29	21	-8
Huntingdonshire	33	24	-9
-South Cambs	20	10	-10
East Cambs	12	6	-6
Fenland	22	15	-7
Total	179	113	-66

Notes: Further reduction in capacity across the board. East Cambs staffing fallen to 50 of current establishment: high visibility patrolling in this area likely to all but disappear due to crime investigation workload. Specialist teams only maintainable in Peterborough with considerable re-organisation. PCSO focus now increasingly demand lead. Low demand areas see near total drop in visibility.

## **PCSO Budget: £3 Million**

LPA	Current Establishment 2013-2014	New Establishment	Change +/-
Peterborough	63	35	-28
Cambridge	29	17	-12
Huntingdonshire	33	18	-5
-South Cambs	20	9	-11
East Cambs	12	5	-7
Fenland	22	14	-8
Total	179	98	-81

## PCSO Budget: £2.5 Million

LPA	Current Establishment 2013-2014	New Establishment	Change +/-
Peterborough	63	33	-30
Cambridge	29	15	-14
Huntingdonshire	33	11	-22
-South Cambs	20	7	-13
East Cambs	12	4	-8
Fenland	22	10	-12
Total	179	80	-99

Notes: With both of the above budget scenarios entire areas of work having to be eliminated in order to service core priorities of ASB and engagement work. Very difficult to maintain any specialist posts outside of Peterborough. Serious reductions in community intelligence and likely very noticeable drop in police visibility with falls in public confidence the result. Increase workloads for police officers from a decrease in PCSO involvement in investigation and incident response.

## **PCSO Budget: £2 Million**

LPA	Current Establishment 2013-2014	New Establishment	Change +/-
Peterborough	63	28	-35
Cambridge	29	12	-17
Huntingdonshire	33	8	-25
-South Cambs	20	6	-14
East Cambs	12	3	-9
Fenland	22	6	-16
Total	179	63	-116

Notes: Outside of Cambridge and Peterborough high visibility patrolling almost eliminated to focus on core business of high risk ASB and incident response. Traditional model of Neighbourhood policing impossible to maintain, even in large LPAs.

## PCSO Budget: £1.5 Million

LPA	Current Establishment 2013-2014	New Establishment	Change +/-
Peterborough	63	23	-40
Cambridge	29	6	-23
Huntingdonshire	33	6	-27
-South Cambs	20	4	-16
East Cambs	12	2	-10
Fenland	22	4	-18
Total	179	45	-134

Notes: with the possible exception of Peterborough, remaining PCSOs focus on high risk ASB only. No proactive patrolling in these areas. Model is considered non-viable due to risks of dramatic falls in intelligence, loss of community confidence, loss of partnership working and slow response times to even high risk ASB

# **PCSO Budget: £1 Million**

LPA	Current Establishment 2013-2014	New Establishment	Change +/-
Peterborough	63	18	-45
Cambridge	29	4	-25
Huntingdonshire	33	3	-30
South Cambs	20	3	-17
East Cambs	12	2	-10
Fenland	22	2	-20
Total	179	32	-147

Notes Remaining PCSOs highly specialist small teams focusing on core ASB and absolutely essential partnership working only. Almost zero PCSO visibility. Demand based model has directed the majority of PCSOs at the areas of greatest need in Peterborough. All other areas see a minimal service.

# **PCSO Budget: £0.5 Million**

LPA	Current Establishment 2013-2014	New Establishment	Change +/-
Peterborough	63	11	-52
Cambridge	29	1	-28
Huntingdonshire	33	2	-31
-South Cambs	20	1	-19
East Cambs	12	1	-11
Fenland	22	1	-21
Total	179	17	-162

Outside of Peterborough all high risk ASB passed to other teams/officers. Remaining PCSOs become internal consultants with extremely limited ability to directly intervene in any incidents. PCSO role effectively removed.

## 22. Radical Hotspots Model

The refined traditional model, although seeking to maintain the value delivered by the current deployment of PCSOs can be seen to come under extreme pressure under certain budgetary scenarios. At the far end of the spectrum the traditional model is impossible to maintain even with the suggested refinements and re-distribution. This in effect means that the value sought by the public would not be delivered. Given the financial challenges that the force faces, it is prudent to examine a radical alternative model that seeks to deliver value to the public under extreme budgetary scenarios. This radical alternative model can be found through the extension of Op Style hotspots policing.

Cambridge Constabulary is currently working in collaboration with Cambridge University to measure the impact of hotspots style policing. In essence, Op Style re-creates previous studies that have proven the impact of targeted patrols in distinct areas with high recorded crime rates but with PCSOs rather than constables. Previous studies have found that considerable reductions in crime can be achieved through this method with a dispersion of benefits for surrounding areas rather than the hypothesised displacement of crime. In other words, hotspots policing reduces crime in the targeted area as well as creating a smaller reduction in neighbouring areas, reducing the overall level of crime in a meaningful way rather than pushing it from area to area. The results of Op Style are not due to be reported until later this year (2014) however interim results were so overwhelmingly positive that consideration has been given to operationalising this and rolling out across the force, making hotspots policing business as usual for PCSOs.

Following the interim results in Peterborough the same methodology to identify hotspots was applied to the entire force area. Based on definition of a hotspot of 20 crimes reported per year, every year, ten years' worth of recorded crime data was analysed.

Analysis of recorded incident 'hotspots' is ongoing- and considerably more problematic due to the volume of recorded incidents compared to recorded crime, 1:4. However there are preliminary indications that suggest 'incident' hotspots closely mirror 'crime' hotspots and the concept of ASB falls across both. It would be highly unexpected if incident hotspots did not follow crime hotspots and so for the purpose of the below analysis, recorded crime is used as a proxy for crime as a whole. Where incident hotspots did not mirror crime hotspots to a great degree it is questionable whether PCSO deployment would be appropriate effective in the first instance- for example traffic related incidents, MFH, and incidents related to the night time economy.

The analysis used the new hotspot unit of analysis of the 'street segment'. Previously hotspots had been based on circular areas which encompassed small areas containing portions of streets but also included open spaces where no crimes occurred. The hotspot was too inexact to be a useful operational tool as it disregarded where exactly crimes occurred. Therefore a new geographical unit- the street segment was introduced. With a focus on actual physical geography of where people live and move through, the street segment is defined as a portion of a street between two recognisable intersections with other streets. This allows for a more exact analysis of where crimes actually take place and lends itself towards more focused patrolling.

The analysis produced the following key findings:

- 1. Crime is highly contained: 100% of crime occurs in only 30% of street segments. 70% of street segments in Cambridgeshire are entirely crime free.
- 2. Within the 38,623 street segments that recorded at least one crime in ten years, crime was again highly contained: 50% of all crimes occurred in 6% of street segments.
- 3. Crime hotspots are stable- recorded crime in hotspots remains consistent year after year.
- 4. Within the 'hottest' of street segments, the majority of crimes centred upon a very small number of addresses- 80% of all crime would be based on 1-3 addresses. This provides some statistical vindication of the current focus of complex case teams, IOM, troubled family initiatives and so forth.
- 5. The hotspot benchmark of 20 crimes per year produces a target list of 125 street segments, out of 38,623 street segments with at least 1 crime in them over a ten-year period. In other words, this list is comprised of 0.3% of all street segments with crime in Cambridgeshire. The 125 hotspots produced 55,229 crimes, out of 564,472 mapped crimes across the force or nearly 10% of all the crime over a 10 year period.
- 6. Not all hotspots are 'hot' all the time- Monday and Tuesday are consistently 'cold' with areas not becoming 'hot' until the afternoon, with key times between 13:00-21:00hrs, Wed-Sun.

Previous studies and the interim results from Op Style suggest that applying the 'treatment' (see below) to these hotspots will produce reductions in recorded crime in the hotspots of between 7- 20% (up to 1100 crimes prevented each year). The interim results also suggest a considerable (but as yet unquantified) reduction in calls for service. Furthermore the 'dispersion of benefits' effect will lead further falls in recorded crime in the attached street segments leading to a considerable overall reduction in crime. Cambridge University academics therefore consider that the estimate of 1100 less crimes will be 'very conservative'.

Ultimately, the hotspot style of policing will make people safer by reducing crime and will lead to efficiencies in the use of police time by reducing the number of required investigations as well as calls for service that could not have been dealt with by PCSOs. This presents the possibility of creating a radical new model of deploying PCSOs based on the following 'treatment'. It is key to note that the predicted falls in crime are predicated upon how consistently and rigorously the treatment is applied- inconsistent application may produce negligible results.

In basic terms the treatment consists of fifteen minute patrols in each hotspot by a PCSO, on foot, between the 'hot hours', with 3-4 patrols carried out per day (four being more effective) with not more than one patrol being carried out every hour. Compliance is measured via geo-location technology currently available via the air-wave handsets.

A further advantage of the hotspots model is that is allows for a non-budgetary, demand based determination of how many PCSOs are required, as well as where they are based. Expressed as an equation the number of PCSOs required is

$$Z = \frac{H}{V}$$

Where Z= required number of PCSOs on a daily basis (wed-sun)

H= number of hotspots

V= number of hotspots that a PCSO manages during a given duty.

'V' requires some further explanation- it is based on the equation below:

$$Y = [H(tV) + (HK)] + [a + 2b + c]$$

Where

Y= predicted value of total time spent in hotspots

H= Number of hotspots

t= 15 minutes per visit (based on Koper (1995) and other studies showing this to be an effective duration)

V= 3 number of visits per day (minimum number required by the treatment)

K= minutes spent travelling between 2 hotspots (20 minutes on foot for a distance between hotspots of up to 1 mile away from each other)

a= 20 minute meal break

b= 15 minute break

c= 30 minutes per day for briefing and de-briefing.

Clearly the above equation will not be precise in all eventualities but it does allow for some reasonable estimation of the amount of time required for hotspots policing. Following the above formula if (H) is 3 (i.e each PCSO is required to manage three hotspots on a daily basis) then the amount of time required per day is 275 minutes, or 4 hours and 35 minutes. If (H) is 4 then the amount of time required per day is 340 minutes or 5 hours and 40 minutes. If (H) is 5 then the amount of time required per day is 405 minutes or 6 hours and 45 minutes. It can be seen that requiring a PCSO to take on an additional hotspot per day requires an extra 65 minutes of duty time.

Returning to the first equation, (V) therefore depends on the proportion of time that the organisation wants the PCSO to be employed in hotspots policing. This is a strategic question. If V=3 then the 275 minutes taken on a daily basis will allow considerable duty time for more traditional functions- essentially the functions identified that have been identified as adding value. This would essentially be a hybrid model- which is not unproblematic and is given further discussion below. Whereas if V=5 then the majority of time will be taken up by hotspots policing and most other functions will cease- either because of the actual time taken by the patrols, or the inability to be committed with other activities for an uncertain period of time due to the requirements of the patrols (i.e. responding to incidents will be difficult to commit to without knowing how long each incident will take to resolve or else the required patrols will be put in jeopardy) Based on the decision as to what the value of (V) is, some prediction on the required establishment can be made.

Number of hotspots per	Minutes per day on hotspots	Number of PCSOs required
PCSO (V)	patrol	daily for hotspot patrol (Z)
3	275	42
4	340	31
5	405	25

The actual establishment of PCSOs becomes dependent on three questions:

- 1) What is the value of (V): what proportion of their time should PCSOs be engaged in hotspots patrol?
- 2) Should all PCSOs be engaged in hotspots policing or should some remain engaged in more traditional or specialist roles (i.e. in areas without identified hotspots- for further see below)
- 3) What should the shift pattern be?

hours

In respect to question (3) there are two broad options. The first option is to run a shift pattern that is within the bounds of 'normal'- i.e running 7 days per week with a mixture of early and late shifts that allows some weekends off but with modifications that reflect the new demand for late shift working Wed- Sunday. The second option is far more radical- based on a strategic decision that hotspots policing should be the sole (or overriding focus of PCSOs) a shift pattern is devised that entirely removes times that are not considered hot. Examples of these patterns are as follows:

Current Pattern								
	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	
	08-							
WK1 PCSO	18	08-18	14-00	14-00	RD	RD	RD	40
	12-							
WK2 PCSO	22	12-22	12-22	RD	RD	08-16	08-16	46
	08-							
WK3 PCSO	18	08-18	RD	RD	14-00	16-00	14-22	46
WK4 PCSO	RD	RD	08-18	12-22	12-22	14-22	RD	38
WK5 PCSO	RD	RD	08-18	08-18	08-18	RD	RD	30
	D = 9	L = 12	Rd = 14	TOT 35				200
Amended				•				
'Normal' Pa	ttern							
'Normal' Pa	M	Т	W	т	F	S	S	
	M 08-							
'Normal' Pa	M 08- 18	T 08-18	W 12-22	T 12-22	F RD	S RD	S RD	40
WK1 PCSO	M 08- 18 08-	08-18	12-22	12-22	RD	RD	RD	
	M 08- 18 08- 18							40 46
WK1 PCSO	M 08- 18 08-	08-18	12-22	12-22	RD	RD	RD	
WK1 PCSO WK2 PCSO	M 08- 18 08- 18 09-	08-18 08-18	12-22 12-22	12-22 RD	RD RD	RD 14-22	RD 14-22	46
WK1 PCSO WK2 PCSO WK3 PCSO WK4 PCSO	M 08- 18 08- 18 09- 19	08-18 08-18 08-18	12-22 12-22 RD	12-22 RD RD	RD RD 12-22	RD 14-22 14-22	RD 14-22 14-22	46 46
WK1 PCSO WK2 PCSO WK3 PCSO	M 08- 18 08- 18 09- 19 RD	08-18 08-18 08-18 RD	12-22 12-22 RD RD	12-22 RD RD 12-22	RD RD 12-22 12-22	RD 14-22 14-22 14-22	RD 14-22 14-22 12-22	46 46 38
WK1 PCSO WK2 PCSO WK3 PCSO WK4 PCSO	M 08- 18 08- 18 09- 19 RD	08-18 08-18 08-18 RD	12-22 12-22 RD RD	12-22 RD RD 12-22	RD RD 12-22 12-22	RD 14-22 14-22 14-22	RD 14-22 14-22 12-22	46 46 38
WK1 PCSO WK2 PCSO WK3 PCSO WK4 PCSO	M 08- 18 08- 18 09- 19 RD RD D = 6	08-18 08-18 08-18 RD RD	12-22 12-22 RD RD 12-22	12-22 RD RD 12-22 12-22	RD RD 12-22 12-22 12-22	RD 14-22 14-22 14-22 RD	RD 14-22 14-22 12-22	46 46 38 30

### 'Radical Pattern #1'

	M	T	W	Т	F	S	S	
1	RD	08-16	14-22	14-22	14-22	14-22	14-22	
2	R	R	14-22	14-22	14-22	14-22	14-22	
3	08- 16 08-	08-16	R	R	14-22	14-22	14-22	
4	16	08-16	14-22	14-22	R	R	R	

Not recommended as consists of 7 day stretch - Best practice says no more than 6

#### Radical Pattern #2

m	t	w	t	f	S	S	
08-							
16	08-16	14-22	14-22	14-22	14-22	r	48
r	08-16	14-22	14-22	14-22	14-22	14-22	48
r	r	14-22	14-22	14-22	14-22	14-22	40
09-							
17	r	r	14-22	14-22	14-22	14-22	40
09-							
17	09-17	r	r	14-22	14-22	14-22	40
09-							
17	08-16	14-22	r	r	r	r	24
							240
	08- 16 r r 09- 17 09- 17 09-	08- 16 08-16 r 08-16 r r 09- 17 r 09- 17 09-17 09-	08- 16 08-16 14-22 r 08-16 14-22 r r 14-22 09- 17 r r 09- 17 09-17 r	08- 16 08-16 14-22 14-22 r 08-16 14-22 14-22 r r 14-22 14-22 09- 17 r r 14-22 09- 17 09-17 r r	08- 16 08-16 14-22 14-22 14-22 r 08-16 14-22 14-22 14-22 r r 14-22 14-22 14-22 09- 17 r r 14-22 14-22 09- 17 09-17 r r 14-22 09- 09- 17 09-17 r r 14-22	08- 16     08-16     14-22     14-22     14-22     14-22     14-22       r     08-16     14-22     14-22     14-22     14-22     14-22       r     r     14-22     14-22     14-22     14-22       09- 17     09-17     r     r     r     14-22     14-22     14-22       09- 09-     17     09-17     r     r     14-22     14-22     14-22	08- 16     08-16     14-22     14-22     14-22     14-22     r       r     08-16     14-22     14-22     14-22     14-22     14-22     14-22       r     r     14-22     14-22     14-22     14-22     14-22       09- 17     09-17     r     r     14-22     14-22     14-22     14-22       09- 09-     17     09-17     r     r     14-22     14-22     14-22     14-22

This is a 6 week 'regulation' pattern which has no more than 6 days in one stretch. May impact on weekend working allowance

#### Radical Pattern #3

	m	t	w	t	f	S	s	
	08-							
1	16	08-16	13-22	13-22	14-22	14-22	r	50
2	r	08-16	13-22	13-22	14-22	14-22	14-22	50
3	r	r	13-22	13-22	14-22	14-22	14-22	42
4	r	r	r	13-22	14-22	14-22	14-22	33
	09-							
5	17	09-17	r	r	14-22	14-22	14-22	40
	09-							
6	17	08-16	13-22	r	r	r	r	25
								240

Slightly amended to give an extra RD Mon week 4

#### 'Best Fit Pattern'

	M	Т	W	Т	F	S	S	
1	RD	RD	14-22	14-22	14-22	14-22	14-22	40

2	R	R	14-22	14-22	14-22	14-22	14-22	40
3	Rd	RD	14-22	14-22	14-22	14-22	14-22	40
4	Rd	RD	14-22	14-22	14-22	14-22	14-22	40

The final pattern represents the most radical solution and focuses PCSOs entirely on hotspots policing, dispensing with all early shifts and requiring constant weekend working. This is a pattern of working that broadly follows a 'retail' model- where staffing rigorously follows demand. It goes without saying that such a move would have a substantial impact on staff- discussed further in the negative impacts section, below. However such a pattern would, if combined with the extreme V=5 formulation allow for the following establishment:

H = 125

V=5

Z = 25.

With an additional 25% staffing to allow for predictable abstraction (annual leave, training, average sickness) the final establishment of PCSOs is 31. This would generate savings (based on an existing establishment of 180 of approximately £4.8 million pounds per annum. There would of course be considerable risks associated with this model, discussed below.

The establishment required to provide hotspots policing under different, non-best fit patterns varies considerably depending on the value ascribed to (V).

V=	Z (+25%)=
3	42(53)
4	32(40)
5	25(31)

The requirement of other patterns is therefore to provide (Z) based on the number of shifts that are working on any given 'hot' day. For example, on a five week shift pattern that saw three out of every five 'hot' shifts being worked (The amended 'normal' pattern), the calculation becomes (with rounding)

V=5, Z=31.

31/3 = 10

5 (evenly balanced shifts) x 10= 50.

Therefore, the equation becomes

$$\chi = \frac{F\left[z + \frac{Z}{4}\right]}{S}$$

Where

X= The total establishment of PCSOs

Z= The total number of PCSOs required to 'treat' the number of hotspots

S= The minimum number of 'shifts' working on any given 'hot' duty period.

F= The total number of 'shifts'

Therefore, the following table repeats this calculation for all of the above possible patterns, with the three different values for (V) (again, where V is a measure of how far the constabulary wishes to devote PCSOs purely to hotspots policing)

Shift Pattern	F=	S=	V=3, Z=42, X=	V=4, Z=32, X=	V=5, Z=25, X=
Current Pattern	5	1	262	200	156.3
Amended Pattern	5	3	87.5	66.6	52.1
Radical Pattern #1	4	3	70	53.3	41.7
Radical Pattern #2	6	4	78.8	60	46.9
Radical Pattern #3	6	4	78.8	60	46.9
Best F Pattern	it 1	1	52.5	40	31.3

It is immediately apparent that both the shift pattern and the degree of focus on hotspot policing have a significant impact on the final required establishment of PCSOs.

Having considered the establishment of PCSOs under the radical hotspots model it is now necessary to consider their distribution. This is problematic when considering fundamental principle (3) as will be readily apparent from the maps pinpointing the locations of the hotspots, shown below.


Map 1. Hotspots Across Cambridgeshire




Map 2. Hotspots in Peterborough




Map 3. Hotspots in Huntingdonshire



Map 4. Hotspots in Cambridge City




Map 5- Hotspots in East Cambs



Map 6. Hotspots in Fenland



Map 7. Hotspots in South Cambs



These maps are only illustrative-full details of the hotspots can be found here:

http://batchgeo.com/map/a912c267256bae23911d801d20dc77ca

However it is quickly apparent that there are large areas where there are virtually no hotspots, including rural communities and the majority of South Cambs, East Cambs as well as large rural portions of Huntingdonshire and Fenland. In effect this means that a rigid hotspots style model would remove PCSOs from large parts of the county. Even for less extreme (V=3) models, this would still limit PCSO involvement in rural communities due to the travelling time from the hotspots that they were required to treat.

#### **Evaluation of the Radical Hotspots Model**

The advantages of the Radical Hotspots Model are reduced crime for a reduced establishment (under most models) however there are a number of significant disadvantages.

Firstly, it has been noted from both PCSO workshops and from the PCSO staff survey that hotspots policing is highly unpopular with staff. This is because if removes PCSOs from their local patches where they have the greatest connection (and where they and the public believe they add the most value) and places them in spots where they have little or no

connection to the community and no long-term investment within it. The type of activity carried out is necessarily short and lacks the depth of engagement that characterises the activity of PCSOs in other areas. In short, it does not provide the job satisfaction that PCSOs gain from their traditional work.

Secondly, and linked to job satisfaction, the nature of hotspots policing is undemanding from a skills/experience perspective: it does little but require a PCSO to be present in a defined area for a set amount of time and to move around within that area. There is no evidence that the actions of the PCSO within those parameters has any impact on crime reduction. The PCSO is therefore reduced to its earliest incarnation, removing ten years of the evolution of the role. It can reasonably be expected that both of these factors would lead to a third disadvantage: low staff morale and high staff turnover. Linked to this third disadvantage would be a fourth: difficulty attracting high quality candidates for vacancies.

Fifthly, depending on the extent of the focus on hotspots policing, a number of activities that have been identified throughout this report as adding value would either cease or be curtailed. Crime investigation would be incompatible with a high level of hotspots policing as would incident response. Prolonged community engagement events would be difficult to manage and PCSOs ability to arrange meetings with their constituents would be heavily impacted by the demands of hotspots policing- both of these would likely have an impact on public confidence. Rural communities would see a very significant reduction in PCSO visibility and availability. Formal engagement with policing panels would become problematic due to time constraints. Intelligence submissions would likely fall due to a detachment of PCSOs from their communities and a 'shallowing' of relations between the public and PCSOs.

Finally, outside of hotspot areas the public would lose what they have stated they value most in PCSOs; a familiar, approachable and visible presence in their community. The impact that this would have on local communities, which would likely be expressed not only directly to the constabulary but also through elected representatives at all levels, would be considerable.

#### Conclusion

The PCSO review has sought to answer fundamental questions regarding the value of PCSOs against a challenging financial backdrop. This report concludes that the value that PCSOs generate through high-visibility patrol, partnership working, tackling ASB and freeing up officer hours is beyond doubt. PCSOs deserve to be recognised as a permanent and successful experiment in British Policing whose long term future within Cambridgeshire should be assured.

However, in light of the financial challenges faced by the constabulary, this review has also identified numerous avenues for reform and presented two broad future options- a refined traditional model made sustainable by a series of reforms and a more radical hotspots policing model. By implementing the recommendations made in this report it will be possible to mitigate against some reduction in the PCSO budget whilst maintaining a traditional model. Key in these reforms is the abolition of double crewing, rationalisation of the crime investigation procedure, enhanced review and closure of incidents that are unlikely to yield positive results from PCSO deployment and focused tasking from the CIB for pro-active intelligence gathering. Supporting these reforms should be a comprehensive re-training program for PCSOs, better use of the PDR and an auditable/trackable tasking system

available to supervisors to reduce un-focused patrol. Taken together these reforms will provide some mitigation and deliver a more streamlined and efficient model of PCSO deployment. It is therefore further recommended that should any of the recommendations contained within this report that are subsequently approved, that they form the basis of a force-wide PCSO action plan. This will ensure that a co-ordinated and corporate approach is taking to achieving a more efficient process.

This review has also outlined a more radical model that will deliver value through crime reduction, reduced demand which can be delivered at a lower cost. Even if there were no financial pressures, success of the hotspots policing project under Op Style suggests that it should be incorporated into everyday business of PCSO deployment. However the radical model is designed to deliver value under significantly reduced budgets. As already outlined this is not without risk.

Whether the constabulary choose to follow option one, option two or a hybrid of both; the strong connections between PCSOs and their communities, the value that the public and partner agencies place in those relationships and the extent to which PCSOs have taken on traditional police work all highlight the fact that any reduction in PCSO budgets needs to be carefully managed at the LPA and force-wide level. PCSO budgets can be reduced with concentrated work at a local level combined with the reforms suggested in this report, the impact on the public and on performance can be controlled. However given the value that PCSOs deliver it must be understood that there are no soft targets or an easily achievable reduction in numbers past those that have already been achieved through a recruitment freeze. Any further reductions will almost certainly be felt to some extent by the public. This calls for an open and honest conversation with the public in order to successfully manage expectations around PCSOs and by implication local policing as a whole.

Inspector 1666 James Sutherland

#### **Summary of Recommendations**

- 1. Recommendation: The Learning and Development Department audit the learning requirements of PCSOs in relation to NCALT packages.
- 2. Recommendation: The Contact Management Collaboration Project considers the long-term involvement and value of deploying PCSOs in E.O cover.
- Recommendation: Adopt a research based policy that acknowledges the low level of return from extensive and ineffective activity of H2H in low level crime investigations;

- 4. Recommendation: Identify a process that seeks to remove the burden from PCSO's of ineffective admin of tasking CCTV material that could be effectively managed within the IMU;
- 5. Recommendation: Ensure a robust Tasking/ Coordinating process of activity that aligns demand to need appropriately within the PCSO deployments;
- 6. Recommendation: Maximise IT solutions within the IMU to add efficiency to the management of victims and witnesses
- 7. Recommendation: PCSOs receive training from the C.I.B on pro-active intelligence gathering and the NIM
- 8. Recommendation: The CIB is tasked with developing a procedure, in consultation with LPAs, for the direct tasking of PCSOs with focused intelligence gathering.
- 9. Recommendation: The IRT and FCR are tasked with reviewing procedures around dispatch to low level ASB and suspicious circumstances incidents where there is no identifiable victim, standard ASB risk and a considerable (greater than one hour) amount of time has elapsed since the incident was recorded.
- 10. Recommendation: After further consultation with staff associations, PCSOs are required to attend an annual fitness test designed and administered by Health Safety and Wellbeing Services. Those failing the fitness test should be supported with action plans generated by HSWS in consultation with the individual officer.
- 11. Recommendation: LPA Commanders are empowered to maintain specialist posts for PCSOs from their allocated PCSO establishment.
- 12. Recommendation: The sole PCSO post that currently sits outside of Local Policing (The rural crime officer PCSO- Investigations directorate) is ring-fenced.
- 13. Recommendation: the L&D department be tasked with developing training for sergeants on managing poor performance in police staff and of employment law regarding police staff.
- 14. Recommendation: a twice yearly force-wide PCSO half day training day is organised on a similar model to junior manager's development days. Such an event could be used to provide a briefing from a senior officer on the

constabularies direction and priorities, to run tool-box style training inputs, to allow for Q+A sessions and issues to be aired, for best practice to be shared and as an opportunity for PCSOs to make connections and professional networks with colleagues from around the force.

- 15. Recommendation: the L&D department is tasked with carrying out a full PCSO TNA.
- 16. Recommendation: the L&D department, in consultation with HR, develop a formal process for career progression from PCSO to police constable, allowing for the proper accreditation of prior learning and allowing PCSOs to develop and evidence professional knowledge that places them in a preferred position in any future recruitment processes for police constables.
- 17. Recommendation: Option 3 is taken forward for further examination and consultation with staff and staff associations with an objective of amending the shift pattern to restrict PCSO working after 22:00hrs and achieve a 1.5% saving in shift working allowance.
- 18. Recommendation: Double-crewing of PCSOs after 20:00hrs ceases. All PCSOs should be single crewed at all times unless there is a specific operational requirement to do otherwise. Instances of double-crewing by PCSOs should be authorised by a supervisor.
- 19. Recommendation: The force reviews and approves the re-drafted PCSO deployment guidelines contained in Annex C.

#### Annex A: Telephone Survey Research Methodology

#### Policing in Cambridgeshire (PiC)

This is a public opinion telephone survey administered in-house and based upon the former confidence survey required in 2009.

#### Population and sample

The target population for this survey are residents of Cambridgeshire or Peterborough UA who are aged over 16 years. In practice, the current contact sourcing methodology necessarily excludes the following:

- Residents who are not on the Electoral Roll or have not provided information to one
  of the other data sources (for example through questionnaires, magazine subscriptions, etc)
- Residents who do not have a landline

Around 300 surveys are collected each month, spread evenly across the six CSP areas in Cambridgeshire and Peterborough UA.

Representation by NPT is aspired to by using ONS population figures to identify broadly how much of a CSP resides in each NPT, as below.

Total sample (CSP) = 300 surveys

Total population (CSP) = 20%(NPT1) + 30%(NPT2) + 50%(NPT3)

Therefore: NPT1 = 60 surveys

NPT2 = 90 surveys NPT3 = 150 surveys

Age and gender within the achieved sample is reviewed every six months. Broad representation of a similar spread to that shown in the ONS population figures is desired, although acceptable limits are wide. If the sample indicates a severe bias, a skewed data order is placed to recruit survey respondents in the under-represented groups.

#### Sourcing contact data

Contact data (names, addresses, telephone numbers, gender and age group) are bought in from ADMAR Support Services when needed.

There is no contract between ADMAR and CambsPol; prices are agreed in principle at the end of each financial year for the coming 12 month period based upon estimated volumes (i.e. ADMAR agree informally to maintain the agreed price provided CambsPol orders a certain volume of data throughout the year).

Orders are made under the requirements of a signed Service Level Agreement each year. This limits the use of data and requires CambsPol to destroy data after three months.

Orders are placed using a template provided by ADMAR detailing numbers of contacts required, including by gender, age and NPT where this level of breakdown is needed.

The population from which the sample is selected is from Experian's National Canvasse file (containing Electoral Roll and other data sources) plus occasional ad hoc sources.

ADMAR excludes all data supplied to CambsPol within the last 4 months (this may still be in use) and excludes any contacts that have been contacted (either as a survey respondent, or someone who has refused to take part) until 12 months has lapsed since they took (or declined) the survey. The latter list of contacts is compiled by the Research & Consultation Officer from the submitted survey data, arranged by ADMAR URN identification number cross-referenced against the CamsPol identification number, and sent to ADMAR with each new order.

ADMAR select for the required quotas at random from their databases and contact data is then matched against the BT OSIS database to identify contacts with telephone numbers.

#### Data collection

These surveys are carried out by a team of part-time Constabulary employees working in the evenings, collectively entitled "The Telephone Bureau". The Bureau input received answers into an HTML Snap Survey which is stored on an internal server and accessed through a link on the Corporate Performance microsite on CamNet (the force intranet). Surveys are submitted for those who take part and provide answers (a "Yes survey"), and for those who refuse to take part (a "No survey")

#### Annex B- PCSOs in the Media

Below are a representative sample of news stories regarding PCSOs from mainstream news sources. Whilst not a comprehensive list, it does provide a fair example of how PCSOs have been represented:

- 1. PCSO is an arresting sight stripped down to her underwear in racy modelling photographs... but what will her bosses say?- Daily Mail 23/05/2012 <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2148732/PCSO-arresting-sight-stripped-underwear-racy-car-modelling-photographs--bosses-say.html">http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2148732/PCSO-arresting-sight-stripped-underwear-racy-car-modelling-photographs--bosses-say.html</a>
- 2. Caught on camera: Hilarious moment two police cars escort PCSO riding a mobility scooter after its owner was arrested- Daily Mail 13/05/2013 <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2323869/Caught-camera-Hilarious-moment-police-cars-escort-PCSO-riding-mobility-scooter-owner-arrested.html">http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2323869/Caught-camera-Hilarious-moment-police-cars-escort-PCSO-riding-mobility-scooter-owner-arrested.html</a>
- 3. Plump PCSO caught stealing jumbo size Toblerone walks free from court- Daily Mail 14/09/2012

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2203155/Plump-PCSO-caught-stealing-jumbo-size-Toblerone-Tesco-walks-free-court.html

4. Beat Bobbies to be replaced with Plastic Police- Daily Telegraph 13/04/2012

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/9201760/Beat-bobbies-to-be-replaced-by-plastic-police.html

5. Plastic Police bill scandal – Daily Express 29/12/2010

http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/219948/Plastic-police-bill-scandal

6. £86 Million pound bill for 'plastic police' who issue one fine every two years- London Evening Standard 20/02/2009

http://www.standard.co.uk/news/86m-bill-for-plastic-police-who-issue-one-fine-every-two-years-6809333.html

7. PCSO probed over slap video- The Sun 04/11/2011

http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/3914735/PCSO-probed-over-slap-video.html

8. PCSO seizes chocolate buttons after mistaking sweet treat for cannabis- Wales Online 09/08/2013

http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/pcso-seizes-chocolate-buttons-after-5685469

9. Suspected thief ran three miles across fields and streams trying to escape PCSO... who loves cross-country running- Daily Mail 15/12/2009

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1235792/Suspected-thief-ran-miles-fields-streams-trying-escape-PCSO--loves-cross-country-running.html

(A rare piece of positive reporting)

#### **Annex C- Intelligence Review**

A Review of Quality and Type of intelligence Submitted to Intrepid

AIM: to understand the quality and type of intelligence submitted.

<u>METHOD</u>: During 3 days in June 2013, FIT team officers and staff kept a log of the intelligence they evaluated. The intelligence evaluated was a random selection of that submitted and thus should be a representative sample of all intelligence submitted on those three days.

#### **RESULTS:**

Туре		Intelligence Submissions Database (ISD)	Charter	TOTAL
Immediately Actionable	"Hot Intell" - time critical intell e.g "There is a stolen tractor on x site now"	0	0	0 (0%)
Actionable	e.g. Ready for a warrant with minimum research	6 (6.8%)	9 (20.5%)	15 (11.4%)
Developable	e.g. Good quality intell but requires corroboration or actions such as DSU task, DWP check, helicopter fly- over, analysis or other covert tactics	19 (21.6%)	11 (25.0%)	30 (22.7%)
For Information	A "Piece of the jigsaw" e.g a target nominal seen in crime hotspot. This type of intell can become "Developable" easily	48 (54.5%)	24 (54.5%)	72 (54.5%)
Rejected – for resubmission	e.g. Incorrect format/wording/provenence	5 (5.7%)	0 (0%)	5 (3.8%)
Rejected - outright	i.e. Not intelligence	10 (11.4%)	0 (0%)	10 (7.8%)
TOTAL		88 (100%)*	44 (100%)*	132 (100%)*

#### **KEY POINTS:**

Of the intelligence reviewed.

- Just 6.8% of intelligence from the ISD and 20.5% from Charter could be actioned with minimal research – the remaining accepted intelligence requires more extensive research before it can be actioned.
- Just over half of all intelligence sampled both from ISD and Charter related to intelligence "For Information".
- Almost one quarter of all intelligence sampled was classified as "Developable" although the rate was lower amongst intelligence from the ISD than it was from Charter.
- From both ISD and Charter there were no "Immediately Actionable" items received in the 3 day review period. A longer review period would almost certainly give slightly different results.

#### Annex D- Records of Interviews with Partner Agencies/Representatives

# 1. What has your experience been of Police Community Support Officers (PCSO)? Have you noticed any difference from County to County?

#### **Kevin James (Hunts Fire & Rescue)**

"I only deal with Cambridgeshire PCSO's – so I can't comment on PCSO's from other Counties. I have however noticed a slight difference between PCSO's in this area and those in Peterborough; mainly in terms of their local knowledge and willingness to help - however this may have changed recently. I have worked with PCSO's on a daily basis since 2002. PCSO's are now noticeably more efficient since they first started; they are better at intelligence gathering and demonstrate a true willingness to help. PCSO's tend to act immediately and play an integral role to the whole investigation process; I would say that ninety-eight percent of PCSO's are driven by their passion for the role"

#### **Gemma Wood (ASB Manager, Cross Keys Homes)**

"The majority of Cross Keys Homes' (CKH) stock is within the Peterborough area so no obvious difference from area to area as there is little interaction with PCSO's in other Counties.

#### **Graham Mountford (Peterborough City Council)**

"They tend to be the people on the ground. They do an invaluable job in pulling projects together. They're vital for pulling information in and take ownership of problems. I have had prior dealings with PCSO's in Bracknell [Berkshire]; there is no major comparison to be made, but locally problem Ownership and Level of Detail is very good"

#### Ruth Mann (Neighbourhood Manager, Wherry Housing Association)

"I've had no dealings outside of Cambridgeshire. PCSO's are equally as helpful as Police Officers. They are often more present than Police and have a good rapport with the Public."

### Sarah Steggles, Danae Evans, Louise Walbank (A former PCSO) and Tulat Raja (ASB Team, Cambridge City Council)

"Really good; we use them on a daily basis. They offer a more holistic service; they know our processes and provide a reassuring presence. They're a good filter for the Police as they have the local knowledge. As they cover a smaller area, they have good specialist knowledge too. TR: Cambridgeshire PCSO's are more human compared to the Metropolitan and Essex Police Service."

#### Polly Wilderspin (Secretary to Cambridgeshire Neighbourhood Watch Coordinator)

"A large experience of PCSO's - going back eleven years. My experience has been extremely good. The feeling from the Neighbourhood Watch is that they are absolutely invaluable. I have no experience of PCSO's from outside the Force area."

#### Adele Dant (Housing Officer, CHS Group)

"I only deal with Cambridgeshire PCSO's. My Colleagues and I have noticed differences between individuals across the Force area, but there is a localised knowledge on offer as well as consistency."

#### Councillors Virginia and Michael Buckner (Fenland District & Wisbech Town)

"We haven't had any dealings with PCSO's outside of the County. We also had no dealings with PCSO's prior to becoming Councillors in the last two years. We know who they are, and they come to our meetings; they're very positive and proactive."

### Allison Sunley (Targeted & Preventative Services Manager, Peterborough City Council)

"I have had no dealings with PCSO's outside of Cambridgeshire. I also have had no direct interaction with PCSO's myself due to my role, however my Team does work in close consultation with local PCSO's in a very integrated problem-solving approach. One thing I would like to highlight is the work of the 'Safer Schools Officers', as I am mindful that these will be cut back on. Their work particularly is valued, but my concerns lie with the leadership of these Officers — as they tend to be swayed by the Head-teachers influence and information can become baulked. We don't currently have free available contact PCSO Supervisors, so perhaps this is something that could be looked at?"

## 2. How frequently do you interact with PCSO's in your current role?

#### **Kevin James (Hunts Fire & Rescue)**

"Almost daily – across Huntingdonshire and Fenland; they will actually call me"

#### **Gemma Wood (ASB Manager, Cross Keys Homes)**

"The CKH ASB team have regular contact with PCSO's for a range of different ASB cases. They attend home visits with ASB officers, they are a point of contact for sharing information and they are a source of support for victims identified through the risk matrix (CKH complete the same risk matrix as the police, City council etc) who are discussed at the SPP case review group."

#### **Graham Mountford (Peterborough City Council)**

"A couple of times a week"

#### Ruth Mann (Neighbourhood Manager, Wherry Housing Association)

"Daily - on average across the patch. I'd ring them, rather than the Police Service Centre"

### Sarah Steggles, Danae Evans, Louise Walbank (A former PCSO) and Tulat Raja (ASB Team, Cambridge City Council)

"Daily – sometimes several times a day."

#### Polly Wilderspin (Secretary to Cambridgeshire Neighbourhood Watch Coordinator)

"It depends on the Crime situation; several times a month – probably three occasions in person."

#### **Adele Dant (Housing Officer, CHS Group)**

"Weekly."

#### **Councillors Virginia and Michael Buckner (Fenland District & Wisbech Town)**

"At least once a week. Face-to-face, probably every three weeks or so; not much at all."

### Allison Sunley (Targeted & Preventative Services Manager, Peterborough City Council)

# 3. How frequently have you interacted with PCSO's whilst away from your current role (e.g. whilst at home in a social setting)?

#### **Kevin James (Hunts Fire & Rescue)**

"A few times; I get on with the PCSO's both in and out of work. We ran a 'Junior PCSO' scheme with Huntingdonshire District Council where six 'problem children' [who had propensity to set fires and commit arson] were identified across the Region and were shadowed/mentored by PCSO's – this has since ceased, but was tremendously successful and rewarding."

#### **Gemma Wood (ASB Manager, Cross Keys Homes)**

"Personally only once, regarding an ASB issue with a neighbour (In the Lincolnshire area)."

#### **Graham Mountford (Peterborough City Council)**

"Not really"

#### **Ruth Mann (Neighbourhood Manager, Wherry Housing Association)**

"Only when they've participated in local Fun Days that we've run"

### Sarah Steggles, Danae Evans, Louise Walbank (A former PCSO) and Tulat Raja (ASB Team, Cambridge City Council)

"Yes. TR: Metropolitan PCSO's didn't appear interested; they were a bit more stand-offish. Local PCSO's are generally good."

#### Polly Wilderspin (Secretary to Cambridgeshire Neighbourhood Watch Coordinator)

"Yes, very good. A single point of contact was quickly established, and any follow-up was done."

#### Adele Dant (Housing Officer, CHS Group)

"None."

#### Councillors Virginia and Michael Buckner (Fenland District & Wisbech Town)

"None."

### Allison Sunley (Targeted & Preventative Services Manager, Peterborough City Council)

"Never."

4. Has the frequency of your contact with PCSO's increased, decreased or remained the same since the role was introduced?

Are there any reasons for this?

#### **Kevin James (Hunts Fire & Rescue)**

"A huge increase - mainly due to the change in my role and remit. PCSO's work in a very streamlined manner nowadays"

#### **Gemma Wood (ASB Manager, Cross Keys Homes)**

"With the introduction of the vulnerable risk matrix I believe that a more formal structure for supporting high risk victims has prompted an increased amount of contact between PCSO's and housing staff. In addition as more and more victims and perpetrators are identified as having a mental health problem or learning difficulty there is a better level of support/ investigation being delivered by joining up 'neighbourhood policing'. However this sometimes depends on the attributes of individual PCSO's to effectively work with us in this way. "

#### **Graham Mountford (Peterborough City Council)**

"I had more contact with the PCSO's in Bracknell, but that was because it was a smaller area"

#### Ruth Mann (Neighbourhood Manager, Wherry Housing Association)

"Increased – due to their availability; they're more easy to get hold of than Police Officers during office hours."

### Sarah Steggles, Danae Evans, Louise Walbank (A former PCSO) and Tulat Raja (ASB Team, Cambridge City Council)

"Increased; Lou [Louise Walbank – former PCSO] joined us in December 2012, and we were desperate to build up contacts."

#### Polly Wilderspin (Secretary to Cambridgeshire Neighbourhood Watch Coordinator)

"Decreased. A lot of South Cambridgeshire PCSO's left in the run-up to April 2013 – leaving sometimes one PCSO per ten villages. They have never been replaced."

#### Adele Dant (Housing Officer, CHS Group)

"Fairly constant; but this may increase with familiarity with their role and the individual. PCSO Marriott has done an excellent job with [Tenants in] River Lane."

#### Councillors Virginia and Michael Buckner (Fenland District & Wisbech Town)

"Only since 2011 when get got elected; there were a lot more PCSO's back then. There has been a decrease in contact, because they're not around and also the Police Neighbourhood Forums have decreased which concerns us."

### Allison Sunley (Targeted & Preventative Services Manager, Peterborough City Council)

"In terms of the service they provide, I would say an increase over the past eighteen months – particularly following the recent Council focus on the racial tensions in the Lincoln road area. The PCSO's played a key role in the diffusion of this event.

# 5. Do you think PCSO's add value to Policing? Please explain.

**Kevin James (Hunts Fire & Rescue)** 

"Definitely; they are the eyes and ears of the community. They are intelligence gatherers and have excellent knowledge of their patch. PCSO's are the integral link between the Police and the Community"

#### Gemma Wood (ASB Manager, Cross Keys Homes)

"We are keen to see whether there is clear evidence held by the police that PCSO's generate outcome based investment for the community. Again, some of this is related to individuals as our experience is that some are more proactive than others. For example, does a PCSO walking around reduce fear of crime and would this be improved if they had an increased spectrum of powers? Does their presence in the Queensgate shopping centre deter crime or should we not expect the security staff to deal with that and deploy PCSO's elsewhere?

However, ASB is a concern for people from research available and enabling PCSO's to more readily execute the additional powers available to them to deal with the underlying causes of ASB such as truanting would add value to Policing and the community. We think that there is value in terms of additional support to victims which some PCSO's are very good at delivering and sharing information.

We also deal with several cases that escalate up to court action and PCSO's are often tasked with providing witness statements to support our case. On the one hand this makes sense as they have often had the most contact with the people involved, however they lack the skills to produce statements to be effectively used to add value to our case and Policing. Often we have to go back to ask Police officer's/ Sergeants to produce a statement and attend court instead which delays action and creates work, plus wastes the PCSO's time."

#### **Graham Mountford (Peterborough City Council)**

"Absolutely. Their presence on the street is comforting for people, and it provides them with a sense of security. It raises the Police profile and is vital for intelligence purposes."

#### Ruth Mann (Neighbourhood Manager, Wherry Housing Association)

"God, yes. It doesn't matter who they are, as long as there's a uniformed presence."

### Sarah Steggles, Danae Evans, Louise Walbank (A former PCSO) and Tulat Raja (ASB Team, Cambridge City Council)

"Definitely. They're like the eyes and ears of the street and pickup intelligence that Police Officers may miss. If they weren't there, who would? They must make life for Police Officers easier."

#### Polly Wilderspin (Secretary to Cambridgeshire Neighbourhood Watch Coordinator)

"Yes, when used as an integrated part of the Local Policing Team. They have excellent insight and work well to follow-up on problems."

#### Adele Dant (Housing Officer, CHS Group)

"Totally; they have more visible presence than Police Officers and are available when needed."

#### **Councillors Virginia and Michael Buckner (Fenland District & Wisbech Town)**

"Definitely. They do the jobs you wouldn't want a Police Officer to do; you want a Police Officer to be focussed on serious crime. PCSO's are the eyes and ears on the ground; they're not as much as an imposing Threat as Police Officers can be; they're more approachable to the younger generation due to their work in the community based projects."

### Allison Sunley (Targeted & Preventative Services Manager, Peterborough City Council)

"Most definitely – due to the costs saved through promotion of life-chance opportunities for our Service Users to avoid the penal system. PCSO's offer a preventative service which works well whilst in partnership with external agencies. They are an extension of the work we do, and we should be an extension of the work they do."

# 6. Do you think there should be more or less PCSO's in Cambridgeshire? Please explain your answer.

#### **Kevin James (Hunts Fire & Rescue)**

"There are currently enough – but their 'split-shift' pattern is problematic. I understand why this is in place, but as I am Office-based, this can be difficult. Contact with your current PCSO staff would be vastly improved for continuity purposes, if we knew when they are likely to be on duty"

#### **Gemma Wood (ASB Manager, Cross Keys Homes)**

"We think there could be a restructure to reduce the number of PCSO's in Cambridgeshire and re-allocate the funding into additional police officers to add value to policing overall. There may be scope to make better use of Ecops, the 101 number and CCTV to bring about this change and perhaps a more joined up approach overall to focus on more environmental crime/ ASB to pool resources from all agencies to obtain better value for money."

#### **Graham Mountford (Peterborough City Council)**

"Everyone will answer 'More' – but you need a good balance."

#### Ruth Mann (Neighbourhood Manager, Wherry Housing Association)

"More - you could probably double the numbers. However, this would be more useful if their remit could be expanded"

### Sarah Steggles, Danae Evans, Louise Walbank (A former PCSO) and Tulat Raja (ASB Team, Cambridge City Council)

"More. DE: We're lacking in the Trumpington area due to the recent development down there. Maybe they could assist in the MARAC / DV victim care follow-up. TR: PCSO's need to reflect the population they serve [in terms of ethnic diversity]."

# Polly Wilderspin (Secretary to Cambridgeshire Neighbourhood Watch Coordinator) "More, but I'm aware of the financial constraints. I would say that they're good value for money."

#### **Adele Dant (Housing Officer, CHS Group)**

"I don't think you can ever have too many – but you have to be realistic."

#### Councillors Virginia and Michael Buckner (Fenland District & Wisbech Town)

"More. We can't really comment further afield [outside of Wisbech], but this area definitely needs more." NB: VB then went on to explain that the Waterlees estate is one of the ten most deprived estates in Europe, with a low level of literacy.

### Allison Sunley (Targeted & Preventative Services Manager, Peterborough City Council)

"That's a difficult question; they should be deployed in areas of need. In some areas of Peterborough, I would like to see a general increase though."

# 7. Do you prefer to see PCSO's patrolling on foot, on bike or in marked Police vehicles? Please explain your answer.

#### **Kevin James (Hunts Fire & Rescue)**

"A mixture of all three; there's a necessity for them all. As an example, I went to St Ives Carnival last week and saw no PCSO's whatsoever – which surprised me - as they would know most of the people present. They may well have been there, but I certainly didn't see anyone"

#### **Gemma Wood (ASB Manager, Cross Keys Homes)**

"We think that by patrolling in cars PCSO's become more removed from the community and therefore bikes and on foot would be preferred."

#### **Graham Mountford (Peterborough City Council)**

"Foot or Bike: which are great for going around Neighbourhoods, as they're made more approachable. Cars are less personable."

#### Ruth Mann (Neighbourhood Manager, Wherry Housing Association)

"I don't care; it's just nice seeing them."

### Sarah Steggles, Danae Evans, Louise Walbank (A former PCSO) and Tulat Raja (ASB Team, Cambridge City Council)

"Foot and Bike - as visible as possible. In vehicles, they look like Police Officers. You're more likely to approach Staff on Foot or Bike."

#### Polly Wilderspin (Secretary to Cambridgeshire Neighbourhood Watch Coordinator)

"Not in vehicles - although South Cambridgeshire PCSO's do have to get around. I'd like them to have cars, but KNOW when to get out on foot."

#### Adele Dant (Housing Officer, CHS Group)

"I wouldn't know who was driving a car. I prefer seeing them on foot in the City, as it's hard to stop them on a bike."

#### **Councillors Virginia and Michael Buckner (Fenland District & Wisbech Town)**

"There's a need for all of them. Being on foot has its limitations on the amount of area that can be covered, but Bikes are pretty good. In cars, Officers are not approachable; people need to see a visible presence and Staff need to be accessible."

### Allison Sunley (Targeted & Preventative Services Manager, Peterborough City Council)

"There's something reassuring about Staff on bike or foot; they're 'there' and can immediately react. The protection of a car makes PCSO's less 'human' and less available to members of the public."

## 8. Are you able to differentiate between a PCSO and a Police Officer from a distance?

#### **Kevin James (Hunts Fire & Rescue)**

"Absolutely"

#### **Gemma Wood (ASB Manager, Cross Keys Homes)**

"I am, but I wonder whether the community would say that?"

#### **Graham Mountford (Peterborough City Council)**

"Yes. The uniform is subtle but effective. It can't be too far away from Police attire."

#### Ruth Mann (Neighbourhood Manager, Wherry Housing Association)

"Possibly." NB: A quick subsequent test suggested that the different uniform between Regular Constable, PCSO and Special Constable caused confusion.

### Sarah Steggles, Danae Evans, Louise Walbank (A former PCSO) and Tulat Raja (ASB Team, Cambridge City Council)

"Yes – because of their blue flashes [on the uniform]."

### Polly Wilderspin (Secretary to Cambridgeshire Neighbourhood Watch Coordinator) "Yes."

### Adele Dant (Housing Officer, CHS Group) "No."

### **Councillors Virginia and Michael Buckner (Fenland District & Wisbech Town)** "Yes – the blue bands."

### Allison Sunley (Targeted & Preventative Services Manager, Peterborough City Council)

"Some PCSO's have the blue jerkins. I don't think that issuing Handcuffs to PCSO's [as per the current trial in certain Metropolitan Forces] is a good idea – their role is to mediate, not confront."

# 9. Prior to this meeting, were you aware of the range of powers that a PCSO has at their disposal?

#### **Kevin James (Hunts Fire & Rescue)**

"Not fully - but most of them, yes"

#### **Gemma Wood (ASB Manager, Cross Keys Homes)**

"Not all of the powers. "

#### **Graham Mountford (Peterborough City Council)**

"Yes – pretty much, through prior experience of working with them."

#### Ruth Mann (Neighbourhood Manager, Wherry Housing Association)

"Vaguely – but not as specific as the list provided."

### Sarah Steggles, Danae Evans, Louise Walbank (A former PCSO) and Tulat Raja (ASB Team, Cambridge City Council)

"Not in detail. no."

**Polly Wilderspin (Secretary to Cambridgeshire Neighbourhood Watch Coordinator)** "Yes – fully aware."

#### Adele Dant (Housing Officer, CHS Group)

"No."

#### Councillors Virginia and Michael Buckner (Fenland District & Wisbech Town)

"Yes, but carrying handcuffs would be quite useful in certain situations."

### Allison Sunley (Targeted & Preventative Services Manager, Peterborough City Council)

"I'm not fully aware, no. Training and Partnership awareness could be improved to address this though. A whole picture of awareness is vital for ALL Agencies – a good example being the '72hr Welfare check' that we conduct on vulnerable Missing Persons, where we link in with the Missing Persons Unit."

# 10. Do you feel that your local PCSO's confidently make best use of their powers? Please explain your answer.

#### **Kevin James (Hunts Fire & Rescue)**

"Yes; they're very quick to tell you their remit, but will be very good at contacting the right people if they cannot help themselves"

#### **Gemma Wood (ASB Manager, Cross Keys Homes)**

"As above I think there are a range of skill sets for PCSO's and they each have strengths in different areas. This does mean that some are more confident in using their powers than others. This may be something that comes with experience and training."

#### **Graham Mountford (Peterborough City Council)**

"On the whole yes. Certain areas may need clarification – e.g. who has ownership of a problem, Police or the Council."

### Ruth Mann (Neighbourhood Manager, Wherry Housing Association) "Yes."

### Sarah Steggles, Danae Evans, Louise Walbank (A former PCSO) and Tulat Raja (ASB Team, Cambridge City Council)

"Not necessarily; some seem more knowledgeable than others. More training input is required, but it's down to the individual concerned."

### Polly Wilderspin (Secretary to Cambridgeshire Neighbourhood Watch Coordinator) "Yes."

#### Adele Dant (Housing Officer, CHS Group)

"I've never heard them say that they can't do something."

### Councillors Virginia and Michael Buckner (Fenland District & Wisbech Town) "I wouldn't have thought so, no."

### Allison Sunley (Targeted & Preventative Services Manager, Peterborough City Council)

"I don't think I can answer that one – due to my role."

## 11. Do you find PCSO's more approachable than Police Officers?

#### **Kevin James (Hunts Fire & Rescue)**

"No. Both roles complement each other when working together. I would say that PCSO's are more 'problem-focussed' whilst Police Officers are more focussed on their standard operating procedures."

#### **Gemma Wood (ASB Manager, Cross Keys Homes)**

"PCSO's are often more available than PO's in terms of access by staff at CKH."

#### **Graham Mountford (Peterborough City Council)**

"No - the same."

#### Ruth Mann (Neighbourhood Manager, Wherry Housing Association)

"No difference. It depends who is most available."

### Sarah Steggles, Danae Evans, Louise Walbank (A former PCSO) and Tulat Raja (ASB Team, Cambridge City Council)

"Some of them: Most PCSO's are willing to learn what WE do. SS: Some Police Officers are stand-offish, and are a lot more time-pressed. I would always ask for a PCSO over a Police Officer, as Police Officers maybe more engaged."

#### Polly Wilderspin (Secretary to Cambridgeshire Neighbourhood Watch Coordinator)

"I never see a Police Officer any more, unless I'm at Histon. I last saw one probably months ago."

#### Adele Dant (Housing Officer, CHS Group)

"No – most are very approachable and Customer-focussed. Police Officers tend to be difficult to get hold of and are very busy."

#### **Councillors Virginia and Michael Buckner (Fenland District & Wisbech Town)**

"We simply don't see Police Officers, so it is the PCSO we approach. We can differentiate who is best suited to the job we report."

### Allison Sunley (Targeted & Preventative Services Manager, Peterborough City Council)

"From my personal experience, 'No' – as I usually deal with Police Officers, whilst my Team usually deals with PCSO's. I don't really engage with PCSO's."

# 12. Do you think PCSO's provide Reassurance to the Community when out on patrol?

#### **Kevin James (Hunts Fire & Rescue)**

"Initially - yes. However, I don't know what continuity and long-term follow-up is made"

#### Gemma Wood (ASB Manager, Cross Keys Homes)

"As question 5 – we are keen to see what evidence there may be in terms of perception of crime and ASB."

#### **Graham Mountford (Peterborough City Council)**

"Yes – just by their presence. It's comforting to have someone out in Uniform who you can turn to if you need to."

#### Ruth Mann (Neighbourhood Manager, Wherry Housing Association)

"Yes. Probably more than Police Officers - as they're around more, and are more approachable."

### Sarah Steggles, Danae Evans, Louise Walbank (A former PCSO) and Tulat Raja (ASB Team, Cambridge City Council)

"Yes – and we get that feedback from our Service Users too. Especially the Residents Associations."

#### Polly Wilderspin (Secretary to Cambridgeshire Neighbourhood Watch Coordinator)

"Yes. From Parish Planning meetings and Neighbourhood Watch feedback – there was also a very strong 'Yes'."

#### **Adele Dant (Housing Officer, CHS Group)**

"Definitely, yes. Lots of my Tenants have been very positive about our local PCSO. A good PCSO almost negates the need for Tenants to contact us."

#### Councillors Virginia and Michael Buckner (Fenland District & Wisbech Town)

VB: "Yes, I think they do through the interaction element. With the area they're now being asked to cover, this will reduce though."

### Allison Sunley (Targeted & Preventative Services Manager, Peterborough City Council)

"Yes I do. Certainly after the EDL march in Peterborough two years ago – the PCSO's provided physical reassurance to the Community then."

# 13. What is the sole most useful function of a PCSO? Why?

#### **Kevin James (Hunts Fire & Rescue)**

"Partnership working and intelligence sharing. Public awareness of their vital role needs to be improved"

#### Gemma Wood (ASB Manager, Cross Keys Homes)

"Support in dealing with ASB cases out of hours and linking up in terms of information sharing to prevent and detect disorder."

#### **Graham Mountford (Peterborough City Council)**

"Being available; their profile in the main is more visible than a Police Officer – due to their numbers. To most Members of the Public, they are the front-line."

#### Ruth Mann (Neighbourhood Manager, Wherry Housing Association)

"They're there to share information and facilitate partnership working."

### Sarah Steggles, Danae Evans, Louise Walbank (A former PCSO) and Tulat Raja (ASB Team, Cambridge City Council)

"The Community interaction and knowledge; they have a good general knowledge of what's going on. The hours they work also helps. They have a positive 'can do' role, and are consistent in assisting."

Polly Wilderspin (Secretary to Cambridgeshire Neighbourhood Watch Coordinator) "Intelligence from Neighbourhood Watch. Promoting an environment in which intelligence can be freely given."

#### **Adele Dant (Housing Officer, CHS Group)**

"For me, when you haven't got an emergency situation but need action to be taken. For the times you don't want to bother a Police Officer – but need some local knowledge. We also get feedback and continuity. [PCSO's are...] Someone taking an interest in our problems."

#### **Councillors Virginia and Michael Buckner (Fenland District & Wisbech Town)**

"It used to be that they were working locally, but that's all changed in the last two weeks. They should be the local presence on the Beat – getting to know the Residents – but that's not there now. You [The Police] have made negative changes to this – it's been sharply noticeable."

### Allison Sunley (Targeted & Preventative Services Manager, Peterborough City Council)

"A more holistic approach to dealing with crime and Suspects, which have the potential to escalate - pointing out the Specialist Teams where appropriate. PCSO's shout target their work onto problem areas and problem individuals – it all goes back to knowledge and information, and being clear about the pathway of available support. I would suggest that Inspector Glazebrook [Peterborough PST] uses a model of Community Cohesion and Partner Agency-working that should be aspired to."

## 14. What is the sole least-useful function of a PCSO? Why?

#### **Kevin James (Hunts Fire & Rescue)**

"I don't see any within my role; everything is useful. They're an asset to the Community all-round, as well as with Partner Agencies. You can tell the ones that 'just do a job' and those that care – as the former have generally gone"

#### **Gemma Wood (ASB Manager, Cross Keys Homes)**

"I am not sure whether writing statements is a function in terms of PCSO's but this is proving to be of least use as it is delaying our action in dealing quickly with cases that require the police to provide evidence of their intervention."

#### **Graham Mountford (Peterborough City Council)**

"I can't think of anything. If they weren't useful, there'd be no role for them – but they are."

Ruth Mann (Neighbourhood Manager, Wherry Housing Association) "They don't have any."

### Sarah Steggles, Danae Evans, Louise Walbank (A former PCSO) and Tulat Raja (ASB Team, Cambridge City Council)

"Having too large an area defeats their purpose. DE: They'd be better off in a car sometimes – I've seen more out in a car these days. SS: Sometimes certain incidents require a Police Officer (e.g. Rowdy Residents Meetings), where a direct answer is needed, without referral having to be made about the law."

Polly Wilderspin (Secretary to Cambridgeshire Neighbourhood Watch Coordinator) "The job description could be expanded [in terms of remit]."

#### Adele Dant (Housing Officer, CHS Group)

"I don't know."

Councillors Virginia and Michael Buckner (Fenland District & Wisbech Town) "I don't think there is one."

### Allison Sunley (Targeted & Preventative Services Manager, Peterborough City Council)

"As long as their powers are applied in context to what an Area needs – none."

# 15. What could Cambridgeshire Constabulary do to make best use of PCSO deployments?

#### **Kevin James (Hunts Fire & Rescue)**

"You need to look at their Shift Pattern; I think the Shift Pattern is a barrier. Certain PCSO's are more effective during office hours, so that there is guaranteed continuity and follow-up. I think the contact management side of things could be improved"

#### **Gemma Wood (ASB Manager, Cross Keys Homes)**

"Look at ways to integrate the community support officer role into a wider partnership team where we can clearly link into hotspots, join up the skills across departments to deploy PCSO's into the right areas."

#### **Graham Mountford (Peterborough City Council)**

"I will leave it up to their Line Managers to identify where the problem-areas are."

Ruth Mann (Neighbourhood Manager, Wherry Housing Association) "Less paperwork."

### Sarah Steggles, Danae Evans, Louise Walbank (A former PCSO) and Tulat Raja (ASB Team, Cambridge City Council)

"They're quite streamlined anyway and do a good job. PCSO's are flexible in their Beat areas; they tend to be focussed on problem-areas and are always accessible. TR: We don't know when they're working though. Neighbourhood Teams need to be easier to contact. We have to complain to too many people – is their 'Out of Office' ever used?"

Polly Wilderspin (Secretary to Cambridgeshire Neighbourhood Watch Coordinator) "Looking at Cambridgeshire as a whole and give South Cambridgeshire more Staff."

#### **Adele Dant (Housing Officer, CHS Group)**

"It would be nice to know who they are and what they do. Understanding their remit and vice versa. Information-sharing could be improved, as we're usually the last to know – sometimes even after the Media e.g. An alleged Paedophile was living in Stevenson Court, and the Residents felt let down by the Police as they weren't told."

#### **Councillors Virginia and Michael Buckner (Fenland District & Wisbech Town)**

"Target your Staff in the places where they're needed. PCSO's act as a preventative measure if used properly; but now people feel there isn't the same presence and can get away with more. A Zero-Tolerance approach to Policing (without being oppressive), and having a consistent approach in PCSO deployments. The Feedback could also be a lot better from PCSO's."

### Allison Sunley (Targeted & Preventative Services Manager, Peterborough City Council)

"I think you already are maximising the PCSO role."

# 16. In your opinion, what could Cambridgeshire Constabulary - as a whole - do to streamline its business functions?

#### **Kevin James (Hunts Fire & Rescue)**

"Look at the function of every Department and analyse their functions. The Fire Service in Cambridgeshire has saved a lot of money through being staff-focussed and pre-planning, and we would be willing to share how we have achieved this. I also think that shared services and assessment of the management structure would be beneficial"

#### **Gemma Wood (ASB Manager, Cross Keys Homes)**

"Look at ways to integrate the community support officer role into a wider partnership team where we can clearly link into hotspots, join up the skills across departments to deploy PCSO's into the right areas." (NB: answered 'As above')

#### **Graham Mountford (Peterborough City Council)**

"The use of technology to save you time and Resource availability."

#### Ruth Mann (Neighbourhood Manager, Wherry Housing Association)

"Deployments outside of the County should be reduced. MARAC cases should be outsourced to other Agencies. More Police Officers and put in a pay-rise."

### Sarah Steggles, Danae Evans, Louise Walbank (A former PCSO) and Tulat Raja (ASB Team, Cambridge City Council)

"The introduction of ECINS. Information-sharing needs to be streamlined."

Polly Wilderspin (Secretary to Cambridgeshire Neighbourhood Watch Coordinator) "Reduce the cost of Interpretation/Translation services; the cost is not warranted. Some Enquiry Office Staff need to be more professional."

#### Adele Dant (Housing Officer, CHS Group)

"Information sharing, and being able to have direct contact with Staff – including knowing their Duty Times."

Councillors Virginia and Michael Buckner (Fenland District & Wisbech Town)

MB: "Improve public confidence. Don't review the man-power, as it's your core business."

VB: "Perhaps introduce cleverer ways of processing Prisoners – e.g. don't send Officers to Kings Lynn PIC."

### Allison Sunley (Targeted & Preventative Services Manager, Peterborough City Council)

"Map what all Partner Agencies can offer to help someone getting into criminality. Joint-Training would be beneficial and learning to integrate external partners would be optimal. Perhaps introduce some Training Inputs for our team concerning control & restraint or Immigration – so your Partner Agencies are operationally astute too."

#### Annex E- Response to Home Office Consultation on PCSO Powers

#### **Home Office Review of PCSO powers**

Name: PS Nick Lidstone Police Force: Cambridgeshire

#### 1. Do you agree/disagree that PCSOs should be given the power to search for drugs?

Agree – but with locally determined provisos as to application

#### 2. What are your reasons?

Nationally (as Designated in Cambridgeshire) a power is already available for a PCSO to seize drugs and require name and address for possession of drugs,. However there is no specific power to search for drugs. As such any drugs seized will be the result of exercising some other power such as the power to search for alcohol.

As such a PCSO has no legal protection to search if they reasonably suspect drugs possession and must rely on a constable to attend with no power to detain the suspect in the mean time.

Drug use is a key concern of communities who often view it to be Anti-Social Behaviour and as such there is an expectation from them that PCSOs should be able to tackle it: it creates a credibility gap when they are unable to effectively do so.

Often this drug taking behaviour is low level and low risk (i.e youths smoking cannabis in public parks) where the risk to PCSOs in actively challenging this behaviour should be low.

However we do not believe that this power should be used extensively for more targeted operations where there is a greater degree of risk- i.e in the supply of class A drugs by organised dealers.

At present the lack of power to search for drugs is an issue in our more rural areas where a PCSO would have to wait for an extended period of time for a warranted officer to attend to carry out a drugs search on a suspect where the suspected use of drugs is low level.

#### 3. Would this free up police time? Why?

As above- there is sometimes extended travelling time for a constable to attend a rural area to provide the necessary support to a PCSO with a suspect. Allowing PCSOs the power to conduct the search would remove this necessity unless there was a positive result- which would then be a valuable use of police time.

4. Does this power push the boundaries of the role too far towards enforcement over engagement? Is there a higher risk of confrontation searching for drugs?

Local communities are concerned about drug use, they do not want their children exposed to it and naturally look to the police to do something about it. As such dealing with substance misuse be that alcohol or drugs is very much a neighbourhood issue relevant to PCSOs. Provided that PCSOs do not edge towards having a power of arrest then we do not feel that this pushes the boundary too far- the ASB impact of drug use is within their core role and the public would support such a move.

There would have to be good local leadership and judgement to ensure that this additional power did not lead to the abstraction of PCSOs to more pro-active targeted operations (as above) that would detract from their core role and place them at a higher risk. Ultimately we should trust the judgement and instincts of our PCSOs to risk assess and make the call on each situation on its merits.

Application of any such power however does carry risk. The same can be said for alcohol searches. Providing the officer is properly trained and a dynamic risk assessment made any risk should be minimised.

Of course the PCSO would have to deal with any substances found, but that is no different to dealing with substances found under existing powers described under Q2.

### 5. Do you agree/disagree that PCSOs should be given the power to issue a penalty notice for cycling without lights?

Strongly Agree. Not having this power is an anomaly when PCSOs can issue tickets to motorists for

#### 6. What are your reasons?

Not having this power is an anomaly when PCSOs can issue tickets to motorists for more serious offences and can ticket cyclists for other offences (e.g. cycling on a footpath). This would help PCSOs combat anti-social cycling as well as contributing to road safety and local schemes aimed at tackling both (for more info see: http://www.cambridgenews.co.uk/News/1000-fined-in-blitz-on-bike-lights-14012013.htm)

#### 7. Would this free up police time? Why?

Operations such as the above are resource intensive and PCSOs would offer a value-formoney contribution.

### 8. Do you agree/disagree that PCSOs should be given the power to issue penalty notice for parking in a restricted area (yellow lines outside schools)?

Generally, yes

#### 9. What are your reasons?

Providing such offences are available (i.e. not since decriminalised as is the case with most yellow line offences in urban communities) then it is appropriate for a PCSO to deal.

Parking issues and especially where they present a danger are important to local neighbour-hoods. They in turn look to the police to deal with them.

Not being able to do so (a) reduces the effectives of the officer and (b) could lead to reduced confidence in the police.

That is why, at least in Cambridgeshire, all our PCSOs are also Traffic Wardens so that the sensible application of appropriate TW powers make a difference locally.

10. Would this free up police time?

In Cambridgeshire we are able to already deploy PCSOs (who are also TWs) in these cases with no need to deploy a constable. This does free up police officer time and would do in other forces.

### 11. Do you agree/disagree that PCSOs should be given the right of entry to investigate licensable activities(Section 179 of the licensing act 2003)?

Yes – but with locally determined provisos

#### 12. What are your reasons?

A power already exists for PCSOs to enter licensed premises under section 180 of the Licensing Act 2003 for the purposes of investigating **relevant licensing offences**\*. They may not enter clubs and must enter all premises with a constable unless the premises are licensed for the sale of alcohol off the premises.

\*Relevant licensing offences' are defined under subparagraph 2(6) of Schedule 4 of the Police Reform Act 2002 as the following offences under the Licensing Act 2003:-

- a) s141 Sale of alcohol to a person who is drunk
- b) s142 Obtaining alcohol for a person who is drunk
- c) s146(1) Sale of alcohol to an under 18
- d) s149(1)(a), (3)(a) or (4)(a) Purchase of alcohol by or on behalf of children
- e) s150(1) Consumption of alcohol by children
- f) s150(2) Allowing consumption of alcohol by a person under 18
- g) s152(1) Sending a child to obtain alcohol

Section 179 on the other hand (not currently available to PCSOs) provides for police officers or other authorised persons to enter premises to ensure that **any licensable activities** are being carried on under the appropriate authorisations. It seems therefore that whilst Sec 180 only relates to offences, Sec 179 allows the officer to inspect a much wider range of issues such as compliance with the terms of the license, which may of course prevent offences in the first place.

Therefore this would prove useful to PCSOs as part of a managed approach to licensing safety. Generally that would be managed through a loc al licensing team to ensure a consistent and proportionate approach. Additional training would also be appropriate for officers.

#### 13. Would this free up police time?

Yes it would in the case of "on-license" premises as current legislation requires a PCSO to be accompanied by constable which clearly abstracts the constable from other duties.

14. Do you think any of the powers proposed above would detract PCSOs from engaging with the community – a task that is at the heart of their role?

No

15. What are your reasons?

Generally speaking licensed premises are the focus of some parts of the community, therefore police interaction and monitoring has a far wider impact than just the premises.

16. Do you think any of the powers proposed above would increase the risk of confrontation?

Not if properly managed. A lone PCSO entering on-licensed premises would need to be dynamically risk assessed and even then we feel visits should only be pre planned and not as a result for a call to service. In other words it would be inappropriate to despatch a lone PCSO to deal with live disorder.

ACPO CONSULTATION ON EXTENSION OF POLICE COMMUNITY SUPPORT OFFICERS (PCSO's) POWERS FOR ALCOHOL LICENSING

#### **Cambridgeshire response**

#### **PS Nick Lidstone**

#### Nick.Lidstone@cambs.pnn.police.uk

How many PCSOs in your force are designated a power of entry under Section 180 of the Licensing Act 2003?

#### All 195 of our PCSOs (establishment figure) have this power designated.

If known, how many times has the power been used?

#### There have not been any recent surveys.

What are your views on extending the power of entry for PCSOs for this purpose?

As you will know the Home Office have also sent out a survey on future PCSO powers. Part of that covers licensing. I have copied the relevant questions and our responses which answer your question as well.

#### (Extract from Home Office survey)

11. Do you agree/disagree that PCSOs should be given the right of entry to investigate licensable activities (Section 179 of the licensing act 2003)?

Yes – but with locally determined provisos

#### 12. What are your reasons?

A power already exists for PCSOs to enter licensed premises under section 180 of the Licensing Act 2003 for the purposes of investigating **relevant licensing offences**\*. They may not enter clubs and must enter all premises with a constable unless the premises are licensed for the sale of alcohol off the premises.

\*Relevant licensing offences' are defined under subparagraph 2(6) of Schedule 4 of the Police Reform Act 2002 as the following offences under the Licensing Act 2003:-

- a) s141 Sale of alcohol to a person who is drunk
- b) s142 Obtaining alcohol for a person who is drunk
- c) s146(1) Sale of alcohol to an under 18
- d) s149(1)(a), (3)(a) or (4)(a) Purchase of alcohol by or on behalf of children
- e) s150(1) Consumption of alcohol by children

- f) s150(2) Allowing consumption of alcohol by a person under 18
- g) s152(1) Sending a child to obtain alcohol

Section 179 on the other hand (not currently available to PCSOs) provides for police officers or other authorised persons to enter premises to ensure that **any licensable activities** are being carried on under the appropriate authorisations. It seems therefore that whilst Sec 180 only relates to offences, Sec 179 allows the officer to inspect a much wider range of issues such as compliance with the terms of the license, which may of course prevent offences in the first place.

Therefore this would prove useful to PCSOs as part of a managed approach to licensing safety. Generally that would be managed through a loc al licensing team to ensure a consistent and proportionate approach. Additional training would also be appropriate for officers.

### 13. Would this free up police time?

Yes it would in the case of "on-license" premises as current legislation requires a PCSO to be accompanied by constable which clearly abstracts the constable from other duties.

14. Do you think any of the powers proposed above would detract PCSOs from engaging with the community – a task that is at the heart of their role?

No

## 15. What are your reasons?

Generally speaking licensed premises are the focus of some parts of the community, therefore police interaction and monitoring has a far wider impact than just the premises.

16. Do you think any of the powers proposed above would increase the risk of confrontation?

Not if properly managed. A lone PCSO entering on-licensed premises would need to be dynamically risk assessed and even then we feel visits should only be pre planned and not as a result for a call to service. In other words it would be inappropriate to despatch a lone PCSO to deal with live disorder.

## **Annex F- Draft PCSO Deployment Guidelines**

# **PCSO DEPLOYMENT PROCEDURES**

# October 2013 V5

1.	Introduction - Aim of Procedures page 3		
2.	Revised Procedures – history and future review	page 3	
3.	PCSO Role		
4.	. Supervision		
5.	Overarching principles	page 3	
6.	Cambridgeshire PCSO powers	page 5	
7.	Detailed guidance	page 5	
	7.1.1 National Intelligence Model and Neighbourhood Policing 7.1.2 Crime Recording 7.1.3 Statements 7.1.4 "A" Grades 7.1.5 Silent 999s / Alarms / Insecure premises 7.1.6 Escorting prisoners 7.1.7 Non uniform 7.1.8 Single / double crewing 7.1.9 Missing from Home 7.1.10 Vehicle Registered Owner / Keeper (RO) enquiry 7.1.11 Transport duties (excluding prisoner transport) 7.1.12 Bogus officials / callers 7.1.13 Nuisance phone calls 7.1.14 Collection of forensic evidence 7.1.15 Road Traffic Collisions (RTC) 7.1.16 Bail checks 7.1.17 Illegal Immigrants 7.1.18 Need to distinguish application of duty as a PCSO v Traffic W 7.1.19 PCSOs have no general powers to seize property 7.1.20 PCSOs covering Enquiry Offices 7.1.21 PCSOs (not) issuing Harassment (warning) Notices 7.1.22 Racial / hate crime 7.1.23 Child Protection / CIN / Vulnerable Adults case conferences 7.1.25 Scene management (cordons and logs) 7.1.26 Domestic abuse incidents		
,	3. Remaining incidents	page 13	
!	9. Related documents	page 14	

## 10. Appendix 'A'

## 1 <u>INTRODUCTION - AIM OF PROCEDURES</u>

- 1.1 To provide operational police managers / supervisors with guidance on procedures for deploying Cambridgeshire PCSOs.
- 1.2 It should not be assumed that printed copies of this document are current. Please refer to the HQ CDD Team at HQ for advice or access the force Policy database.

#### 2 REVISED PROCEDURES – HISTORY AND FUTURE REVIEW

- 2.1 The first Guidelines were issued in September 2005; this document is the fourth revision of PCSO deployment following extensive research and strategic debate.
- 2.2 Documentary records tracking the methodology and reasoning behind these revised Procedures and arrival of force policy is available via the HQ SDD Team if required.

#### 3 PCSO ROLE

- 3.1 The fundamental role of the PCSO is to contribute to the policing of neighbourhoods and the safeguarding of vulnerable persons, primarily through highly visible patrol with the purpose of reassuring the public, increasing orderliness in public places and being accessible to communities and partner agencies working at local level<sup>1</sup>.
- 3.2 The deployment of PCSOs is not intended to replace police officers but rather enable a more effective and efficient use of all available resources appropriate to deliver a first class service. Predominantly PCSOs are expected to patrol on foot or cycle (cycle only by mutual agreement).
- 3.3 PCSOs are not police officers and do not have a positive duty to intervene. They also have the fundamental option to withdraw from an incident based on their own assessment of risks.
- 3.4 Full cognisance should be made of national ACPO PCSO Guidelines which detail generic circumstances where only sworn police officers should deployed. *Please see Appendix 'A'*.

#### 4 SUPERVISION

4.1 PCSOs will be under the immediate line-management of a Local Policing Sergeant. LPAs have operational responsibility for PCSOs.

### 5 OVERARCHING PRINCIPLES

- 5.1 Detailed guidance is now included about specific incidents or tasks which have caused confusion in the past. *Please see 7.1.*
- 5.2 You will also find an updated list providing deployment directions for all other available Command and Control incident types. *Please see 8.*

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> As defined by ACPO National PCSO Guidelines

<sup>5.3</sup> The review felt that it is not possible to anticipate and offer guidance for every eventuality faced by Cambridgeshire PCSOs. Therefore, as with the first guidelines, what follows are principles which should be applied in all cases:

<sup>5.3.1</sup> **Abstractions**: Ancillary tasks abstracting PCSOs from their local high visibility and accessible role (see 3.1) should be monitored and kept to a minimum. It may be appropriate in line with Force Policy to utilise PCSOs in short term office-based

duties if this assists with recuperation / restricted duties or, as an exception to cover station Enquiry Offices (see 7.1.20)

- 5.3.1.2 **Specialisms:** A small number of PCSOs may be selected to carry out specialist or thematic roles including Licensing, Safer Schools, Rural Crime, Business crime. The Decision to use a PCSO in a specialist capacity is at the discretion of the LPA Commander. While a specialist post may remove a PCSO from traditional high-visibility patrol, it must remain within the defined fundamental purpose of the role (see 3.1 above) Any PCSO acting in a specialist capacity must receive appropriate levels of training and a bespoke risk assessment if the role is considerable divergent from the basic role.
- Geographical stability: Local Policing requires stability of personnel. To that end all efforts must be taken to retain identifiable staff in geographic neighbourhoods. We must especially ensure externally supported posts e.g. those attracting local authority funding, are staffed with corresponding geographical deployment.
- 5.3.3 **Violence and use of force**: Cambridgeshire PCSOs are not trained, equipped or empowered to effectively deal with violence or serious public disorder and should not be deployed where there is a likelihood of either. Cambridgeshire PCSOs are instructed not to use physical force in the application of any of their powers including detention.
- 5.3.4 **Unforeseen incidents**: It is acknowledged that PCSOs will without being intentionally deployed, inevitably *come across* incidents which exceed their powers, training or equipment. In these circumstances more appropriate resources will be deployed, if need be urgently. If not possible, an FCR / local supervisor will be notified and a decision made regarding the continued presence of the PCSO at the incident.
- 5.3.5 **Hours of duty:** PCSOs will *normally* work a 37 hour week including weekends consisting of shifts between the hours of 0800 midnight, subject to local agreements providing they fit within the criteria appropriate to the shift allowance being paid. Overtime is at Divisional discretion<sup>2</sup>. When *necessary* PCSOs may be required to work additional hours or change shifts to meet operational requirements.
- 5.3.6 **Risk Assessment:** Full cognisance *must* be made of the current Force PCSO Risk Assessment.
- 5.3.7 **Supervisor discretion:** Following a *dynamic* risk assessment, supervisors may deploy PCSOs other than in accordance with these Procedures if *necessary* to save life, prevent serious injury or in the event of a major incident, or in the interests of the effective and timely delivery of service to local communities. However this will only be in exceptional circumstances where justification can be provided.
- 5.3.8 **Skills / over-deployment:** It is proper for PCSOs with additional skills, such as languages or unique insights in diverse communities, to be deployed specifically to corresponding incidents or events, sometimes away from their own beat. However supervisors must monitor frequency of deployment and ensure this does not adversely affect either that officer personally or performance on their own beat. It is also important to recognise the extra contribution that officer brings and to ensure their peers understand the need for any absences. **Note:** Supervisors should not assume an officer is fully skilled, able and willing to be specially deployed merely based on that officers ethnicity, sexuality, age, religion, disability or sex.

112

#### **CAMBRIDGESHIRE PCSO POWERS**

- 6.1 All powers Designated to Cambridgeshire PCSOs have been carefully selected to support improved performance and delivery of a first class service to local people. Specific instructions on the application of some powers are also given so as not to put the officer or the public at risk.
- The definitive list of powers may change from time to time. Therefore we have not attempted to reproduce it in these Procedures. Instead we refer readers to the PCSO Microsite, HQ SDD, Force Learning and Development or of course individual PCSOs themselves. "

#### 6.3 PCSO use of Power of Detention

Upon notification that a PCSO detention has occurred an incident will be raised and it will be graded as appropriate in order to deploy a police officer to the scene **within 30 minutes of the power being exercised**. A supervisor will be advised - this will be recorded on the CC3 log.

The PCSO will give precise details of the beginning of the detention time, location details, detained persons demeanour, offence and any further relevant details plus any changes in those circumstances. The dispatcher may need to reassess the grading as the incident progresses.

If a police officer has not attended within the 30 minutes of first use of the power, the detention will cease. Any re-grading will be subject to the discretion of the dispatcher.

#### 7. DETAILED GUIDANCE

7.1 Detailed guidance is now included about specific incidents or tasks which have caused confusion in the past (see 7.1.1 to 7.1.26). You will also find an updated list providing deployment directions for all other available Command and Control incident types (see 8)

#### 7.1.1 National Intelligence Model and Neighbourhood Policing

Deployment will be intelligence led, at the discretion of the LPAs e.g. daily tasking. All of which should adhere to the principles of the National Intelligence Model.

There is also an expectation that PCSOs will be deployed in response to Neighbourhood Policing Team priorities and Action Plans.

PCSOs will primarily be deployed by their own local supervisors, but should also be deployed by FCR in line with these Procedures. Where possible, Probationer PCSOs should be assisted in completion of PDP via appropriate incident deployment.

PCSOs will routinely make use of links to community / business groups and their local knowledge in order to self-deploy. PCSOs will always keep the FCR appraised of their status and location for officer safety reasons. In such cases an incident will be raised if one is not already in existence. PCSOs will keep their supervisors appraised of their activities if they are self-generated.

## 7.1.2 Crime Recording

At this time PCSOs are not PIP certified Level 1 investigators. They may however be deployed **as the initial response** to instigate Crime Reports for basic incidents as listed below

Your attention is drawn to the overarching principle of Supervisor discretion, where in limited circumstances PCSOs could instigate reports outside the list:

**Supervisor discretion:** Following a *dynamic* risk assessment, supervisors may deploy PCSOs other than in accordance with these Procedures if *necessary* to save life, prevent serious injury or in the event of a major incident, or in the interests of the effective and timely delivery of service to local communities. However this will only be in exceptional circumstances where justification can be provided.

In each case the onus is on the dispatcher / supervisor to Risk Assess the incident set against generic PCSO skills and training. Where there is doubt a trained investigator e.g. a police officer should be considered.

As a matter of routine PCSOs **CAN** be sent as the initial response and complete basic Crime Reports for:

- Theft
- Criminal damage
- Theft of and from motor vehicle
- Cycle crime

**EXCEPT** where any of the following "trigger factors" are revealed. In which case the dispatching supervisor should risk assess the incident and consider deploying a level 1 Investigator e.g. a police officer:

- Where the dispatching officer considers the incident requires the initial attendance of a Level 1 Investigator e.g. a police officer.
  - Attendance may place the PCSO at risk
  - There is a named offender / suspect on scene or close by\* (unless the offence is 5 Public Order or Common Assault)
  - Is part of a series of crimes
  - The victim or witness is under 17 yrs old (VIVW) Is
  - domestic in nature
  - Where the incident has racial / hate crime elements (see 7.1.22)
  - Enquiries are likely to breach ACPO Guidelines which highlight when a PCSO should not be used (see Appendix 'A')
- \* PCSOs who initiate enquiries should seek support from their operational colleagues where an offender is or is likely to be identified. This will ensure that the principles of maximising the *golden hour* response are maintained i.e. by ensuring that appropriate arrests are made early and evidence secured.

## Follow up support

PCSOs are invaluable in assisting investigations with follow up visits, support and local enquires. But this should be under the control / management / direction of the Investigating Officer or police supervisor.

#### Crime file

PCSOs should be granted access to *CrimeFile*, including allowing them to accept and update tasks.

#### 7.1.3 **Statements**

When PCSOs will take statements which are low level and predominantly on their own Sector.

PCSOs should take statements for incidents following the same category for recoding Crime Reports i.e.

- Theft (not burglaries or deceptions)
- Criminal damage
- Theft of and from motor vehicle
- Cycle crime

If they can't take a report of crime type "X" then nor should they be routinely asked to take a statement for that type of crime either.

Due to additional skills a PCSO is deployed to record statements from people in a language other than English, there is an expectation that that officer has received appropriate instruction / training in particular in relation to translation statements and PACE 1984.

□ **Discretion:** However, to make best use of PCSO availability, subject to dispatching / local supervisor's direction PCSOs may be deployed to take other statements when properly risk assessed.

#### 7.1.4 Immediate Grade Incidents

There may be some Immediate Grade incidents which when Risk Assessed may be suitable for a PCSO to monitor **but** only when a police officer **has already** been dispatched.

• It must be remembered PCSOs cannot "respond" they only have "basic drivers" authority, nor do they have the same powers, legal protection, equipment or training as police officers. For example PCSOs are not entitled to use blue lights or warning sirens when driving.

As such the routine position is for a Police Officer to be dispatched **first** and only then, subject to a dynamic Risk Assessment by the dispatching supervisor, could an available PCSO be sent to observe and report back pending the arrival of the police officer.

This then would be the default deployment model.

	Police Officer is dispatched t	0	☐ RESPOND
	PCSO who is locally available - subject to Risk		essment can
	☐ ATTEND (the area)	□ OBSERVE	□ REPORT BACK
	whilst awaiting, if still necessary, the police officer to		
	□ ARRIVE	□ ENGAGE	□ RESOLVE
□ <b>Discretion</b> : There will also be those scenarios when subject to dispatching / local supervisor subject in the dispatching in the possible of the possible			

## 7.1.5 Silent 999s / Alarms / Insecure premises

Without **entering**, risks remain unknown. Unknown risks should be treated as "high" until proved otherwise. Therefore:

A Police Officer is to be dispatched **first** and only then, subject to Dispatching supervisor dynamic Risk Assessment, could an available PCSO be sent to observe and report back, pending the arrival of the police officer. <u>This is the same deployment model as used for Immediate Graded incidents</u>

#### 7.1.6 **Escorting prisoners**

Existing DP transport policy allows support staff to drive while police officer escorts but

only in secure e.g. caged, vehicles.

It must be remembered PCSOs cannot "respond" they only have "basic drivers" authority, nor do they have the same powers, legal protection or training as police officers. For example PCSOs are not entitled to use blue lights or warning sirens when driving.

PCSOs will not escort prisoners. If risk assessed a PCSO *may* **drive** a secure vehicle BUT ONLY when there are already sufficient police officers to escort detainees and deal with eventualities.

## 7.1.7 Non uniform

PCSOs MUST be in uniform to use any of their designated powers: Sec 42(2) Police Reform Act 2002 states: "A power exercisable by any person in reliance on his designation by a chief officer of police under section 38 [PCSOs] shall be exercisable only by a person wearing uniform"

PCSOs will routinely work in full uniform.

□ **Discretion**: There may be scenarios when subject to line managers discretion e.g. for operational / developmental reasons which do not require actual use of powers, a PCSO may be asked to perform a particular task for a limited period in plain clothes. PCSOs should not merely wear a plain jacket over uniform and remove it when they need to use powers (the *Superman* effect!).

#### 7.1.8 Single / double crewing

PCSOs are expected to be single crewed, unless a supervisor has risk assessed and authorised differently (e.g. for a specific task). It is recognised that on occasion PCSOs will risk assess situations or deployment plans themselves and make a decision to double crew- either with another PCSO or a Police Constable/ Special Constable where prior authorisation by a Supervisor is not practicable. In these circumstances the rationale for double crewing should be made in the officer's PNB and a supervisor made aware at a later time.

#### 7.1.9 Missing from Home

Clearly the local knowledge possessed by a Neighbourhood PCSO could be invaluable to the enquiry, that knowledge should be sought at the earliest opportunity by the investigating officer.

MFH enquiries can become critical and by their very nature are often complex from the start. Consequently MFH incidents will only be allocated to police officer as the first response. The police officer will deal. A police officer, and <u>not</u> a PCSO, will also be deployed to visit "found" MFHs. In all cases it is entirely appropriate for a PCSO to assist the police officer.

#### 7.1.10 Vehicle Registered Owner / Keeper (RO) enquiry

Subject to Risk Assessment PCSOs may conduct RO enquiries. **EXCEPT** where the enquiry is part of serious investigation / incident i.e. priority (major) crime or fatal RTC.

#### 7.1.11 Transport duties (excluding prisoner transport)

The frequency of transport duties e.g. shuttling police vehicles between stations must be monitored so as not to abstract PCSOs away from high visibility foot patrol too much (see 5.3.1)

PCSOs will be allowed to engage in transport duties (not prisoner escort) but ideally within

their own Sector. PCSOs should be available and are expected to deal with incidents they come across, even if away from their own beat area whilst driving police vehicles.

#### 7.1.12 Bogus officials / callers

There is a difference between reports of a *peddler* selling goods door to door and someone who may be trying to gain entry e.g. *bogus official*. There is also a difference between someone on scene now and after they have left.

There is no reason that subject to Risk Assessment an available PCSO could not attend (the area), observe and report back, pending the arrival of police, as with the "A" grade model.

The potential for a pre curser to a distraction burglary is consequently high. As such unless evidence to the contrary is known, a police officer will be the first response rather than a PCSO.

#### 7.1.13 Nuisance phone calls

Currently subject to aggravating factors and age of suspect, this is an offence which PCSOs can deal with by use of PND tickets. Subject to a dynamic Risk Assessment PCSOs will be eligible to attend incidents of nuisance phone calls.

#### 7.1.14 Collection of forensic evidence

PCSOs will be allowed to collect forensic evidence if they have received appropriate training in "bagging and tagging" except where a specialist or investigating officer"s particular skills or equipment is required.

#### 7.1.15 Road Traffic Collisions (RTC)

It must be remembered PCSOs can not "respond" they only have "basic drivers" authority, nor do they have the same powers, legal protection or training as police officers. For example PCSOs are not entitled to use blue lights or warning sirens when driving, nor have they received "fast road" training.

PCSOs do not have the legal authority to demand driver or vehicle documents (other than production of licenses in very limited – parking offence – scenarios)

Police Officers should <u>always</u> be deployed as the first response to a RTC, however where a PCSO comes across a RTC they may, subject to dynamic risk assessment, stop at the scene in order to render immediate first aid and to warn others other motorists <u>pending urgent arrival of a police officer</u> who will then assume control and deal with any offences revealed. PCSOs may use blue lights on stationary vehicles to raise their visibility.

#### 7.1.16 Bail checks

PCSO do not have the legal authority to demand production of a person subject to bail (curfew) conditions.

Without **entering**, risks remain unknown. Unknown risks should be treated as "high" until proved otherwise. Therefore

- PCSO will not be used to check the attendance (or otherwise) of a suspect at a bail address.
  - (2) However with appropriate Risk Assessment a PCSO may be deployed to assess suitability of Bail address for Detained Persons currently in custody.

#### 7.1.17 Illegal Immigrants

Without **engaging** risks remain unknown. Unknown risks should be treated as "high" until proved otherwise. Therefore:

A Police Officer is to be dispatched **first** and only then, subject to Dispatching supervisor dynamic Risk Assessment, could an available PCSO be sent to observe and report back, pending the arrival of the police officer. This then would be the same deployment model as used for Immediate Grade incidents.

#### 7.1.18 Need to distinguish application of duty as a PCSO v Traffic Warden

As Cambridgeshire PCSOs are both Community Support Officers (under the Police Reform Act 2002) <u>and Traffic Wardens</u> (under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984) it is vital the officer is aware which power (and therefore which status) they are exercising at the time of any obstruction or assault as different offences would have to be considered for either a PCSO or a TW.

#### 7.1.19 PCSOs have no general powers to seize property

All PCSOs and their line managers are reminded of the limitations of PCSO search and seizure powers and in cases where property seizure is required outside of those powers a constable should attend. Where appropriate, necessary, and where sufficient training has been received, PCSOs may be specifically named as "accompanying persons" on search warrant applications – Section 16(2) PACE Act.

## 7.1.21 PCSOs coverina Enquiry Offices

Police station Enquiry Offices will be opened at published times and where no other support staff are available, as an exception to the rule, PCSOs will cover, providing the officer has received adequate training.

#### 7.1.21 PCSOs (not) issuing Harassment (warning) Notices

A constable is likely to be experienced in identifying other criminal offences revealed and is trained and equipped to deal with a suspect who may react violently when issued with a Harassment Notice; PCSOs may not be for the exact opposite reasons. PCSOs will however continue to provide invaluable information to investigating officers. Therefore, PCSOs will not issue Harassment (warning) Notices to suspects.

## 7.1.22 Racial / hate crime

PCSOs will not be deployed as the reporting officer to deal with racial / hate crime or incidents. However where such elements are subsequently revealed whilst a PCSO is reporting an incident the officer will immediately seek supervisor direction. That supervisor may either task a constable to attend and take over or, subject to risk assessment, direct the PCSO to complete initial reporting pending full allocation to a constable.

#### 7.1.23 Child Protection / CIN / Vulnerable Adults case conferences

Non-trained staff, which includes PCSOs, must only attend Child Protection Case Conferences, when accompanying a Child Abuse Investigation Unit (CAIU) member of staff, to provide direct evidence. The purpose of the conference is to allow experienced Child Protection professionals to discuss a child's circumstances and assess whether collectively there is a need for additional resources. The force's attendance is firstly for CAIU staff, who have an understanding of the child and the safeguarding procedures, and secondly, for any other staff who can provide direct evidence which will assist the decision

making process.

#### 7.1.24 **Dealing with speeding motorists**

Trained PCSOs may use speed detection devices (a) where safe to do so, (b) where the vehicle is not stopped, and (c) where prosecution or even a warning is not intended. Use of speed equipment is restricted to community speed watch operations where registration numbers are taken and letters sent to owner.

PCSOs must NOT issue FPNs for excess speed; they must NOT operate speed detection devices on behalf of a constable who then issues the FPN; they must NOT assist a constable by writing the FPN out even if the constable operates the speed detection equipment and signs the ticket.

#### 7.1.25 Scene management (cordons and logs)

PCSOs on receipt of appropriate training and subject to supervisory risk assessment may be deployed to manage incident scene cordons and logs. Police Supervisors and SIOs must understand however that unlike constables PCSOs have only limited powers to deal with confrontations at crime scenes

#### 7.1.26 **Domestic Abuse incidents**

PCSOs are not equipped nor do they receive the same level of training as a police officer in regard to attendance at potentially violent and complex domestic abuse incidents within a household, as distinct from non violent neighbourhood disputes. PCSOs may however be well placed to offer invaluable support to victims after the event and in particular leading up to a prosecution.

In order to make the best use of our front line resources the **default position** will be that PCSOs will not be deployed to domestic abuse incidents as the first response. PCSOs may however, at the request of the Domestic Violence Officers (DVO) subsequently visit and support the victim.

As an exception to the rule, supervising officers, having risk assessed the incident, may send a PCSO as the initial resource <u>pending urgent arrival</u> of a police officer. They must specifically assess the risk of violence and the potential need for an arrest to be made. The decision made must recognize the limitations of PCSOs

(8. see Remaining incidents on next page)

## 8.

REMAINING INCIDENTS

This is a list all the possible remaining incident types. In each case guidance is given on whether a Cambridgeshire PCSO should be deployed or not- AS THE INITIAL REPONSE

	OTHER INCIDENTS			
	□ <u>Default position</u> :		□ <u>Default position</u> :	
	□ PCSO <u>CAN</u>		□ PCSO <u>CAN NOT</u>	
	be deployed as initial response to:		be deployed as initial response to:	
Н	INCIDENT		INCIDENT	
	ABANDONED VEHICLE		ABSCONDER	
	ABNORMAL LOAD – Local - only with RA		BOMB (i.e. threat / detonated)	
	ANIMALS		BURGLARY IN PROGRESS	
	BEGGING		CORDLESS	
	BROKEN DOWN VEHICLES – Only with RA		CUSTODY OFFICE WORK	
	COLLAPSED / ILL		DOMESTIC WORK	
	COLLECTION OF CCTV TAPES		SEARCH / ARREST WARRANT	
	CONCERN		EXPLOSION	
	DISORDER - Only with RA & if low level		FIREARMS INCIDENT	
	DRUGS – Unconcealed & Only with RA		FOOTBALL MATCHES	
	FILE PREPARATION		FRONT OFFICE (except short term cover)	
	FLOOD		INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT	
	FOUND STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLE		KIDNAP	
	GAS/ ELECTRICITY		NUCLEAR/RADIOACTIVE INCIDENT	
	HOUSE TO HOUSE		PASS (AGONY) DEATH MESSAGE	
	MOBILE POLICE STATIONS		POACHING	
	NOISE COMPLAINT		PROTEST (where violence is likely)	
	NUISANCE VEHICLE		PURSUIT	
	PARKING ISSUES		RAIL INCIDENT (depends on scale)	
	PASS MESSAGE (excluding 'agony' – death)		ROUTINE OFFICE BOUND DUTIES	
H	POLICE SURGERIES		SUBSTANCE MISUSE	
H	PROPERTY		SUDDEN DEATH	
	PROSTITUTION - Only with RA		SUSPECT DEVICE	
	PROTEST (where violence is not likely)		VEHICLE IN WATER	
	ROAD RELATED Can assist police if safe		VIOLENCE	
	ROWDY/ NUISANCE		VIOLENCE	
		Rer	nember:	
	SCENE GUARDS – Cordon and Log			
	SCHOOL VISITS		(1) In each case the <b>overarching principles</b> for PCSO deployment must	
	SPECIAL OPERATION – community event		be considered (part 5).	
	SUSPICIOUS PERSON – Only with RA		,	
	SUSPICIOUS VEHICLE – Only with RA		(2) If the incident is not here it will probably	
	VIEWING OF CCTV TAPES – FIXED		be one of those specifically covered earlier in the procedures (part 7).	
	VIEWING OF CCTV TAPES – MOBILE		, ,	
	VISIT ON-LICENCE PREMISES	(RA	A: Additional and specific Dynamic Risk	
	VISITING VICTIMS OF CRIME		Assessment)	
	WATER - <i>Only with RA</i>			
	YOUTH CLUBS – assisting / running them			

## 9. RELATED DOCUMENTS:

Author	Title	Location	Public
ACPO	ACPO PCSO Guidelines	ACPO web site	u/k
Cambs Constabulary	PCSO Risk Assessment – V5 (Aug 08)	Risk Assessment log	No
Home Office	National Evaluation of PCSOs – 01/06	Home Office web site	Yes
ACPO	Practice Advice on Professionalising the Business of Neighbourhood Policing – 04/06	ACPO intranet	u/k
Home Office	National Community Safety Plan 2006 – 2009	Home Office web site	Yes
NPIA	National Review of PCSOs – Aug 2009	NPIA web site	Yes
Cambs Constabulary	QAT Tier 3 PCSO/SC Deployment – monitoring doc July 2009	Cambs Constabulary FHQ	No
Cambs Constabulary	Anti-social Behaviour Strategy	Cambs Constabulary FHQ	u/k
Cambs Constabulary	Force Policy on Dealing with Hate Crimes - procedures	Cambs Constabulary FHQ	u/k
Cambs Constabulary	Force Policy on Dealing with Hate Crimes – Background and Guidance	Cambs Constabulary FHQ	u/k
Cambs Constabulary	Diversity – racist and Homophobic Incidents Policy	Cambs Constabulary FHQ	u/k
Cambs Constabulary	Community Engagement Strategy	Cambs Constabulary FHQ	u/k
Cambs Constabulary	Double Crewing Policy	Cambs Constabulary FHQ	u/k
Cambs Constabulary	Force Control Room Policy	Cambs Constabulary FHQ	u/k
Cambs Constabulary	Various Standard Operating Procedures	Cambs Constabulary FHQ	u/k
Cambs Constabulary	Local Policing Plan 2009-11	Cambs Constabulary FHQ	Yes

#### Addendum- February 2014.

In the time period between the internal publication of the first draft of this review and the subsequent final version, considerable progress was made external to the review process on the development of the constabulary budget for 2014-2015. As part of this process the budget for PCSOs was set to allow for an establishment in 2014-15 of 150 officers.

As eluded to in the introduction to this review- the methodology was always set to allow the force flexibility to set budgets and then to use the findings of this review to maximise the available resource- both in terms of their deployment and their distribution.

Leaving aside for the moment the 'Radical Hotspots' model upon which there is an emerging consensus would be *too* radical a departure to become the primary deployment model in the short-medium term, the set establishment of 150 officers allows for the formula set out in the 'refined traditional model' to be employed.

However, as alluded to in the methodology, certain aspects of the formula are arbitrary. Acting on early feedback from the draft versions of the report it was suggested that too little consideration had been given to the population density of certain deprived wards (1.5 officers for population dense wards, compared to either 1, or 0.5 in the lease dense.) Further study showed that the disparate number of wards contained within the six LPAs disadvantaged those LPAs with a population dense but lower number of urban wards. Therefore the formula was refined to allow for a weighting of 2 officers for the most dense wards, with other wards remaining either 1 or 0.5. The overall distribution of resource based on 'need' vs overall population remains set at a 50/50 split.

Based on this re-configuration of the formula, the distribution of PCSOs across the six LPAs on a budget of 4.8 million is as follows:

Police Area	New Establishment
Peterborough	48
Cambridge	32
Huntingdonshire	30
South Cambs	14
East Cambs	9
Fens	18

Addendum Table 1: Demand Based (formula based) PCSO distribution.

This formulation still allows for a population based distribution but weighs heavily in favour of high populations in wards of high deprivation. For this reason both Cambridge, Huntingdon and Peterborough see increases in establishment, whereas South Cambs sees a reduction due to overall low levels of deprivation and Fenland sees a small reduction due to deprived wards with a low population density. East Cambs remains broadly stable in all models at 10( +/-1)

However, as stated in the main report, this formulation has an arbitrary dimension: other distributions are viable and it will never be possible to create an entirely objectively justifiable distribution. Therefore, for illustrative purposes, a pro-rata reduction across the areas based on the previous establishment figures (as defined in the 2011 Operation ReDesign 'brickman' configuration) is as follows:

Police Area	New Establishment
Peterborough	50
Cambridge	25
Huntingdonshire	27
South Cambs	18
East Cambs	10
Fens	20

Addendum Table 2: Pro-rata PCSO redistribution.

As can be seen, there are some discrepancies between the two distributions and in some case these are considerable. Given that fact, it appears necessary to provide a compromise configuration that adopts a 'floors and ceilings' approach that allows for an evidence based redistribution (table 1) but mitigates against large scale changes that would be difficult to absorb in the short term (table 2). With the floor/ceiling set at not more than 10% change (based on the pro-rata distribution), the proposed distribution would be as follows:

Police Area	New Establishment
Peterborough	49
Cambridge	28
Huntingdonshire	30
South Cambs	16
East Cambs	9
Fens	18

Addendum Table 3: Floor/Ceiling moderated PCSO redistribution.

Recommendation: It is the recommendation of the PCSO review that the distribution of PCSOs for the six LPAs is based on the configuration of Addendum Table 3.